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This thesis presents how the ‘will of the people’ is legitimized in the practical 
application of external self-determination. Since international law recognizes people 
as political communities, if they are sufficiently knowledgeable and aware of their 
rights, their involvement can legitimize the actions of their governmental authority. In 
order for the people’s deliberations- or self-governance- to be considered legitimate, 
the expression of their will in territorial alteration decision-making processes must be 
continuous. Moreover it is necessary to have responsible institutional and legal 
frameworks to guarantee that the people’s will is both considered and put into action.  
 
Using republican liberal theory, this study will explore the importance of ordinary 
citizens in determining their territorial status. The theory foregrounds the right to 
participate in determining their own destiny, and suggests a number of practical ways 
in which democratic legitimacy can be achieved. In order that the people’s will be 
considered legitimate, republican liberalism promotes ongoing interactions between 
ordinary citizens, democratic mechanisms, institutions and legal instruments. In order 
to ensure that any self-determination process conforms to republican liberal theory’s 
requirements for legitimacy, the process must empower people both individually and 
collectively to participate. It must also ensure that all citizens are considered equal 
and have political equality, regardless of their ethnic, racial, religious or linguistic 
backgrounds. In addition, republican liberal theory stresses the power of the people to 
check and scrutinize governmental authorities, and addresses the importance of law 
(constitution or statutes) in guaranteeing that the will of the people is central to any 
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1. General background 
It is generally accepted that holding a referendum allows a form of direct, public 
participation in a decision-making process. 1  The nature of direct participation 
presupposes ‘the vision of citizen lawmakers’; the people using their values to inform 
the creation of laws from the outset.2 A referendum is a mechanism which allows the 
people to choose, and is designed to illustrate the collective will of the people. During 
a referendum, ordinary citizens have the opportunity to express their political attitudes 
on a ballot paper on a proposed topic. Holding a sovereignty referendum3 means that 
the people’s approval has a legal effect on the change of a territory. 4 Since consent of 
the people is accepted to be the supreme power,5 their expressed will can give 
legitimacy to a boundary alteration. In addition, where the constitution of a state 
limits the power of the people in expressing their will over such boundary alteration, 
the people’s will can also legitimize a constitutional change.6 Ideally, the constitution 
should reflect the voice of the people, ensuring that there are legal and institutional 
structures in place to guarantee that all ethnic people within a pluralistic society have 
                                                      
1  Laurence Morel, ‘Referendum’ in Michel Rosenfeld and Andras Sajo (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative   
Constitutional Law (OUP 2012) 501; Lawrence Leduc, The Politics of Direct Democracy: Referendums in Global Perspective 
(2nd edn, Broadview Press 2003) 37 
2 Sherman Clark, ‘The character of Direct Democracy’ (2004) 13 Journal of Contemporary legal issues 341, 347-348 
3 In this thesis, the term sovereignty referendum will use interchangeably with independence referendum. See, e.g, Leduc (n 1) 
33; David Butler and Austin Ranney, at ‘Practice’ in David Butler and Austin Ranney, Referendums around the world: The 
growing use of direct democracy (AEI Press 1994) 2-3; Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice 
of Republican Deliberation (OUP 2012) 1  
4 Butler and Ranney (n 3) 2  
5  Fabienne Peter, ‘Political Legitimacy’ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter edn, 2014) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/legitimacy/>revised 13 May 2016, last accessed 1 June 2016; Patrick Riley, 
Will and Political Legitimacy: A Critical Exposition of Social Contract Theory in Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel 
(Harvard University Press 1982) 8-9 
6Butler and Ranney (n 3) 2 and Leduc (n 1) 30 
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the opportunity to express their will. 7 The people’s will therefore has significant legal 
power in the process of territorial alteration. 
Post-1990, the use of independence referendums8 was revived to settle disputes over 
external self-determination practices, for example, in the former Yugoslavia 1991, 
Quebec 1997, and Scotland 2014. As Tierney states “holding referendums has 
become part of state-framing processes designed to express the collective will of the 
people”.9 In this sense, the people’s autonomy is necessary to balance state power, 
and when the people are given such status, this legitimizes the actions of the 
governmental authorities of the state.10 The practical application of the external right 
to self-determination relies on this interaction between the people and the state; 
between the people’s will as a supreme power, and the ability of domestic institutions 
to reflect and carry out their will.11 The relationship between them relies on the equal 
participation of all affected groups of people in the decision-making process,12 
necessitating that political institutions take into consideration the will of all the people 
in order for the state to gain international legitimacy. 
However, there are practical difficulties in holding an independence referendum 
which can undermine the stability of the ‘free and genuine expression of the will of 
the people’. Firstly, even if the referendum gains a majority vote, it may not have any 
                                                      
7 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its critics (Yale University Press 1989) 25; Simone Chambers, ‘Democracy, Popular 
Sovereignty, and Constitutional Legitimacy’ (2004) 11(2) Constellations153 
8 The use of sovereignty referendums may be examined in five periods. The first period began with the French Revolution. The 
second period started with the process of the unification of Italy in nineteenth century. The third was inspired by the Wilsonian 
principle of self-determination, referendums were provided by the Paris Peace Treaty for ending war between Germany and 
Austria. The fourth period comprised the decolonization process after the Second World War. The fifth period started with the 
collapse of the USSR and the former Yugoslavia. See, e.g., Ilker Gokhan Sen, Sovereignty Referendums in International and 
Constitutional Law (Springer 2015) 18-20; J.A. Laponce, ‘National Self-determination and Referendums: The Case for 
Territorial Revisionism (2001) 7(2) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 33, 38-40 
9 Tierney (n 3) 10 
10  Thomas M. Franck, ‘The emerging right to democratic governance’ (1992) 86 (1) AJIL 46,50; Thomas M. Franck, 
‘Legitimacy and the democratic entitlement’ in Gregory H. Fox and Brad R. Roth (eds), Democratic governance and 
international law (CUP 2001) 26   
11 James Summers, ‘The rhetoric and practice of self-determination’ (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 325,327 
12 Frederick G. Whelan, ‘Prologue: Democratic theory and the boundary problem’ in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman 
(eds), Liberal Democracy (New York 1983) 18-19  
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legal consequences unless the executive authority approves the legal validity of the 
outcome.13 On the one hand, the executive may decide not to approve the outcome. If 
the executive opposes the public’s demands, holding a referendum will be 
meaningless and have no legal consequence. On the other hand, the elites or 
governmental authorities can use the referendum simply to prove their democratic 
status without making any changes. Thus the outcome of any referendum is not 
necessarily a legitimate one.14 Secondly, there is the problem with identifying those 
eligible to take part. If certain groups of people are included in a voter’s list, this 
directly affects the outcome of the referendum.15 In addition, holding a referendum is 
considered to be ‘a zero-sum game’ or ‘winner takes all’, for example, in Western 
Sahara, the inclusion of one particular group of people could have determined the 
final outcome of a referendum.16 Thus, it is not fair to some ethic groups of people 
who are excluded from the list. Thirdly, holding an independence referendum cannot 
be described as either a dynamic or continuous process. If the process is dynamic then 
it is changeable and flexible. If it is continuous it allows ongoing public participation 
in decision-making processes and includes ‘communicative actions’ between citizens 
and governmental authorities. In this sense, citizens are able to check, revise, or 
contest their political agents’ actions in state institutions. 17  The nature of a 
referendum, however, is a singular action. Post-referendum, there is no clear, ongoing 
framework to ensure that the people’s interests will be upheld. In other words there is 
no designated state institution to carry out the will of the people after they have made 
their decision. In addition, because a referendum is a one-shot-deal, if there is a 
                                                      
13 Tierney (n 3) 23-27 
14 SP Bill Report on the Scottish Independence Referendum Bill Session 4 (2013) 7 
15 Tierney (n 3) 75-84 
16 Anna Theofilopoulou ‘The United Nations and Western Sahara: A Never-ending Affair’ (2006) 116 United Nations Institute of 
Peace Special Report 2 
17 Some republican liberal theorists support the significance of the communicative actions between citizens and governmental 
authorities. See Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (OUP1997) 190-194; Richard Bellamy, 
‘Republicanism, Democracy, and Constitutionalism’ in Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (eds), Republicanism and Political 
Theory (Blackwell 2008) 161-163; John W. Maynor, Republicanism in the modern world (Polity 2003) 155-158 
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constitutional restriction of the people’s power, there is no recourse for the people to 
ensure that their will is taken into consideration. These limitations present continual 
difficulties with degree of legitimacy that the people’s will can give to the outcome of 
a referendum.  
The mere establishment of a process-based mechanism -such as a referendum- is not 
sufficient to assess the free and fair will of the people. In this study, two alternative 
methods are provided to measure the free and fair will of the people in determining 
their territorial status: representative processes and public consultations. Republican 
liberal theorists consider these two mechanisms to be more dynamic and ongoing than 
referendums on the basis that they fundamentally require institutional and legal 
frameworks to carry out the will of the people.18 As a result, continuous channels 
exist which allow the people to engage with the governmental authorities.  
The first method of operation is the representative process. A representative process, 
including holding an election, is carried out to select the people’s representatives who 
are expected to promote the local populations’ interests.19 The use of representative 
processes as a mechanism for external self-determination allows opportunities for 
checking and balancing between legislative, executive, and judiciary powers. 20  
Obviously, there is a channel for public involvement in contesting or challenging the 
central government’s policies through their representative bodies. The mutual checks 
and balances between competing groups is an important way to protect the interests of 
various groups of people.21 In other words, the people are able to ‘influence and 
                                                      
18 Philip Pettit, (n 17) 146-147 
19 Bernard Manin, The principle of representative government (CUP 1997) 170-172; Paul Hirst, Representative democracy and 
its limits (Polity1990) 23-24 
20 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge 2007) 
197-198  
21 Ibid 197-198 
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direct’ their representative through state institutions.22 After the people have voted, 
they inform the content and meaning of their own decision-making process. If the 
people are dissatisfied with their representatives’ actions, they have the right to 
remain politically engaged and the right to contest any consequential action through 
the state institutions. 
In terms of an institutional framework, republican liberalism proposes two objectives 
to ensure all people can be involved in the representative process: the composition 
should include representatives from all ethnic backgrounds and administrative power 
should be allocated to a federal or local government.23 The former guarantees equal 
participation, ensuring that all public interests are heard, for example, the Federal 
Assembly of Czechoslovakia which included both Czechs and Slovaks in equal 
number. 24  The latter is an alternative way to raise awareness amongst local 
populations of their right to self-govern, for example, the Catalan Parliament which 
played a crucial role in balancing the power of the state government and requesting a 
greater degree of autonomy.25 If these two objectives are reached, the representative 
process is more interactive and dynamic, and ensures broader political participation.  
In terms of a legislative framework, it is crucial that the law guarantees the rights of 
the people, in particular the right to engage in free and fair elections. It provides a 
legal requirement for institutions involved in the process that there is a proportional 
number of representatives from all ethnic backgrounds within the territory. Moreover 
the law can provide guidance regarding the degree of authority that federal 
                                                      
22 Pettit (n 17) 187 
23 Richard Bellamy (n 17) 171  
24	Katarina Mathernova, ‘Czecho? Slovakia Constitutional Disappointments’ (1992) 7(3) American University Journal of 
International Law and Policy 471, 480 
25 Kathryn Crameri, ‘Political power and civil counterpower: the complex dynamics of the Catalan independence movement 
(2015) 21(1) Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 104,112 
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governments should have, in particular administrative power. Republican liberalism 
mandates that the creation of law is a way to guarantee public participation in any 
decision-making process through the representative system.26  
 
The second method of operation is a public consultation. The main aim is to ensure 
that all ethnic minorities are involved in the decision-making process. A public 
consultation aims to create political equality among populations in determining their 
future status. It is a way of consulting the local population through a ‘dialogue’ 
system. During a territorial alteration, a public consultation consists of two stages. 
Firstly, ‘informed and motivated’ citizens are consulted to express their will 
individually and collectively. The establishment of communicative action is the 
central part of the consultative process in order to discuss and share information 
among populations.27 Ordinary citizens have opportunities to share their attitudes 
whether they agree or disagree with the territorial change. Then, a combination of 
elected and nominated representatives convey these public opinions to a state 
institution. These two stages of action illustrate the ongoing processes which take the 
people’s will into consideration. If all ethnic people participate and freely express 
their opinion on their territorial status, this will increase the degree of legitimacy of 
the governmental authority in implementing a policy or law.  
Republican liberal theory addresses the importance of these institutional and legal 
frameworks as integral to the practical application of any external self-determination 
process, because their presence legitimizes the expressed the will of the people. As a 
theoretical framework for assessing the legitimacy of public opinion, republican 
                                                      
26 Philip Pettit, On the people’s terms: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy (Cambridge 2012) 225-229  
27 On the explanation of ‘dialogue system’ and ‘communicative action’ see James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, 
Complexity, and Democracy (MIT Press 1996) 28-37; John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberal, Critics, 
Contestations (OUP 2002) 20-27; Seyla Benhabib, ‘Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy’ in Seyla Benhabib 
(ed), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton University Press 1996) 71-74    
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liberalism crucially emphasizes democratic legitimacy, involving both political 
equality 28 and human rights protection. Ideally, any democratic process must 
encourage the people’s participation (particularly minorities) in decision-making and 
must create political equality among populations. Human rights protection has been 
systemized to ensure that the people’s fundamental freedoms are guaranteed in 
political participation. If these two elements function properly, then the outcome of 
the decision-making process is legitimized in the eyes of the international community. 
Republican liberalism advocates that all people must be involved in decision-making, 
and that their fundamental freedoms must be in place,29 in order that a territorial 
alteration process is considered legitimate.  
Applying republican liberal theory to external self-determination processes provides a 
greater degree of legitimacy to the outcome of the process because the theory 
advocates for greater democracy (including broader participation) and for human 
rights. The application of republican liberal theory is in accordance with the 
democratic principle; the use of procedural mechanisms in public decision-making 
provides for political equality among different groups of people within a society.30 
They can play their role as constituent powers with no fear of interference or coercion 
in the decision-making process. In terms of human rights, the theory proposes that all 
people, both individually and collectively, should have the right to say whether they 
agree or disagree with territorial change. According to republican liberal theorists,31 
there should therefore be three, integral parts of the collective decision-making 
process: the people’s freedom to express their will without any domination from the 
                                                      
28 Cass R. Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Republican Revival’ (1988) 97(8) The Yale Law Journal 1539, 1552-1553 
29 Philip Pettit, ‘Republicanism, Democracy, and Constitutionalism’ in Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (eds) (n 17) 107-108 
30 Philip Pettit (n 17) 31-32; Cass R. Sunstein (n 28) 1539, 1552-1553 
31 Philip Pettit (n17); Philip Pettit (n 26); John Mayor, Republicanism in the modern world (n 17); Richard Bellamy (n 17); 
Cecile Laborde and John Maynor (eds), Republicanism and Political Theory (n 17); Cass R. Sunstein, (n 28) 1539-1590 
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authorities, the presence of functional institutions to put public opinions into action, 
and the recognition of the people’s authority within a legal framework.32 
Firstly, the people’s right to decide should be free from any governmental coercive 
measures, and without pressure or intervention from the state or any institution. 
Republican liberal theory states that all people should be considered equal, regardless 
of their ethnic background. 33 Political equality must exist during the practical 
application of self-determination. In order for the outcome be considered legitimate, 
the free and genuine will of the people must be expressed both individually and 
collectively. Individually, republican liberal theory advances that each human being 
should have the freedom to choose their way of life. Collectively, the theory mandates 
the importance of communities sharing their opinions during decisions affecting their 
future. 34 
According to the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No.25,35 during any 
decision-making process, certain substantive rights of individuals should be promoted 
and protected: freedom of expression, freedom of movement and freedom of peaceful 
assembly.36 These three are categorized as fundamental civil and political rights 
which create a relationship between government and people. Organized groups or 
civil society can gather the collective will of the people about political affairs. If the 
                                                      
32 See more details on Philip Pettit, On the people’s terms (n 26) 5-8 
33 Philip Pettit (n 17) 66-68 
34 Michael Freeman, ‘National Self-Determination, Peace and Human Rights’ (1998) 10(2) Peace Review 157; Philip Pettit (n 
17) 210-211 
35 The Human Rights Committee is a permanent human rights body to implement the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. See Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Clarendon Press 1991) 44-55 
36	These three substantive rights are expressed in the work of the Human Rights Committee. See Human Rights Committee, 
General Comment No. 25 (57) (1996) para8,12 
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collective decision-making process does not reflect individual participation, this will 
decrease the level of legitimacy of the overall process.37  
In the context of the external self-determination process, the application of republican 
liberalism can contribute to the evolving interpretation of the ‘peoples’ within 
international law. ‘People’ as units of self-determination, within international law, are 
recognized based on political and territorial units.38 According to the UNGA res 1514 
(1960), 1541 (1960), and 2625 (1970), only people living in dependent territories or 
certain administrative units (i.e. colonial, trust, non-self-governing territories) were 
granted the right to be consulted about the alteration of their own territory. 39 In 
addition, according to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 
and the Human Rights Committee in General Comment No.12 (1984), the application 
of the right to self-determination is linked with a sovereign state. Only people of a 
state were entitled to exercise their right to self-determination.40 When applying 
republican liberalism, the whole population residing within the territory is considered 
equal.41 No specific groups of people (i.e. ethnic classification) prevail over any other 
group of people within the same territory. 
Secondly, there must be institutional frameworks in place which uphold the will of the 
people. Internally, the interplay between the legislative, executive, and judicial 
systems is a domestic method of balancing power in order to take the will of the 
people into consideration. They can check and balance each other’s power to prevent 
                                                      
37 Christoph Mollers, The Three Branches: A Comparative Model of Separation of Powers (Oxford 2015) 63 
38 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, UNGA Res 1514 (XV) (14 Dec 1960) 
(adopted by 89 votes to none; 9 abstentions);Principles which should guide Members in determining whether or not an obligation 
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39 UNGA Res 1514 (n 38) para5; UNGA 1541 (XV) Principle VI; UNGA Res 2625 (XXV) (n 38) Principle 5 para6  
40 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171 (ICCPR) Art.1; Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 12 Article 1 (The right to self-determination of 
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each other overruling the will of the people.42 For example, if the executive or the 
legislative order attempts to overrule the will of the people, the judicial review of 
legislation can balance their power by forming a legal reasoning beyond the political 
process in order to protect the will of the people.43Apart from this, during the 
decision-making process, political parties, the media and civil societies can help to 
create ‘informed and motivated’ citizens who are then capable of taking part.44  
Meanwhile, international institutions work alongside the state to ensure that public 
involvement in political affairs becomes an integral component of decisions about 
governance. Internationally, the United Nations (UN) framework is an alternative to a 
state framework in recognizing the will of the people in territorial alteration 
processes. Because international institutions represent the association of member 
states, their resolutions are accepted as practical guidelines to member states. The 
expressed will of the people should be an integral part of constructing new institutions 
or of modifying existing ones in order to foster self-government.45  
Besides this, regional organizations, for example, the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s human rights system, the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) under the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights46 also provide evidence to support the significance of the will of the 
people as an integral part of legitimizing territorial alteration processes. For example, 
the Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire in 1994,47 the African Commission held that 
the right to self-determination might be exercised in a variety of ways, including 
                                                      
42 Richard Bellamy (n 20) 195-199 
43 Christoph Mollers (n 37) 92 
44 Philip Pettit (n 17) 58-61; John W. Maynor (n 17) 176-177 
45 On the ascertainment of the wishes of the inhabitants and UN participation in decision-making processes see A. Rigo Sureda, 
The Evolution of the right of self-determination: A study of United Nations Practices (Leiden 1973) 307-323   
46 OSCE’s human rights system, for example, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) About ODIHR see 
http://www.osce.org/odihr; African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights see http://www.achpr.org;  [Accessed 30 
December 2017] 
47Katangese Peoples’ Congress v Zaire 75/92 (ACHPR, Decision taken at its 16th Session, Banjul, The Gambia 1994)  
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“independence, self-government, federalism, conferedalism, unitarism or any other 
form of relations that accords the wishes of the people, but fully cognizant of other 
recognized principles such as sovereignty and territorial integrity”.48 These regional 
organizations can use their reporting systems or render their legal opinions through 
communication procedures to assess the legitimacy of external self-determination 
practical action. After the people have expressed their will, existing state institutions 
must take responsibility for putting it into action. If there are no such institutions, 
republican liberalism advocates for the creation of laws which ensure that the will of 
the people is carried out.49 
The practical application of external self-determination processes always involve 
more than one unit (i.e. people, state agencies, governments, political institutions 
etc.)50 After the people have expressed their views, state institutions should take 
further steps to consider these views and put them into action. When looking at 
republican liberal theory, the interaction between the people and state institutions is 
considered as a fundamental element of external self-determination processes.51 
Thirdly, legal frameworks must be put in place to guarantee the first two dimensions 
detailed above. Legal mechanisms can create a robust system which safeguards the 
free and genuine will of the people. This robust system – i.e. the constitution or 
equivalent statutes – is considered to be the supreme law of the nation.  Republican 
liberal theory advocates that the people’s authority be protected by such legal 
mechanisms in order to achieve democratic legitimacy and human rights protection.52 
There are two major outcomes of having the people’s will safeguarded by law. Firstly, 
                                                      
48 Ibid para26; Quoted in David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination (Kluwer 2002) 330 
49 Philip Pettit (n 17) 190-192; John W. Maynor (n 17) 154 
50 James Summers, ‘The internal and external aspects of self-determination reconsidered’ in Duncan French (ed), Statehood and 
Self-Determination: Reconciling Tradition and Modernity in International Law (CUP2013) 232   
51 Philip Pettit (n 17) 172-173 
52 Richard Bellamy (n 20) 188-191 
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the creation of laws is a way to enact certain standards of democratic legitimacy, for 
example, the equal participation of all people and proportional equality of 
representatives. 53  Popular power therefore only exists if the people’s right to 
participate is enumerated in the constitution or equivalent legal regulations. In order 
to protect the fundamental rights of all people, legislation must exist which ensures 
that everyone, including minorities (such as ethnic groups), have freedom of 
expression, of movement and of association. 54  If these conditions are secured 
properly, the free and genuine will of the people will legitimize governmental action. 
Secondly, legislation must ensure that all non-governmental institutions can work 
independently from state control and that existing state institutions must take 
responsibility for carrying out the will of the people.55 If a state has a constitution this 
can ensure that a non-arbitrary (i.e. a non-coercive) outcome of external self-
determination can be reached.56 
According to the In Re secession of Quebec 1998, the Canadian Court held that the 
constitution was the expression of the will of the people to be governed in accordance 
with certain principles held as fundamental and certain prescriptions restrictive of the 
powers of the legislature and government.57 Thus, it is necessary to design laws with 
the aim of providing communicative channels between the state and the people.58 The 
constitution emphasizes that citizens have a clear, legal duty to be involved in 
decision-making process. In order to ensure the process is legitimate, the fundamental 
rights protection of all ethnic communities is a crucial point to put in place within a 
                                                      
53 Philip Pettit (n 17) 175-177; Christoph Mollers (n 36) 75-76 
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57 In Re Secession of Quebec, Canada Supreme Court Judgment 2 SCR 217 (1998) para 85, 87 
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constitution.59 Using republican liberalism can contribute to the degree of legitimacy 
of any decision-making process because it supports the value of domestic law as an 
instrument to control the balance of power between government and people.60 The 
sharing and balancing of the people’s authority and governmental power is a way to 
legalize people as a source of legitimacy. Thus, the external recognition of external 
self-determination process may be facilitated if the rights of people are guaranteed by 
law.  
2. The Research Question  
The distinction between the internal and external right to self-determination in 
international law came into existence in the Special Report of the United Nations 
Commission for Indonesia in 1949.61 On the one hand, internal self-determination 
refers to the ability of people to choose which governing system they want by 
establishing a democratic decision-making processes.62  If people do not enjoy their 
internal rights to self-determination, they are entitled to secede.63 On the other hand, 
the external right to self-determination was traditionally implied as the right of 
colonial people to secede from the parent state and form an independent state.64 The 
legal consequence of external self-determination can be territorial change. Then, post-
1960, the external right to self-determination became a general right belonging to all 
people in non-colonial situations. 65  This was due to ethnic groups of people 
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increasingly demanding the right to self-government (i.e. autonomy, sovereignty, or 
independence) freeing themselves from oppression or alien dominating powers.66 The 
assertion of democratic governance (i.e. the interaction of procedural mechanisms, 
state institutions, and legal mechanisms) is a way to ensure that public political 
participation within a state is compliant with international standards. If all three work 
together, this will help to increase the degree of legitimacy of the practical application 
of the external self-determination process.  
In this thesis, the main research question is “How can the expressed will of the people 
during external self-determination be most legitimately ascertained and 
implemented?”. In order to respond to this question, three practical applications of 
external self-determination are examined: referendums, elections and public 
consultations. These three mechanisms illustrate varying degree of continuity of the 
expression of the people’s will This study argues that holding a referendum is not 
considered to be a dynamic and ongoing process. Instead, non-referendum 
mechanisms (i.e. representative processes including an election and public 
consultations) provide more dynamic and continuous action than referendums.   
This research focuses on external self-determination practices because of the inherent 
conflict between the administrative ruling power and the people under the existing 
regime. In the past, the power for territorial alteration was solely in the hands of the 
government, and the people had no right to decide their own destiny.67 In the last half-
century, there has been increasing calls from people living in former-colonial states to 
allow greater popular autonomy over their territorial status. The greater involvement 
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of people has been supported by international institutions, and many international 
legal institutions have succeeded in enshrining in law the people’s right to express 
their will over their territory.68 As a result, from an international legal standpoint, for 
external self-determination processes to be considered legitimate they must involve 
public participation.69 When the people’s rights are positioned at the center of the 
territorial alteration process, this demonstrates how ‘the people’ as an entity, shift 
from the object to the subject of international law.70 In other words, they become the 
right-holders and constituent power during any process which has the potential to 
change their status.  
Within the scope of international law, the external ‘right to self-determination’ has 
arguably shifted from the right to independence, towards the procedural right 
belonging to all people. In other words, people act as political constituents in the 
external self-determination processes. The right of peoples to self-determination is 
recognized within international and regional treaties.71 One interpretation of this right 
is simply that people should be able to publicly participate in politics. However, due 
to the vagueness of the concept of external self-determination in international law, the 
people’s rights need judicial opinions and interpretations to protect them. 72  A 
significant number of international legal documents support the idea that the right of 
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self-determination is a procedural right belonging to all peoples. These include the 
UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 and the Resolution 
2625 of 24 October 1950. The former specified the legal significant of the right to 
self-determination from the ‘principle’ to a ‘legal right’ for non-self-governing 
territory.73 The latter was a legal instrument to clarify how international law regulates 
self-determination. It also mentions that it is the duty of states to promote the right to 
self-determination of peoples.74  In addition, the CERD General Recommendation 
No.21 of 23 August 1996 provided the scope of the external aspect of self-
determination that “all peoples have the right to determine freely their political status 
and their place in the international community based upon the principle of equal rights 
and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from colonialism and by the prohibition 
to subject peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”.75 Based on 
these documents, only peoples within the colonial territory and peoples within non-
self-governing territory are entitled to exercise their rights to self-determination.  
Due to the lack of a clear division between internal and external self-determination in 
international law documents, in the non-colonial situation, one argument with regard 
to external self-determination is how to implement this right along with public 
involvement in any decision-making process. In order to answer this question, it is 
worthwhile to look at the possible meanings of self-determination and certain 
prerequisites of external self-determination. According to Patrick Thornberry, the 
external dimension of self-determination defines the status of a people in relation to 
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another people, State or Empire.76 In this sense, peoples are the central units of 
external self-determination. They can interact with other entities, for example, other 
peoples, governments, or states.77 Thus, external self-determination could refer to a 
people-centered perspective and their exercising of their rights with other peoples or 
institutions.78 In addition, there was evidence in In Re secession of Quebec in 1998 to 
address the possible rights of people in external self-determination. There is a 
prerequisite condition for people to claim self-government through the process of the 
external self-determination. If a state fails to perform its duty to provide the internal 
right to self-determination for peoples, they are entitled to claim for external self-
determination.79 This condition implicitly suggests that people’s fundamental freedom 
and their participative role in any public affairs should be protected. 
When the people are accepted as a constituent power involved in the ‘state-framing 
process’, it is necessary both to establish processes to assess the will of people, and 
also to protect their substantive right to express their will.80  During any self-
determination process, the success of these two actions (creating processes and 
protecting people’s substantive right to express their will) can increase the legitimacy 
of the decision-making process through accountability. Importantly, the international 
legal community has never specified how to carry out such public participation in a 
way that satisfies democratic and human rights-based needs.81 During external self-
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determination processes, these three mechanisms are used as a way to identify the will 
of the people. The nature of each of these procedural mechanisms is different; this 
research explores the different conditions and specifications that influence how the 
free and fair will of the people is ascertained and implemented. It is noteworthy that 
the outcome of an external self-determination process is considered legitimate 
because the international community will then accept the internal decision. Thus, it is 
crucial to generate domestically stabilized systems to guarantee free and genuine will 
of the people. The three practical applications demonstrate different degrees of 
legitimacy due to the different ways in which each ascertains and implements the will 
of the people. 
 
3. Research Methodology      
3.1 Doctrinal Research  
This study is categorized as doctrinal research. It aims to develop a legal theory, 82  
using the conduct of states and judicial opinions to examine how the external rights of 
peoples to self-determine evolve in a practical sense. 83 Unlike previous doctrinal 
studies, which have examined the practical application of external self-determination 
by applying nationalist,84 liberal and communitarian principles,85 this research uses an 
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alternative interpretation – republican liberal theory. Since an aspect of ‘the right to 
self-determination’ is a right to democratic participation, public political participation 
is of central importance to the process.86 Using the core principles of modern 
republican liberal theory to establish a process of measuring the will of the people 
foregrounds public participation in external self-determination practices.  
Doing research based on theoretical development requires the selection, discussion, 
and evaluation of primary and secondary source material. These collections of data 
are used as interpretative tools to evaluate the legitimacy of external self-
determination practices, creating examples of best practice. Qualitative research 
methods are used to analyze how the will of the people is an integral part of territorial 
alteration, and therefore how republican liberalism (which foregrounds public 
participation) remains more relevant than any other theoretical framework in external 
self-determination processes.   
3.2 Data Collection and Analysis  
The data collection and analysis will be based on the use of republican liberalism as 
an underlying theory which supports the people’s rights during external self-
determination processes. The data collection in this study consists of literature 
examining both republican liberal theory and democratic legitimacy. These two 
collections of data are used as interpretative tools to evaluation the legitimacy of 
external self-determination practices. The literature is analysed in order to examine 
the development of liberalism, communitarianism and classical and modern 
republican liberal theory, and how the latter can be applied to external self-
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determination practices. This study uses republican liberal theory to examine how 
public opinion is an integral part of legitimizing external self-determination practices. 
In addition, analyzing the literature also involves examining the conditions for 
achieving democratic legitimacy. This includes the nature of procedural and 
substantive legitimacy in decision-making processes, and guides how domestic law 
should protect the will of the people. The argument is therefore developed through 
this analysis that republican liberalism is a better solution than any other relevant 
theories in external self-determination processes.   
Therefore the documents used to analyze public participation in self-determination 
practices include international treaties, international customary law, regional treaties, 
international or regional institutions’ official documents, the contentious cases 
between states’ and the courts’ decisions and guidelines, state reports and the reports 
of non-governmental organizations. In addition, secondary sources include academic 
papers, textbooks, the opinion of experts in the field of international law and the 
lectures of internationally respected lawyers. These kinds of documents play a 
supportive role in re-conceptualizing international legal theory, tracing the 
development of the practical application of external self-determination.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework of the Research- Republican Liberal Theory 
Among international lawyers, there is a question over the proper procedural 
mechanisms and substantive norms for public, political participation in determining 
their territorial status. The answer lies in the use of republican liberalism as an 
underlying theory in external self-determination practices. This theory mandates the 
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importance of peoples as constituent powers in any decision-making process. 
Territorial alteration affects the people politically, economically and socially, and 
therefore is a decision that must involve the people. 87  Since an external self-
determination process has direct consequences on the people’s lives, their collective 
decision-making is considered to be a way to legitimize governmental action in a 
territorial alteration process.  
 
When people become central in any decision making process, it is essential to create a 
way to put their public opinion into action. Looking at the three different theories, 
there are some restrictions when implementing these theories in external self-
determination practices. The use of nationalist theory lessens the people’s authority to 
determine their future status. Within this theory, a state or a governmental authority 
has the full power to decide ‘who should be the people’ who are entitled to decide.88 
Most of them classify people based on ethnic background in order to create a 
homogenous society.89 Thus, different ethnic groups are not recognized as the legal 
entities. It is not fair for certain groups of people who are excluded from any decision-
making process. In addition, the people-centered perspective can be seen in two 
underlying theories: liberalism and communitarianism. The former outlines that each 
individual has the authority to determine their own future. Each will make decisions 
freely and choose their interests.90 The latter emphasizes the communal or group 
rights as collective decision-makers.91 However, the application of liberal theory in 
self-determination processes is contrary to a pluralistic society because it is hard to 
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find any conciliation between different ethnic communities.92 In the context of 
communitarianism, collective decision-makers sometimes do not reflect the consensus 
between group members as some dissenting opinions (i.e. a member in the group) are 
not considered by other members.93  
 
Applying republican liberalism can provide solutions to ensure that the people’s will 
is respected by governmental authorities. This study is based on the modern form of 
republican liberal theory which has been formalized in Philip Pettit’s 1997 book, 
‘Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government’.94 Recognizing that the 
people are a political entity, Pettit proposed that they should be involved throughout 
any decision-making process which would affect their lives. The status of the people 
is therefore emphasized in his version of republican liberalism; greater involvement of 
the people in political affairs can legitimize the actions of the state. It is also 
concerned with the importance of popular sovereignty, a principle which holds that 
the will of the people should prevail over governmental authority. 95 Therefore 
modern, republican liberalism advocates that the people’ right to participation must be 
guaranteed to enable popular sovereignty to balance state power. 96  Republican 
liberalism bases the ideals of popular sovereignty on the protection of people’s 
fundamental freedoms – i.e. the people’s rights to freedom of expression, assembly 
and movement.97 If human rights are properly implemented during the decision-
making process, the expressed will of the people will conform to the ideals of 
republican liberalism. 
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Unlike communitarian theory or liberalism, republican liberal theory suggests a set of 
practical guidelines which, if used during the self-determination procedure, makes the 
collected will of the people more credible. Firstly republican liberalism suggests that 
to motivate citizens to express their will, raising public awareness of their right to 
participate can be done through civic education.98 Thus the people are ready and 
educated in advance of any decision-making process. Secondly republican liberalism 
gives a number of guidelines for creating institutional frameworks which foreground 
the people’s will.99 However there are two particular practical guidelines which can 
be applied directly to external self-determination processes.  
i) the distribution of the people’s representatives should be based on proportional 
numbers of different ethnic groups in a particular territory; 
ii) the allocation of powers to regional or local governments should balance the 
powers of central government.100 
Thirdly republican liberalism suggests that having a law or domestic constitution 
which guarantees public involvement can promote and protect the will of the 
people.101 Through doing this, a state can demonstrate its acceptance the people’s 
opinion as an integral part of self-determination. Based on these three sets of 
guidelines, republican liberal theory provides a more concrete way (than any other 
theory) of recognizing the people as the subject of international law, and suggests that 
institutional and legal frameworks can uphold the people’s authority in any decision-
making process. Within the framework of international law, republican liberalism 
provides realistic, practical ways to carry out external self-determination based on the 
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credible will of the people, leading to the acceptance of the legitimate outcome by the 
international community.102  
 
5. Contribution to the field 
This study illustrates how the will of the people can legitimize external self-
determination practices and its consequence in the legitimacy of territorial alteration. 
Referendums, elections and public consultations demonstrate varying degrees of 
continuity of the expression of the people’s will. Within the procedural mechanisms, 
the different ways in which the will of the people is ascertained is analyzed to identify 
their legitimacy. The thesis suggests that non-referendum mechanisms, such as 
representative process and public consultations, are more dynamic and ongoing than 
referendums, and are therefore more legitimate in identifying the will of the people.  
Republican liberal theory can be used as a guiding principle to interpret the practical 
application of self-determination practices. This theory stresses the importance of 
equal participation of the people in a decision-making process and addresses the 
importance  of involving  institutional and   legal  frameworks  to   complement  the 
people’s will. If these three conditions of republican liberal theory properly function, 
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6.  Overview of chapters 
Chapter 1 examines the right to self-determination as a right to public political 
participation as confirmed in the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). Since the external right to self-determination relates directly to ‘the people’, 
popular authority is an integral part of legitimizing the external self-determination 
process. Public participation is an integral component of moral reasoning and can 
increase the quality of the secession process. During any decision-making process, the 
interaction between ordinary citizens and political institutions is a factor in the 
legitimacy of the subsequent governmental authority. In order to ascertain the will of 
the people, this study introduces an alternative theory to liberalism and 
communitarianism to evaluate external self-determination practices. Republican 
liberal theory encourages the active role of the people. All ethnic groups are equally 
considered. Republican liberalism mandates a continuous process of taking public 
opinion into account. This requires institutional and legal mechanisms to support 
ongoing public participation. 
Chapter 2 explores the use of referendums as a process-based approach which is 
generally considered to be a direct and a participatory form of democracy. When the 
alteration of territorial status is in question, a referendum assesses the will of the 
people. There are two types of independence referendums: consensual and non-
consensual.  Consensual-based   referendums   take   place    when  there is agreement 
between the parent states. Some instances include Eritrea 1993, East Timor 1999, 
Montenegro 2006, South Sudan 2011 and Scotland 2014. By contrast, non-consensual 
based referendums involve disagreements between two parties; the parent state and 
the secessionist movement with popular support. This typology includes the former 
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Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, Ukraine 1991, Quebec 1996, Crimea 2014, 
and Catalonia 2014. In most cases, the Constitutional Court rulings identify the 
constitutional imperative with a view to preserving unity and the territorial integrity 
of the states rather than securing public support for peaceful secession. From the 
study, however, the use of referendums in external self-determination practices does 
not inherently imply a dynamic and ongoing process of assessing the will of the 
people. The ‘one shot deal’ nature of a referendum cannot be described as either 
dynamic or ongoing. In fact critics argue that referendums are used as executive 
driving mechanisms to claim popular legitimation.  
Chapter 3 examines an indirect way of public participation, that is, an election and its 
representative processes. There are five instances to illustrate how public opinions are 
put into action: Namibia, Czechoslovakia, Kosovo, Bangladesh and Catalonia. 
Representative processes are classified into two types: consensual and non-
consensual. Both types are analyzed through five components to assess their 
legitimacy: the nature of the election and the subsequent actions of the elected 
representatives, majority and minority relations, the pre-identification of voters, 
human rights protection, and the role of international institutions. Through the lens of 
republican liberal theory, an  election  and  the actions of the people’s elected officials 
can be considered as a dynamic and ongoing process. When the people are not 
satisfied with the governmental action, they have opportunities to choose new 
representatives to promote their interests. Meanwhile, the people are able to contest or 
review any consequential action of the election through the different levels of state 
institutions (i.e. local, or federal, or national institutions). Therefore there is a recourse 
system for the people to ensure that their will is taken into consideration. In addition, 
if there is proportional equality of the people’s representatives then the latter can be 
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held fully accountable to the people, and the outcome of their decisions will be more 
legitimate. 
Chapter 4 explores the public consultation process as an alternative way of identifying 
the will of the people. The aim of public participation is to create political equality 
and to broaden public participation. If all groups of people are consulted in a 
territorial alteration, this will increase a degree of legitimacy of governmental 
authority. There are two instances (i.e. West Papua and Bahrain) which illustrate how 
a public consultation has been conducted in a territorial alteration processes. During 
external self-determination practices, a public consultation has two stages: the direct 
participation of the people in expressing their political opinions and the 
implementation by the people’s representatives of the outcome of the collective 
consultation. According to republican liberalism, the people as a political community 
should have the right to be continuously, publically involved in the practical 
application of  any  territorial  alteration  processes. There   are   three relevant factors  
affecting the legitimacy of public consultations: international institutions’ 
involvement, the effective participation of the people, and human rights protection. 
These three factors are explored in detail to measure the free will of the people in 











The expressed will of the people during the external self-determination process 
 
1. Introduction 
The aim of the chapter is to explore self-determination as a right belonging to all 
people to decide their future destiny, as interpreted by the international legal 
community. In theoretical rhetoric, the right to self-determination is the right of the 
people to public, political participation which allows ordinary citizens to be involved 
in decision-making processes. Judge Dillard’s statement in the Western Sahara 
advisory opinion in 1975 under the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction 
supported this position. He stated that:  
“Self-determination is satisfied by a free choice not by a particular 
consequence of that choice or a particular method of exercising it”.103 
This statement emphasizes the right to self-determination as a process of decision-
making. It concerns people’s ability to take part in deciding the legal rules which 
affect their future destiny.104 Thus, according to Dillard, the expressed will of the 
people should be an integral part of external self-determination. 
One example of a political decision is a territorial alteration, or external self-
determination, where local populations should be able to decide which country they 
belong to. In practice, when one considers ‘the people’ as the central element of 
external self-determination, one needs to consider the mode of operation of allowing 
people to express their will. During public participation in external self-determination, 
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it is necessary for the people to express their will through a political process - (i.e. a 
referendum, an election, or a public consultation) however each of these requires an 
international legal framework consisting not just of the law, but of institutions and 
law-making processes. The interaction between popular participation and political 
institutions105 is a factor in the legitimacy of subsequent governmental authority.  
 
Republican liberalism is a theory which can resolve problems of political 
discrimination against ethnic groups in a pluralistic society and emphasizes the 
importance of relevant institutions and legal frameworks to make the process of 
public participation more robust.106 Since the people are of central importance to 
external self-determination practices, during a territorial alternation process, they are 
recognized as a political community who have the right to deliberate their decision.107 
International lawyers have raised questions about which groups of people are entitled 
to make these decisions. 108  In most external self-determination practices, the 
eligibility of voters in a secession process is linked to their ethnicity. The people are 
divided by the race or community they belong to, but this categorization excludes 
some ethnic groups in the decision-making process.109 One solution is to treat all 
people in the same manner regardless of their backgrounds. All people who may be 
affected by the outcome of a political decision should be involved in the decision-
making process.110 This equal consideration in participation can increase the level of 
legitimacy of a secession process. Using republican liberal theory to examine ‘the 
expressed will of the people’ usefully foregrounds political equality. Republican 
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liberalism also mandates that in order for the consequence of any such self-
determination process to be legitimate, the expression of the people’s will needs 
institutional and legal frameworks. Institutional frameworks (either domestic or 
international) are necessary to check each other, so that the people are not dominated 
and are able to express their popular sovereignty. Legal frameworks are required to 
create both opportunities for the people to communicate reciprocally with the political 
institutions, and also a legal obligation to listen to all the people in a pluralistic 
society. Republican liberal theory fills the gap where institutional and legal vacuums 
which have previously prevented external self-determination processes from being 
acceptable and legitimate. By emphasizing equal, public participation backed by 
institutional and legal frameworks, it provides a set of guidelines for future territorial 
alteration processes to be more legitimate in the eyes of the international community. 
 
Undeniably, ordinary citizens are directly affected by governmental action when there 
is a change in boundaries. Public political participation in a secession process is a way 
of increasing the people’s authority while the government has no free hand to make 
decisions based on its own interests. If the people have the authority to balance state 
power, this legitimizes the actions of the governmental authorities of the state.111 In 
other words, the government must be based on ‘the consent of the governed’,112i.e. the 
power of public opinion over government, who must perform their duty according to 
the people’s interests.113 The consent of the people can be assessed through processes 
which involve them expressing their will. Public participation therefore increases the 
degree of political and legal legitimacy that a government holds after a decision has 
been reached. Both a legal concept (the moral reasoning of law) and a political 
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concept (democratic governance) illustrate how the people’s participation acts as a 
standard for legitimacy. ‘The moral reasoning of law’ is a process where fairness, 
justice and equality exist within the law-making process.114 In terms of external self-
determination, the legitimacy of any decision-making process is increased when the 
moral reasoning of the law (and therefore wider public involvement) is upheld. 
‘Democratic governance’ means how to bring public scrutiny upon decision-making 
processes, in other words the interrelation between the people, state mechanisms and 
democracy.115 Democratic governance includes public participation and human rights 
protection. In terms of increasing legitimacy, democratic governance states that it is 
the duty of a state to guarantee human rights protection for all people, who are 
therefore free to express their will during the decision-making process. Both moral 
reasoning and democratic governance require public involvement as an integral 
component of any decision-making process.  
1.1 Legitimacy and legality in the law of secession  
Through the lens of the international law, there are both political and legal 
justifications for the will of the people to be included. Legitimacy is originally a 
political concept whereas legality is a legal concept. 116 Legitimacy can be defined as 
a subjective political standard of rules and rule-making. Among these is the 
perception a decision is made in accordance with a ‘right process’ and, the 
intercommunication between the ruler and ruled.117 If the people are able to engage 
with the governmental action this makes the rules and rule-making process are 
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considered to be more acceptable to international community and therefore the 
decision-making process is legitimate. Legality is the quality of a state or process 
being in conformity with the law. Legality provides a way of increasing the people’s 
authority in law-making process through communicative channels.118 In terms of 
external self-determination, the legality of the external self-determination process 
requires the inclusive participation of the people.  
Legality and legitimacy are two, interconnected issues 119  which justify public 
involvement in any decision-making process through the existence of relevant rules, 
institutions or systems. 120 In fact legitimacy fills the gaps that legality leaves, 
justifying the legal validity of the procedural mechanism chosen to assess the will of 
the people.121 If a state adheres to the conditions of legitimacy, this can lead to a 
lawful act of secession. According to Thomas M. Frank, legitimacy in the 
international law system lays out four ‘objective factors’.122 These factors can be used 
to validate the legitimacy of a national government in a secession process.  
Firstly, ‘determinacy’ is the existence of legal regulation. It can be assessed from 
‘substantive’ and ‘procedural’ perspectives. Substantively, it deals with the clarity of 
a legal text. In certain circumstances, if the legal text is ambiguous, it is necessary to 
redress this through institutional channels. Procedurally, it relates to responsibility of 
state authorities to carry out their duties regarding law creation.123 In terms of 
secession, the right to unilateral secession is neither recognized nor prohibited under 
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international law. There are two possible conditions of a secession process within 
external self-determination practices. One is the consensual agreement between two 
involved parties to allow public involvement in territorial alteration.124 Another is the 
remedial secession when local populations are politically oppressed or discriminated 
against. Secession is considered to be a remedial mechanism for such groups living 
under unjust circumstances.125  
 
According to Buchanan126, Van Den Driest127, Buccheit128 and Vidmar129 proposed 
that remedial secession should be exist as a method of redress for the violation of 
human rights.130 The remedial right to secession should take place under two set of 
circumstances. Either the physical survival of the territory’s members must be 
threatened by actions of the state (or there are violations of other basic human rights). 
Or the territory has been unjustly occupied by a sovereign state or other than the 
previous parent-state.131 However, Nielsen proposes some additional criteria that 
would extend the remedial right to secession to other groups. By his account, the right 
to secession should necessitate (1) their cultural survival being threatened (2) and the 
former parent state not respecting the will of the majority of the people.132 These 
arguments for the remedial right to secession’ all rest on the people’s involvement in 
their own political status being obstructed in some way. It is necessary therefore to 
create legal and institutional frameworks to allow these affected groups of people to 
determine their territorial autonomy. However, these criteria have no clear 
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international legal text to clarify whether certain situations have reached the level of 
secession or not. This limitation needs a practical action and juristic opinion to 
recognize its legal determinacy.133  
Secondly, ‘symbolic validation’ takes place when a rule-making process or institution 
uses cues in order to gain compliance with a command.134 There are two interrelated 
issues: the authority of the rule-makers135 and the communicative system with the 
recipients.136 The former refers to the existing state or international institutions which 
take responsibility for passing laws or releasing practical tools in the form of binding 
laws, for example, legislatures or the UN subsidiary bodies (i.e. Security Council and 
General Assembly). The latter is the establishment of communicative action between 
governmental authority and the people provided by the existing state institutions.  
In order to assess the legitimacy of a governmental authority by international legal 
standards, it is necessary to look at two authoritative bodies: states and international 
institutions.137 These two are the main actors within the international legal system. 
Allen Buchanan argues that the legitimacy of laws depends on the legitimacy of the 
institutions that make them.138 Therefore assessing the legitimacy of law involves 
analysing the diverse composition of state and international institutions. If these 
bodies are considered legitimate, then the frameworks they create and maintain during 
external self-determination practices are also considered legitimate, as is the result of 
the territorial alteration process.  
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In a practical sense, there are two types of ethnic communities’ request: secession139 
and power-sharing for self-governing purposes (i.e. federation, autonomous territory, 
sovereignty, confederation).140 The former is the withdrawal of a group of people 
from a larger entity, becoming a new, independent state. The latter is a strategy for 
resolving unequal access to political power in multiethnic societies. The redistribution 
of power is a way of accommodating the right to self-determination with the aim of 
increasing minority involvement. In most circumstances, states and international 
institutions are involved in a secession process or a self-governing purpose. They can 
work collaboratively to ensure public participation as integral component of territorial 
alteration. During secession process, the communication between government, non-
governmental organizations, media, civil society and ordinary citizens is essential to 
empower public authority towards collective decision-making processes.  
 
Thirdly, ‘coherency’ is the conduct of governing bodies (i.e. states or institutions)   
which apply the same regulations in a similar manner fairly and equally.141 Through 
the lens of international law, the practice of the state is considered to be a form of 
international law. In addition, international and regional institutional frameworks are 
also essential to monitor and to implement rules equally.142 Regarding the right to 
self-determination, it can evolve in this way from incoherence to coherence which 
reinforces its legitimacy.143 The right to secede is a part of the people’s right to self-
determination, the practical application of which involves a diversity of actors 
including the people who wish the boundaries to change political institution and the 
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international community.144 A way to justify the secession process involves the 
political actors and legal consequence of the legal process. As the expression of the 
people’s will is the basis for state power, the consent of the people in any decision-
making process can increase the level of legitimacy of governmental action. If public 
involvement is not taken into account consistently in self-governing processes, this 
lessens the stability of rule. 145  
Fourthly, ‘adherence’ is a state action to commit itself to a legal obligation. In order 
to assess the quality of law, the nexus between primary rule (law context) and 
secondary rule (i.e. negotiating, interpreting) can increase the level of legitimacy.146 
In terms of the right to self-determination, adherence is a controversial issue. In the 
era of decolonization, the right to self-determination was widely recognized as the 
right to be independent. The outcome of decolonization was the release of new 
independent states to be free from domination by a more powerful state. The 
establishment of territorial integrity principle aims at maintaining territorial status quo 
of a state. In non-colonial situations, secession is claimed by certain groups of people 
within a particular territory for self-governing purposes. Crucially, secession was, and 
still is, another way to create a new state under the scope of external self-
determination.147 In practice, there is no specific justification for legalizing the 
secession process except a consensual action between two involved parties (i.e. parent 
state and a secessionist movement) to draw new boundaries.148 In addition, a state’s 
obligation within the international law perspective is to ensure democratic 
participation from all citizens within its territory. International law imposes certain 
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conditions for public involvement in secession process: democratic governance and 
human rights.149 Public participation in a territorial change is a way of balancing 
territorial integrity of a state.150 Some theorists argue that territorial integrity is a 
principle which protects a state from an external intervention. It does not cover an 
action of taking a piece of territory away within a state. 151 In order to consult local 
populations, if democratic governance and human rights are met by a state during a 
secession process, then the latter is considered to be more legitimate in the eyes of the 
international legal community.  
1.2 Moral reasoning and secession process 
Within the international legal perspective, a process of secession must conform to 
certain standards of morality.152 Legal theorists153 have attempted to incorporate the 
people’s moral reasoning into the law-making process. When a state creates a law the 
people have an opportunity to demonstrate their opinion about this law. However 
during territorial alteration, the process used to elicit the will of the people allows 
them to explicitly voice their moral reasoning. This public involvement in politics is 
considered by international lawyers to increase the quality of the secession process 
because it guarantees the equal treatment of all the people in a territory.154 
 
The insertion of moral reasoning into a secession process is a way of creating a more 
reasonable outcome among the secessionists, former parent states, and international 
community.155 The use of human reasoning in law-making process can create legal 
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obligations in conformity with moral value.156 When the people are recognized as 
subjects of international law, they have the right to rule and exercise their power with 
moral reasoning.157 If local populations are involved as integral parts of law creation, 
this could lead greater to public, consensual compliance to the rule.158  
The moral principle consists of justice and equality to the public involvement in the 
secession process. Justice is used to test the quality of a procedural mechanism being 
just and fair when people make decisions in their territorial status. If a state meets the 
requirement for justice, the actions of the state are legally legitimate. In addition, 
political and legal institutions must be designed to function in conformity with the 
principle of justice.159 Equality is a concept which is compatible with the non-
discrimination principle. All people are treated equally in a similar manner. The equal 
participation of the people in a territorial alteration decision is, in turn, not upheld by 
any legal framework.160 The idea of equality is also reliant on the human rights moral 
reasoning which aims to protect the individual rights of people. If individual rights are 
upheld, this makes the outcome of the collective decision-making process more 
legitimate in the creation of a new state, or in the request for an autonomous territory. 
A fair implementation of the right to secede can be evaluated using procedural 
mechanisms. During any decision-making process, it is necessary to allow all ethnic 
communities to participate and be represented. This requirement needs institutional or 
legal frameworks to ensure the stability of law. If a secession process implements as a 
way of redressing an injustice action (i.e. a remedial right), this would ensure the 
treatment of minority people fairly and justly.  
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1.3 The inclusion of public participation into democratic governance 
Democratic governance is a concept which limits state power and promotes the 
people’s authority in any collective decision-making process.161 Democracy is a moral 
issue and an international legal obligation which allows public participation in any 
decision-making processes. In addition, democracy is a developing theory which 
consists of the interaction between autonomous actors (the people) and political 
institutions. 162  Democratic governance- on a global level- foregrounds the 
significance of a constitution, which is a written legal tool providing a channel for 
public engagement in these decision-making processes. Evidence in support of the 
connection between democratic governance and public participation can be found in 
Gregory H. Fox and Simone Chambers’ work. According to Fox, “the term 
democracy means the essential procedures by which a democratic society functions;” 
one such essential procedure is public participation, which allows ordinary citizens to 
be involved in the decision-making process. This in turn is an example of popular 
sovereignty at work. Additionally, Fox states that the people hold supreme authority 
“to exercise their power with consent as grounded in alternative sources of 
legitimation”. 163 In other words, if a state respects popular sovereignty, this confers 
legitimacy upon it as a governmental authority. The idea that public participation 
processes should take place as part of popular sovereignty has been developed by 
Simone Chambers. Based on her reasoning, the process-based model embodies 
popular sovereignty in a variety of dimensions: giving people a voice, including 
people in the process and concerning itself with people’s opinions.164 From these two 
accounts, both public participation and democracy are generally accepted by 
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international law theorists as components of popular sovereignty. 
 
Post 1990, a group of international lawyers165 made attempts to bring a right to 
‘democratic governance’ into international law. The impact of this was that the 
democratic legitimacy of any self-determination process could now be assessed by 
international actors. Citizens of any state therefore held ‘democratic entitlement’ in 
international law. This entitlement is grounded in the principle of human rights, with 
reference  specifically to the rights to political participation.166 The establishment of a 
democratic decision-making process is not enough to ensure that the people can freely 
express their will. Instead the legitimacy of the outcome should be assessed by 
measuring how well the state can protect human rights during the decision-making 
process.167 The international community tried to clarify the practicalities of the 
democratic principle. The motivation for incorporating the democratic principle into 
international law was twofold; the protection of the fundamental rights of people and 
keeping peace and security in the international community. Additionally, the presence 
of democracy can allow the assessment of the integrity of governance.168 Good 
governance includes respect for human rights and the meaningful participation of all 
citizens in the political process and in decision-making affecting their lives. The 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted at the World Conference on 
Human Rights in 1993, was the first constitutive, international instrument for firmly 
establishing democracy as a critical aspect of human rights.169  The declaration 
represents “a clear indication of the development of international law” in terms of 
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supporting, strengthening and promoting democracy as well as respecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the entire world. 170  The content includes: 
interdependence within democracy, respect for human rights, and fundamental 
freedoms which recognize that “democracy is based on the freely expressed will of 
the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems and 
their full participation in all aspects of their lives”.171 In the context of the right to 
self-determination, the Declaration points out the “inalienable right of self-
determination”. The right to self-determination cannot be denied, as otherwise it leads 
to a violation of human rights.172 In addition, in 1996, there was an Agenda for 
Democratization which emphasized the insertion of democracy into international law. 
It stated that democracy must be accepted as “the ideal of political power based on the 
will of the people”.173 In this Agenda, the proposal of Boutros Boutros-Ghali clearly 
indicated the importance of cooperation between state and civil society for promoting 
and consolidating new and lapsed democracies. He also suggested that in a pluralistic 
society, the presence of a culture of democracy could avoid violence and promote the 
peaceful, collective rights of the people.174 From these two international frameworks, 
one relevant observation is that democracy cannot work without the substantive 
element of human rights protection. 
 
Human rights, therefore, provide a basis on which democratic mechanisms used 
during external self-determination can be legitimized. Specifically, if certain civil and 
political rights of people (i.e. freedom of expression, freedom of movement and 
freedom of association) are fully protected, this will increase the degree of legitimacy 
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of collective decision-making outcomes. Human rights protection consists of a moral 
principle to protect individual rights and a legal obligation for governments to 
guarantee fundamental freedoms to their citizens.175  
There are two international law instruments for suggesting how to consolidate 
democracy and human rights protection. The Commission on Human Rights, under 
the guidance of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
passed two resolutions: ‘promotion of the right to democracy’ in 1999 176  and 
‘promoting and consolidating democracy in 2000. 177  The content of the first 
resolution was the clarification of ‘the rights to democratic governance’ which 
included the right to political participation with equal opportunity for all citizens and 
the right of citizens to choose their system of government through constitutional or 
other democratic means.178 The concept of democratic governance emphasizes the 
evaluation of the people’s political position in a culturally diverse society.179 The 
second resolution takes further steps to improve the active involvement of civil 
society in the processes of governance along with building democratic societies, 
incorporating the inclusion of all people. Furthermore, it suggested that legal and 
administrative frameworks are crucial for civil society, particularly in pluralistic 
societies, in order to gather the collective will of the people democratically.180 During 
public participation in any decision-making process, human rights protection should 
therefore be foregrounded.181 
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The correlation between democracy and human rights during public involvement 
processes includes the bottom-up transference of power from the people to the state. 
On the one hand, public involvement in decision-making processes is an illustration 
of democracy, and on the other hand human rights can guarantee the promotion and 
protection of individual rights to expression and association during such processes. 
 
2. Colonial and post-colonial legal frameworks for the right to self-determination  
2.1 Self-determination as a process for legitimizing decolonization  
After the inception of the United Nations in 1945, the right to self-determination was 
included in an international legal framework for the first time. From the references in 
the United Nations Charter in 1945, Article 1 (2) and 55 mentioned “respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples”.182 The meaning of 
‘peoples’ was unclear as the classification of people was linked to territorial status. 
The international community legally recognized three dependent territories where 
local populations were authorized to express their will on territorial alteration: 
colonial peoples,183 peoples in Non-Self Governing Territories (NSGT), and peoples 
in Trust Territories (TT).184  
 
In practice, the right to self-determination was only applied to decolonization of non-
European territories (i.e. Asian and African territories). The goal of colonial powers to 
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free new independent states ignored the subsequent complicated situations of those 
new states because the right to self-determination was not exercised as an ongoing 
process.185  Furthermore, the process of decolonization was not concerned with 
restoring the ethnic links of the people living in former colonial territories. 
Consequently, the populations of former colonies were disenfranchised through the 
reshaping of boundaries by colonizers who provided little choice for those concerned 
regarding their membership of a new state.186  
 
Between 1945 and 1960, the right to external self-determination was made equal to 
the right to independence. Under the scope of the UN General Assembly Resolution 
1514 (1960), external self-determination was invoked as a tool “to legitimize the 
termination of colonial rule”.187 The decolonization process was the first time in 
history that colonial people were granted the right to be consulted about the alteration 
of their own territory without being dominated by an alien governmental authority.188 
According to the resolution, the colonial people should be able to determine their 
future destiny.189 However, the resolution did not specify any practical suggestions for 
how to consult the people and ascertain their will. In other words, there was still no 
international legal recommendation for public involvement processes to allow 
colonial people to participate in decisions which would affect their future status.  
 
Later, the UN General Assembly 1541 (1960) attempted to rectify this by outlining 
practical public involvement processes for consulting the people in NSGT and TT 
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territories.190 However, the UN General Assembly only stipulated three options: 
integration with an independent state, free association with an independent state, and 
independence.191 Moreover, only the first and second choices required ‘informed and 
democratic processes’ as prerequisite conditions of becoming either integrated or 
associated with an independent state. There was no such ‘informed and democratic 
process’ required for consulting local populations when they expressed the desire to 
become an independent state. Due to this lack of an international legal framework for 
guaranteeing the people’s involvement in such decisions, there was an ongoing 
discussion about how to create a ‘free and fair process’ to measure the will of the 
people. This raised the problem of how to balance and accommodate the people’s 
demands whilst maintaining the stability of territorial state borders.  
 
International lawyers, such as Pomerance, Hannum, McCorquodale, and  Thornberry 
argued at this point therefore that external self-determination required an 
internationally-defined framework to ensure that in practice, the people could exercise 
their right to political participation.192 When the people become an integral part of 
territorial alteration, any self-determination process is made more legitimate.193 In 
other words, all people, without distinction of ethnicity, race, religion, or language 
difference, are not excluded from participating in deliberative decision-making. 
People are conceived of as a unit of collective decision-making towards the right to 
self-determination. Both direct and representative forms of public participation are 
involved in validating the people’s will under the scope of this right.  
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2.2 Post-colonial legal frameworks for external self-determination  
The process of decolonization (1945-1970) impacted the legal understanding of 
external self-determination.194 Contemporary theorists advocate for a reconsideration 
of external self-determination as an ongoing right, opening channels for people within 
a state to play a more active, continuous role in the political governance of their 
state.195 It is evident that reforming the concept of external self-determination as a 
continuous process of participation requires a democratic-based mechanism for 
assessing the will of the people.196  
2.2.1 International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 1966 
From 1966 to 1970, there were two important legal frameworks to illustrate the right 
to self-determination as a ‘right belonging to all people’. The first was within the 
principle of Article 1 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR). Both covenants stipulated that “all peoples have the right to self-
determination”.197 For the first time, the people’s right to freely determine their future 
was expressed in international law. Moreover the Article specifies this right as an 
ongoing one, not one which ends after independence is attained. 198  If self-
determination is understood as an ongoing right, then there is an implication that the 
people’s expressed will on public, political matters must be sought continuously. To 
illustrate this, public participation in democratic decision-making required the 
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establishment of constitutional and political processes in each state.199 However, 
Article 1 of the ICCPR does not spell out a democratic process. Article 1 is upheld by 
Article 25, however the latter goes one step further by mentioning the opportunity for 
this right to take place: “every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity … to 
take part in the conduct of public affairs”.200 This Article attempted to promote the 
link between self-determination and democracy as well as to provide some effective 
machinery for assuring self-determination and equal rights for people.201 The right to 
self-determination shifted away from the outcome and instead towards the procedural 
right belonging to all people.202 
According to the Human Rights Committee General Comment number 25, the right to 
public participation should include the right to vote, 203  and individual rights 
protection.204 During decision-making processes, the people’s freedoms of expression, 
assembly and association are essential conditions of the right to vote.205 Voters should 
be able to form opinions freely and independently; simultaneously, they should be 
free from any unlawful or arbitrary interference or coercive measures. Importantly, 
the General Comment number 25 allowed state parties to set certain standards 
limiting people’s right to vote with proportionate and reasonable cause. However, it 
did not clearly specify what this criteria could be. In 2002, according to Gillot v 
France, the Human Rights Committee confirmed the connection between the right to 
self-determination and the right to public political participation.206 Crucially, it also 
pointed out that restrictions on the right to vote may be imposed but only provided 
that they are not discriminatory based on people’s ethnic origin, place of birth, family 
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ties, descendent.207 If people are not able to prove a sufficient link to the territory, this 
is considered to be a proportionate ‘cut-off point’ for taking part in an electoral 
process. These actions do not violate the right to political participation under Article 
25(b) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966). After the 
ICCPR Covenant, its Articles and the interpretations contained in the General 
Comment, the right to self-determination for the first time could be defined as the 
right to public participation.208 These documents also provided a set of guidelines for 
procedural mechanisms required to carry out the practical application of external self-
determination practices.  
2.2.2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2625 
The second framework was laid out in the UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 in 
1970.209 It stated that it was the duty of international community to end colonialism 
and to permit each colonial territory to assume a political status freely determined by 
its inhabitants.210 In addition, the Resolution specified the protection of the territorial 
integrity of states. However, the ‘safeguard clause’ in principle 5 (7) noted that if a 
state complies with the principles of equal rights and self-determination for the people 
(in other words, ensuring the people are able to express their will freely and fairly) 
then no action should be taken which might destroy its territorial integrity.211 Thus the 
resolution argues that to help protect their own territorial integrity in the eyes of the 
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international law, states must take responsibility for ensuring self-determination 
processes are legitimately and legally managed by a representative government.212  
Clause 5(7) refers back to the normative principle of self-determination outlined by 
Wilson in 1918. According to him, the people are the source of all legitimate 
governmental power; state authority must be based on the will of the people.213  His 
idealistic perspective214 was expressed by proposing the ideals of a democratic system 
and the popular sovereignty of the people. Thus, he argued over fifty years earlier 
than the UN Resolution that if a territory’s existing government represents the people 
appropriately then the international community should recognize any subsequent act 
of self-determination as a legitimate action.215 Between them, these two frameworks 
opened a channel to interpret self-determination as a procedural right belonging to all 
people, who are accepted as having constituent power over their territorial status.  
Since the development of the legal understanding of self-determination as a 
continuing right, certain institutions tries to develop the idea of public participation 
and the right to self-determination as established by these frameworks. There are two 
examples: the Badinter Commission Arbitration in 1991,216 and the guidelines in the 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).217    
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2.2.3 Badinter Commission Framework 1991  
The Badinter Commission was set up by the Council of Ministers of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) on 27th August 1991. After releasing the ‘Guidelines on 
the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union’ in 1991, 
the Commission acted as a fact-finding body to assess whether the various republics 
in the former Yugoslavia had fulfilled the criteria for recognition. These guidelines 
recommended further conditions for recognizing a new independent state. The 
Declaration included the phrases,  
“Respect for the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki and in the Charter of 
Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law, democracy and human rights;  
Guarantees for the rights of ethnic and national groups and minorities in 
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of the CSCE;  
Respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by 
peaceful means and by common agreement; 
Acceptance of all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear 
non- proliferation as well as to security and regional stability;  
Commitment to settle by agreement, including where appropriate by recourse to 
arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes”.218 
The Declaration stated that new states should be recognized in international law by 
their commitment to democracy.219 This was clarified in two fundamental points. 
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Firstly, new state-creation involves “a democratic procedure” required by 
international law. In other words, altering the legal status of a territory requires the 
expressed will of the people. Secondly, state-creation requires “democratic 
government structures” that adhere to a democratic political system which fully 
represents the people. 220  Based on democratic procedural requirements, public 
participation is accepted as an ongoing process. Therefore by specifying that a new 
state must conform to the rules of democratic governance, the Badinter Commission 
emphasized that, to be accepted by international law, public participation in any 
territorial alteration process must be ongoing. In addition, the Badinter also attached 
human rights and minority rights protection as conditions of recognizing new 
states.221  
 
The Badinter Commission clearly underlined the importance of continuous public 
participation in the decision-making process of territorial alteration. With reference to 
the recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina,222 the Commission noted that: 
 “Under the constitution of Bosnia-Hercegovina as amended by Amendment 
LXVII, the citizens exercise their powers through a representative Assembly 
or by referendum”. 
 
Thus the statehood of Bosnia-Hercegovina was not recognized because there had been 
an absence of public involvement in the decision-making process, and neither a 
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representative process nor a referendum had taken place. 223  In addition, the 
Commission warned that the will of the people must be clearly ascertained from the 
three different ethnic groups (i.e. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims) residing in the 
territory.224 This instance illustrates the significance, by international legal standards, 
of the expressed will of the people as integral component of external self-
determination practices.  
2.2.4 The European Commission for Democracy Through law Guideline 1999 
The European Commission for Democracy through law (Venice Commission) 
released their reports to the Parliamentary Assembly Political Affairs Committee 
concerning the constitutional right to self-determination and secession in 1999. The 
commission report focused on the status of territorial integrity in constitutional law 
and the question of the constitutional right to self-determination. If there was no 
existing constitutional right to self-determination in a domestic law, secession was 
considered to be an illegal process.225 In addition, the Venice Commission played an 
important role in drafting the code of good practice concerning electoral matters in 
2003226 and referendums in 2007.227 The Code of Good Practice on Referendums 
provides some guidelines on conducting referendums to a legitimate and accountable 
standard.228 Although the Venice Commission frameworks were not legally binding, 
it represents a significant contribution towards clarifying certain legal issues and 
advising on referendum mechanisms with respect to the interests of the people. 
Meanwhile, the main objective of the Code of Good Practice in Electoral matter was 
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to create advice about electoral processes, providing legitimate avenues for the 
expression of the people’s will. It consisted of five, fundamental principles of 
elections which should be taken into consideration: suffrage must be universal, equal, 
free, secret and direct.229 In order to provide free and fair elections, the Code also 
mentions how crucial the fundamental rights of voters’ are, entailing both the voters’ 
freedom to form an opinion and to express their wishes. The former refers to the duty 
of states to provide adequate information to voters, including availability in the 
languages of national minorities. The latter relates to the people’s freedom to cast 
their vote; this should be free from intervention from authorities or individuals 
threatening their voting rights.230  In addition, respect for fundamental human rights, 
the stability of electoral law and the efficacy of procedural guarantees are supportive 
elements to improve the legitimacy of elections. In terms of human rights, freedom of 
expression and of the press, freedom of movement, and the freedom of assembly and 
association for political purposes - are all vital components of election campaigns.231 
The stability of electoral law is a condition for guaranteeing the people’s authority in 
voting systems. Thus electoral law (including the electoral system, electoral 
commissions, and constituencies’ power) should have the same status as statute law, 
ensuring its efficacy. 232  The efficacy of electoral procedures is based on the 
establishment of an impartial body and the proper administration of the election 
process from pre-election to the end of the electoral process.233 
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3. Why use republican liberal theory to assess the practical applications of 
external self-determination processes? 
The majority of the literature uses nationalist, liberal, communitarian or a 
combination of liberal-nationalist theories as underlying doctrines to examine self-
determination practices. Since contemporary understandings of society have shifted 
from populations being homogenous to pluralistic, one of the main difficulties in 
protecting the people during any self-determination process is upholding the political 
equality of different ethnic communities residing in a particular territory. Therefore, it 
is necessary to examine the interrelation between the people, the existing political 
institutions and legal frameworks. These previously used theories do not offer a clear 
understanding of this interrelation. In other words, they do not account for how the 
people’s authority, as an integral part of the decision-making process, can balance 
state, institutional power or can be guaranteed by legal frameworks.  
 
3.1 Nationalist theory 
Nationalist theory divides people into nations which are the foundations for a state. 234 
Although it is seen by nationalists as an artificial institution, the state is nevertheless 
the main focus of their demands. 235  Although in theory the process of self-
determination relies on nationalism by categorizing people into national units, 
(legitimizing decolonization), in practice, there is an inherent tension between the 
people disenfranchised by colonial regimes.236  
 
In order to unite people in a society, the principle of nationality is recognized as a 
foundational concept of national self-determination. According to Bluntschli, the rise 
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of nation states merely implies a political process, necessitating a legal mechanism 
such as a constitution to legalize the political process. He accepts that the principle of 
nationality is a way to unite people within the state after it has been created.237 The 
nationality principle has both support and opposition. On the one hand, a positive 
aspect is expressed by John Stuart Mill, who proposes that the nationality principle is 
a collective symbol of the people which would make them co-operate with each other 
under the same government. Nationality can be seen as a symbol of race, descent and 
feelings of either pleasure or regret over the same incidents.238 In addition, the main 
objective of the nationality principle is to protect minorities from coercive 
assimilation into a more powerful nation.239 On the other hand, Lord Actor criticizes 
the use of nationality as a standard for uniting people.240 In his opinion, the right to 
nationality itself being an arbitrary system whereby the governmental authority has 
the power to identify the specifications.241 It is a mechanism for the eradication of the 
involvement of minority groups, as they are categorized as second class citizens in a 
state.  
 
Later, the principle of nationality was rephrased as the national self-determination. As 
a result of national self-determination, certain ethnic communities may request greater 
levels of autonomy. However, nationalist theory is orientated towards a homogenous 
society as the collective identity of a nation. 242  In practice, different ethnic 
communities are not recognized as the legal entities until the governing body 
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recognizes them, depending upon the arbitrary will of the governing authorities.243 
Nationalist theorists often make little reference to a distinct cultural identity to justify 
their claims.244 Therefore, because only certain ethnic groups are eligible as political 
entities to express their will, nationalist theory does not guarantee political equality in 
a pluralistic society during external self-determination.  
  
3.2 Liberalist theory 
Liberalism is a theory regarding the freedom of individual and personal autonomy.245 
Liberalism advocates people’s rights and people’s involvement in political 
movements. States or governmental authorities are expected to represent the people, 
and be accountable to the individuals they represent, through democratic structures 
and the rule of law.246 It aims to protect rights of individuals in expressing their views 
on any political issue. It also provides a moral argument about the justification for 
political action and institutions.247 Believing in the people’s authority, liberalism 
justifies the people choosing their own political direction, and justifies the state’s 
subsequent actions.  
Liberal theorists hold that individual ‘self-respect’, i.e. the people’s moral reasoning, 
is facilitated by providing the conditions for them to judge freely and choose their 
own best interests.248 As Copp and Van Dyke state, “the right of secession consists of 
moral powers together with a moral liberty”.249 However, the application of liberal 
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theory is not necessarily concerned with the collective will of the people. There is 
controversy about ethnic inclusion in decision-making processes in a pluralistic 
society. Due to the emphasis on individual rights, in practice, liberalism may overlook 
collective rights; barriers may therefore exist which prevent negotiation or 
conciliation between different ethnic communities. 
3.3 Communitarian theory  
Communitarianism is most prominent in the mid-20th century in an international law 
context.250 It was developed from liberal theory, and was intended to solve the 
problem in the latter of the lack of collective rights. 251  The nature of 
communitarianism is intended to fulfill the gap of the ‘self’ concept in the liberal 
theory.252 Within communitarian perception, the concept of ‘self’ implies the freedom 
of choice of all people to make decision. As Ellis notes “communitarianism provides 
to undercut the conflict between fairness and utility”.253 This principle embraces the 
communal and cultural values among different backgrounds of people.254 According 
to Sandel, the communal aims and values are not just affirmed by the members of the 
community, but define their identity.255  
Communitarian theory therefore focuses on groups’ rights as collective decision-
makers and advocates the importance of people as members of a community. The 
concept of communitarianism “presumes culture to derive its value from the choice of 
individuals”.256 Within the scope of communitarianism, it stresses the connection 
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between individual and the community. 257 This theory accepts communal action and 
cultural values among people from different backgrounds.258 However, there is a 
practical difficulty for guaranteeing the individual rights of people within a 
community. When one person holds a different view to the others in a minority group, 
communitarian theory does not offer a clear basis for how this contrasting opinion is 
considered before reaching the final decision.259  
3.4 Liberal nationalist theory  
The use of liberal nationalist theory is a way of exploring “how nationalism might 
contribute to liberal thinking”.260 These theories can be combined for the purpose of 
identifying the creation of nation-states. Liberalism can acknowledge the importance 
of belonging, membership, cultural affiliations and the particular moral commitments 
that follow them.261 Likewise, nationalists can appreciate the value of personal 
autonomy and individual rights and freedoms, as well as sustain a commitment to 
social justice between and within nations.262 Liberal-nationalism advocates that all 
nations should enjoy equal rights and derives its universal structure from protecting 
individual rights as the central power.263 According to Nielsen, nations are not only 
free because of a nationalist perspective of independence. Instead, nations should be 
concerned about individual rights protection and about democratic governments 
which represent the people under the perspective of liberalism.264 These components 
reflect the combined product of two political sentiments, liberalism and nationalism.  
                                                      
257 Will Kymlicka (n 91) 208 
258 Ibid 48 
259 Allen Buchanan, (n 93) 852, 863 
260 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press 1995) 4 
261 Yael Tamir, (n 260) 6; David Miller, ‘Holding Nations Responsible’ (2004) 114(2) Ethnics 240,243  
262 Yael Tamir, (n 260) 6  
263 Yael Tamir (n 260) 6-7 
264 Kai Nielsen, (n 132) 253,260  
66 	
In external self-determination, there is a question about the application of liberal 
nationalist theory in multinational states.265 This theory cannot be applied to such 
states during external self-determination practices, because if a governing body only 
respects one national culture it ignores other minority group identities.266 
3.5 Republican liberal theory 
This study instead focuses on republican liberalism, a theory which was developed 
from liberal and communitarian theories, and which emphasizes political equality in 
any decision-making process.267 Republican liberal theory is therefore proposed as an 
alternative to the four previous theories. As the people are increasingly recognized by 
international law as actors possessing civil and political rights (or ‘moral foundational 
appeal’), republican liberalism is increasingly prevalent. When it is applied to external 
self-determination, the emphasis lies on individual liberty through self-rule in order to 
achieve self-governance with a fair, collective decision-making process.268 The theory 
addresses the interdependence between the active role of ordinary citizens, the 
procedural requirement for gathering the will of the people both individually and 
collectively, and the function of institutional and legal mechanisms to carry out the 
will of the people.269 Republican liberalism also addresses the protection of group 
rights on the basis that the people have the freedom to express, confer and discuss 
their political opinions.270  
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However, there is a controversy over the definition of the ‘people’; i.e. those who are 
entitled to determine their own territorial status.271 Republican liberal theory provides 
a way to resolve this problem by considering all people as equal, and as having social, 
cultural, and religious links with a territory.272 Thus republican liberalism uses the 
presence of such political equality as a way of increasing the legitimacy of boundary-
making processes.  When there is more than one ethnic group of people in a particular 
territory, they should all be considered equal in determining their territorial status. 
Thus, if various groups of people all demand self-government, then, since this is 
perceived as a collective expression by those directly affected by any territorial 
change, future action by the government towards self-determination is legitimized.   
 
Within republican liberal theory, people are perceived as a type of political 
community; their constituent powers directly produce collaborative decisions in 
certain situations. As a central concern of the theory, people have the right to be 
involved in the political arena. The concept of ‘the people’ in republican liberalism 
develops from both liberal and communitarian theories. The former focuses on the 
role of individual rights and government neutrality in respecting the people’s 
autonomy and their choice.273 The latter emphasizes the communal action within a 
community.274 The specific focus of each, however, excludes the focus of the other. 
Due to this limitation, republican liberal theory provides a more balanced perspective, 
in that ‘the people’ are treated with equality, taking into consideration both their 
individual and collective rights.  
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The reason for selecting only these arguments from the many theories that have been 
characterized as republican liberalist, is that each represents integral factors justifying 
the relationship between legitimacy and legality of the practical application of 
external self-determination. Republican liberal theorists endorse popular control over 
the state to improve the quality of political and legal legitimacy.275 The people’s 
consent is required as an integral part of political legitimacy276 because public consent 
is a fundamental basis of a legitimate government. Legally, the people should have 
the authority to determine appropriate boundaries for the country they wish to become 
a part of, including forming an independent state. They are right-holders and therefore 
participants in international law both individually and collectively. Individually, each 
human being has the freedom to choose their own way of life277, while collectively, 
organized groups or civil society gathers the collective will of the people in political 
affairs. The free and genuine will of the people (i.e. individuals or groups) creates a 
legal obligation for the government to put their demands into practice, which in turn 
legitimates the latter’s authority.278   
In terms of external self-determination practice, republican liberal theory emphasizes 
that political equality and state, international and legal frameworks are integral 
components. From pre- to post-decision, the people have equal opportunity to be 
involved in participating, checking, and following up on the consequential action of 
governmental authority’s action in external self-determination practices. 279  This 
mechanism can ensure that all differing views are considered before implementing 
law or policy. Similarly, non-governmental organizations are expected to work 
alongside state institutions to provide alternative channels for public involvement in 
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political affairs.280 This can guarantee the full implementation of checking and 
balancing between competing parties in state institutions. Lastly, law-creation can 
guarantee that state institutions and non-governmental organizations function properly 





The expressed will of the people is central to any political decision regarding their 
future status. In order to increase the value of a moral foundation in the international 
law system, using republican liberalism can diminish the indeterminacy of territorial 
alteration processes as it provides a viable solution for institutional and legal 
constraints in self-governing processes. Republican liberalism is compatible with the 
understanding of legitimacy and legality. If a state uses republican liberalist 
conditions for legitimacy and legality, then the practicalities of the territorial 
alteration process will be made more efficient.   
Republican liberalism can contribute positive development in territorial alteration 
process. Firstly, the people are considered equal and are able to make decisions freely 
and independently. Secondly, republican liberalism holds that in order to be 
legitimate, the expression of the people’s will needs institutional framework provided 
by the state and international guidelines. Institutional frameworks (either domestic or 
international) are necessary to check each other, so that the people are not dominated 
and this can provide a continuous process to take public opinions into consideration. 
Thirdly, the motivation for incorporating public involvement into law is required to 
create both opportunities for the people to communicate reciprocally with the political 
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Referendums as a mechanism for expressing external self-determination 
 
1. Introduction 
Having examined the legitimacy of public, political participation in any decision-
making process, it is crucial to explore external self-determination as a continuous 
process, and its practical consequences.281 There are many international frameworks 
which requires a connection between procedural mechanisms and the legitimacy of 
governmental authorities. According to the ICCPR in 1966282, Judge Dillard in the 
Western Sahara case in 1975283, the Helsinki Final Act 1975284, and the Charter of 
Paris1993285, the expressed will of the people is recognized as a basis for democracy. 
In terms of self-determination, the free and fair will of the people is a source of 
legitimacy for the process. Similarly, during the Re Secession of Quebec in 1998, the 
Supreme Court of Canada specified two conditions for a legitimate process of self-
determination, requiring “a clear majority on a clear question in favour of 
secession”.286 In this way, the expression of the will of the people would be attained 
democratically, and the negotiation between the government and the secessionists 
would happen fairly.   
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These precedents suggest that the free will of the people is a legitimizing tool for the 
practical application of self-determination.287 One way of measuring the will of the 
people in external self-determination practices that is often used by the international 
community and states is a referendum. A referendum symbolizes a bargaining tool, 
balancing power between the interests of the government and those of its citizens.288  
There are several different ways in which the republican theory can be applied to an 
understanding of the legitimacy of certain self-determination practices. Firstly, the 
application of the republican liberal theory aims to find a transparent and accountable 
mechanism with which to increase opportunities for people’s participation in politics. 
It engenders a fundamental concern for democratic process-based legitimacy, and 
advocates that in order to improve the quality of democracy, the people’s right to 
public-participation should be established.289 One way in which to do this is through 
the use of referendums. Secondly, discussions about territorial alteration in particular, 
can be approached from a republican liberal perspective, because the latter promotes 
the equality and freedom of all citizens to democratically engage in and contest public 
policy-in this case, determining their own boundaries. 290  Thirdly, republican 
liberalism holds that the right to self-determination should be laid out in clear, legal 
terms, i.e. a constitution or a statute. This is a formal legal document for ensuring that 
the will of the people will be adhered to, and that self-determination be legitimized.291 
In the absence of a constitutional right to self-determination, republican liberalism 
states the importance of guaranteeing the rights of the people through various 
institutional frameworks: e.g. state agencies, international involvement ensuring 
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human rights protections and the role of civil society as a constituent power.292 
Finally, republican liberal theory hold that people should have an equal say in the 
political arena, and that people should not be classified in terms of their ethnicity, 
race, linguistic background, etc. Therefore, due to the inherent pluralistic nature of 
modern society, republican liberalism emphasizes that all people should have the 
right to engage in political decision-making.293  
Republican liberal theory stresses the maximization of the freedom of the people and 
the minimalisation of the domination of government.294 The non-domination character 
is a fundamental concern of republican liberal theory on the basis that all people are 
recognized as free to enjoy their freedom. All are treated equally whether majority or 
minority groups of people since they are all affected by the referendum outcome. A 
contemporary understanding of citizenship, according to Pettit and Skinner, refers to 
an instrumental relationship to the overall enjoyment of liberty.295 This can be 
exemplified by the demand of a citizenship principle to identify eligible voters in 
referendum process in order to enfranchise certain groups of people, who could grant 
a right to vote and affected from the referendum outcome. In addition, the non-
domination character can also be interpreted in conjunction with non-interference or 
any actions which control people’s freedom of choice.296 A referendum is conceived 
as a tool for elites to prove that they are in favour of a democratic regime. Yet the 
administrative agencies are responsible for identifying those allowed to vote in a 
referendum. It is easy for them to use their power to arbitrarily exclude certain groups 
of people who have dissimilar opinions. The non-interference from elites to settle 
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questions and determine the referendum process value is represented as the goal of 
securing freedom of people.297  
In order to guarantee this, republican liberal theory suggests the need for a viable 
form of public participation, both through procedural processes and through 
instrumental processes. In terms of procedural mechanisms, referendums- such as 
sovereignty or independence referendums - are examples of participatory processes in 
pluralistic societies that illustrate the will of the people. An instrumental process 
involves polling stations, election-monitoring, voter identification, establishing an 
electoral commission to settle specific legal regulations for referendums and appeals. 
These institutional arrangements are understood as the ingredients of a well-
functioning deliberative process298 because these agencies are involved throughout the 
process, working on voter-identification and the pre-assessment of people’s attitudes. 
Measuring the legitimacy of the sovereign will of the people within the republican 
perspective, according to Stephen Tierney, comprises three components: simplicity, 
democratic legitimacy, and completion. Simplicity is defined by the act of popular 
expression in answering ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ in a referendum. Democratic legitimacy refers 
to the character of a referendum as a democratic mechanism seeking to maximize the 
engagement of the people. Completion deals with the satisfaction of there being both 
winning and losing sides when settling a dispute. A referendum, then, offers an 
opportunity for people to speak their mind, which is often lacking in the process of 
representative democracy.299 Another perspective comes from the work of Laurence 
Morel. By her account, the function of a referendum can be seen as evidence of 
popular legitimacy to decide over the future of the nation’s territory as a crisis-solving 
                                                      
297 Stephen Tierney, (n 3) 24 
298 Cass R. Sunstein, (n 28) 1539,1569		
299 Stephen Tierney, (n 3) 261-262 
 
75 	
device.300 A function of a referendum is to facilitate nation-building so that during 
any potential boundary alteration, the people have the opportunity to express their 
will-whether that is to agree or disagree.301 
Moreover, the function of international institutions is recognized as an institutional 
framework to provide evidence for democratic transition alongside human rights 
protection. International institutions are involved in the process of people’s 
registration and assists civic education to ensure that all people are ready to make 
decisions based on their own voice. Republicanism holds that public political 
participation is a necessary element in modern pluralistic societies as this mechanism 
ensures ‘an acceptance of rule from top down’.302 In addition, democratic processes 
must support civic education. Civil societies’ and non-state organizations’ 
involvement are important for running campaigns, raising awareness of civic 
education, and fulfilling people’s commitment to rights protection, such as freedom of 
expression, movement and peaceful assembly.303  
In terms of instrumental mechanisms, as a legal instrument, a state’s constitution must 
provide a mandate for public engagement within the democratic processes. As part of 
the relevance of republican liberal theory and the instrumental mechanism of 
democracy, the discussion draws on the importance of a domestic constitution for 
securing individuals’ rights to freedom. One aspect of republican liberal theory 
emphasizes increasing civic virtues and the checking of governmental authority. As a  
formal constitution is a legal instrument to establish the will of people,304 republican 
liberal theory emphasizes the democratic need for a domestic constitution or 
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equivalent legal instrument to recognize the people’s authority. In republican thought, 
a constitution is perceived as a particular form of government, which “incorporates 
certain ways of sharing and balancing power”.305 The sharing and balancing of the 
people’s authority and governmental power is a way to legalize people as a source of 
legitimacy. In the absence of a constitutional right to self-determination, there is a 
need for an alternative institutional framework that details the states’ obligation to 
establish certain regulations to secure the freedom of people during a referendum 
process. 
The substantive elements of the constitution or other legal framework should include 
how to allocate power to people. This can be achieved in such a way that it distributes 
more power to the people. A practical method of balancing governmental and popular 
power in the constitution-making process is mentioned in the Re Secession of Quebec 
in 1998, which highlighted the concept of constitutionalism and the rule of law. The 
Supreme Court of Canada specified that:  
“The constitutional matter is an obligation of the state and citizens”. It 
guarantees fundamental rights to all Canadian citizens and the rule of law 
forces governments to act in accordance with the law.”306  
The free and genuine will of the people is a vital component of claiming a referendum 
to be legitimate. The will of the people is credible and legitimate provided that the 
main democratic elements of a referendum are present. This chapter will examine a 
process-based approach which is used in assessing ‘the will of the people’ when the 
alteration of territorial status is in question. One of the most accepted process-based 
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approaches is holding a referendum, which is generally considered to be a direct and a 
participatory form of democracy. However, the use of referendums in external self-
determination practices does not inherently imply a dynamic and ongoing process of 
assessing the will of the people; the ‘one-shot deal’ nature of a referendum cannot be 
described as either dynamic or ongoing. In fact, critics argue that referendums are 
used as executive driving mechanisms to claim popular legitimation. Moreover, 
referendums do not necessarily demonstrate the free and fair will of the people if 
there is no state or international framework to legalize their will.307  
Legitimate or illegitimate actions will be explored alongside relevant factors that 
impact the ‘free and genuine will of the people’. Section 2 primarily outlines the 
distinction between consensual-based referendums and non-consensual based 
referendums. These dichotomies will explain how people are recognized as a source 
of legitimacy within the law. When an existing constitution does not include the 
constitutional right to self-determination, a referendum can still be held (as non-
consensual) within an institutional framework which has been recognized by an 
international community such as the European community arbitration commission on 
Yugoslavia. Section 3 discusses a number of conditions for legitimacy when assessing 
the free will of the people. These include the theoretical conditions from the Re 
secession of Quebec 1998: the clarity of referendum questions, and  the  impact  of the 
balance of power between the majority and the minority on voting practices. Other, 
practical considerations for referendum legitimacy include the eligibility of voters, 
human rights protection, and the function of international institutions concerning 
referendum organization. The last section will conclude the lessons we have learned 
                                                      
307 This issue has taken into consideration with a problem concerning the subject of self-determination. See Markku Suksi, 
Bringing in the people: A Comparison of Constitutional Forms and Practices of the Referendum (Martinus Nijhoff 1993) 247; 
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from different referendums about whether or not the will of the people was clearly 
established.  
 
2. The typology of independence referendums 
The dichotomy between consensual and non-consensual based referendums indicates 
the importance of bringing the power to the people as a source of legitimacy. In 
practice, on the one hand, a referendum may be held with a clear mandate under a 
written constitution that promotes legal certainty and predictability.308 However, on 
the other hand, holding a referendum faces numerous constitutional constraints.309 
Referendums may be held without the validity of domestic law; in most cases, these 
actions are denied by the parent state’s court as being unconstitutional,310 e.g. in 
Tatarstan, and Catalonia. The court’s prerogative is to maintain the status quo, 
preserving territorial integrity rather than giving the people a chance to determine 
their own political status. In the case of Catalonia, the Spanish constitutional court’s 
judgment (JCC) 103/ 2008311 commented that:  
“The key to this case rests on the basis of whether, firstly from a general 
perspective, an analysis of what should be considered constitutionally as a 
referendum, and later, and already on a more specific plane, to decide whether 
what the contested law considers to be a consultation based on the alleged 
implicit authority of the Autonomous Community of the Basque Country is in 
                                                      
308 There is a consensual action between two governments to agree on holding a referendum. See Allen Buchanan (n 159) 338-
339; Marcelo G. Kohen (n 147) 3 
309 Stephen Tierney (n 3) 266-268 
310 Anne Peters ‘The Crimean Vote of March 2014 as an Abuse of the Institution of the Territorial Referendum’ (2014) 
<http://ssrn/com/abstract=2463536> accessed 16 October 2014 
311  Constitutional Court Judgment No. 103/2008 (11 September 2008) (Unofficial translation) 
https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es/ResolucionesTraducidas/103-2008,%20of%20September%2011.pdf accessed 15 October 
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reality an authentic referendum although it avoids that term, as if the 
conclusion were to be reached that it is in effect a referendum, the contested 
law would be unconstitutional”.312 
On this basis, external self-determination practice on independence referendums can 
be divided into two different types: consensual-based referendums and non-
consensual referendums.  
2.1 Consensual-based referendums 
A consensual-based referendum is where two parties (i.e. state governments) reach an 
agreement to hold a referendum within the specific provisions of the law,313 for 
example, in Eritrea, East Timor, Montenegro, Southern Sudan, and Scotland. From 
the perspective of international law, when the central government of a state commits 
itself in advance to respect the will of the people, the latter is a way to balance the 
territorial integrity of a state.314 In the eyes of the international law, consensual-based 
referendums conform both politically and legally to the constitution or equivalent 
instruments, therefore legitimizing the external self-determination process.315  
Nonetheless, in practice even though consensual referendums are carried out with the 
consent of governments, the free and genuine will of the people is contested 
depending on the context of the protection of the people’s fundamental freedoms (i.e. 
freedom of expression, movement, or association) and the role of the media and the 
role of civil society during the process.316  
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2.2 Non consensual-based Referendums 
A non consensual-based referendum is where two governmental parties cannot reach 
an agreement to hold a referendum,317 for example, Quebec, Slovenia and Catalonia. 
The organization of the referendum may be achieved by the efforts of a group or 
section of a state wishing to withdraw from the political and constitutional authority 
of a larger state and to achieve statehood for a new territorial unit.318 However, the 
people’s expression of their will may oppose the existing constitution which often 
prioritizes the indivisibility of a state over respecting the rights of the people.319 
However, the legitimacy of non-consensual referendums is based on the recognition 
of satisfactory human rights protection, including granting political equality between 
people, guaranteeing fundamental freedoms, and the involvement of media, and civil 
society during a referendum.   
 
Some fundamental observations will be made about consensual-based referendums 
and non consensual-based referendums. There are two major factors which have the 
potential to improve the quality of a referendum: the protection of the fundamental 
freedom of the people and the involvement of political parties, media and civil 
societies during any decision-making process. In practice, despite the presence of a 
constitution, the will of the people in consensual-based referendums can still be 
limited due to the lack of human rights protection, governmental control over the 
media’s broadcasting, and restrictions of civil society’s involvement in civic 
education. On the other hand, the proposal of non-consensual based referendums is 
                                                      
317 Allen Buchanan (n 313) 241-243 
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necessarily contentious, whereby local governments or opposition parties express to 
the central government that a referendum to assess the will of the people is needed. 
An example of this is the initiative of the Quebec (federal) government to advocate 
for a referendum on Quebec secession. 320  In addition, non consensual-based 
referendums rely on greater civil society engagement in civic education and the 
distribution of information to broad groups of people.321 These elements can reinforce 
the free and genuine will of the people as they have access to a range of information. 
During any decision-making process, if the existing governmental and non-
governmental institutions work jointly during a referendum process, this will increase 
the chances of a credible outcome for the referendum.  
 
3. The application of republican liberalism to referendum processes 
Republican liberalism mandates the active role of the people as constituent powers in 
any decision-making process.322 Therefore governmental authorities have a duty to 
create opportunities for public involvement in order to protect the interests of the 
people. As the expressed will of the people is a source of legitimacy, both practical 
democratic processes and theoretical democratic ideals (such as human rights) are 
crucial to improve the quality of territorial alteration processes. All the people can 
confer legitimacy on boundary alteration and policy-making, which gives them 
political equality in any decision-making process.323 According to the precedent of the 
Re Secession of Quebec, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that all people can 
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exercise their right to self-government through democratic process and any 
functioning democracy requires a continuous process of public involvement resting 
ultimately on public opinion reached by the interplay of the people’s ideas.324  
The following section will look at five interrelated factors which determine whether 
the free and fair will of the people has clearly been ascertained.  
3.1 Clear wording of referendum questions 
Constructing a clearly-worded question in a referendum is an important element of 
ensuring the credibility and legitimacy of the will of the people.325 The questions 
posed on ballot papers must be consistent with the outcomes, in terms of identifying 
the wishes of the population. In other words, the will of the people must be genuinely 
expressed in order to have legitimacy. The importance of constructing clear 
referendum questions is displayed in the Code of Good Practice on Referendums of 
the European Commission for Democracy through Law. The objective of this Code is 
to provide guidelines for best practice when holding a referendum, including setting 
referendum questions. Because the question has a direct impact on the people’s 
freedom and future, referendum questions must be constructed in a way which 
ordinary people can understand the implications.  
 
Under the scope of this Code, elements of clarity and conciseness in a comprehensive 
referendum question are necessary to give people enough understanding to determine 
their future. The standards that the Code stipulates has a broader scope than simply 
independence referendums. The explanation stipulates that:  
                                                      
324 In re Secession Quebec [1998] (n 57) para65,68 
325 Stephen Tierney, (n 3) 226; Ilker Gokhan Sen, (n 8) 255 
 
83 	
“The clarity of the question is a crucial aspect of voters freedom to form an 
opinion. The question must not be misleading; it must not suggest an answer, 
particularly by mentioning the presumed consequences of approving or 
rejecting the proposal; voters must be able to answer the questions asked 
solely by yes, no or a blank vote; and it must not ask an open question 
necessitating a more detailed answer. Lastly, electors must be informed of the 
impact of their votes, and thus of the effects of the referendum (is it legally 
binding or consultative? does a positive outcome lead to the adoption or repeal 
of a measure, or is it just one stage in a longer procedure?)”.326 
Undoubtedly, a referendum mechanism provides a democratic method of ascertaining 
the views of the electorate on important political questions on a particular occasion.327 
From these examples, it is self-evident that the clear manifestation of the people’s will 
would confer legitimacy on demands for secession. After the Canadian Supreme 
Court decision in the Re Secession Quebec, the standard setting of the Clarity Act 
2000 regarding the referendum question was that it must clear and free from 
ambiguity as a precondition for considering the clear expression of the will of the 
population.328  
In this manner, the Supreme Court of Canada formulation is specified in the preamble 
and article 1(3), (4) of the Clarity Act;   
“The result of a referendum on the secession of a province from Canada must 
be free of ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the 
support it achieves if that result is to be taken as an expression of the 
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democratic will that would give rise to an obligation to enter into negotiations 
that might lead to secession.”329 
“A clear expression of the will of the population of a province that the 
province cease to be part of Canada could not result from 
(a) a referendum question that merely focuses on a mandate to negotiate 
without soliciting a direct expression of the will of the population of that 
province on whether the province should cease to be part of Canada; or 
(b) a referendum question that envisages other possibilities in addition to the 
secession of the province from Canada, such as economic or political 
arrangements with Canada, that obscure a direct expression of the will of the 
population of that province on whether the province should cease to be part of 
Canada”.330 
What matters here is acceptance of the formulation of the Supreme Court of Canada 
as offering a common standard for referendums. A clearly expressed question 
supposes a clear will of the population before taking the further step of negotiations 
leading to an independent state. The clear will of the people is legitimate and credible 
if their will were determined with non-arbitrary or dominant by elites. Thus, any bias 
in the question asked may undermine the legitimacy of a referendum as a free 
expression of the will of the people.  
In Re Secession Quebec, the clarity is premised on the basis that “clarity can be 
realized in a referendum on secession by posing a short and direct question and 
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obtaining an enhanced majority”. 331  Pursuant to this, although the Canadian 
Constitution does not address the use of a referendum procedure, and the results of a 
referendum have no direct role or legal effect in our constitutional scheme, 
conducting a referendum undoubtedly may provide a democratic method of 
ascertaining the views of the people on importance political questions on a particular 
occasion.332  
Accordingly, the practice in Scotland illustrates the logic of a clearly-worded question 
being compatible with people’s feeling of security. The referendum legislation on 
Scottish independence set out the wording of the question to attain the highest 
standards of fairness and transparency after consultation with independent experts. 
The agreed referendum sentence was legislated by the Scottish Parliament, with just 
one question on independence. Then the question was set out in the Referendum Bill 
to be introduced by the Scottish government, subject to the Electoral Commission’s 
review process. After a review process, the Electoral Commission submitted the 
question with a report to the UK Parliament on the clarity of the question.333 
Following this, interested parties were consulted, as they were capable of proposing 
wording to the Electoral Commission as part of the review process.334 This review 
process contributed to the intelligibility of the proposed referendum question, 
however, despite this, some academics pointed out that the Scottish Parliament set up 
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the question in favour of the nationalist perspective, and other people’s demands were 
not taken into account.335  
Another consideration for the importance of clear articulation in the wording of 
questions in a referendum was referred to in Order 30 of the Scotland Act (1998). The 
question presented to voters in a ballot comprised one ballot paper in the referendum, 
and the ballot paper must give the voters a choice between only two responses.336 The 
Commission did research, in collaboration with members of the public, to assess the 
proposed question in terms of intelligibility, simplicity and neutrality. During this 
information- gathering stage, there were many individuals, organizations and 
members of committees who gave their opinions on how to format an intelligible 
question with a clear, simple and neutral disposition.337 Participation and gathering 
information from all stakeholders are necessary components of constructive question 
in conformity with people’s demand. In order to avoid any confusion, a proponent of 
the phrase “do you agree” shall be replaced by a more neutral phrase, as they were 
concerned that this phrase might lead people into supporting independence rather than 
remaining with the status quo. Instead of asking “do you agree”, they proposed the 
following wording:  
 “Should Scotland be an independent country?” Yes or No.338 
It is vital to note that the formulation of ballot questions is often placed in the hands 
of state organizations and sometimes with contribution from international institutions. 
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This could be involved parliamentary decision-making process, executive bodies or 
international institutions such as the United Nations. On this point, a proposition to 
shape the wording of questions requires a consultative process to ensure ballot 
questions are in agreement with people’s concern339 such as holding public-forum 
debate, doing researches. Referendum questions should be clear and concise without 
any intent to mislead public opinion and attain a particular outcome because a clearly 
worded question provides a tool for eliciting information about what people think, 
what they feel and what they want. 
As regards the external aspect of conducting referendums, no leading questions 
should be used to examine the people’s will on independence, equal sovereignty or 
greater autonomy demands. Further, in light of independence referendum procedures, 
the strategic wording of ballot questions is mostly divided into two patterns: the 
traditional style with a yes/no answer to a specific question or two choices with either 
a first or a second answer-option. Unlike the traditional style, multiple options in a 
referendum question allows for differentiated voting choices. Two or more decisive 
choices in a referendum let people express their preference decidedly for one option.   
Before discussing below the specific examples of the wording of the question, it is 
important to note three fundamental concerns for the formation of questions. First, the 
wording should be clear and free from ambiguity. This includes using unbiased 
questions to avoid   influencing people to respond in a way that does not accurately 
reflect their positions. Secondly, the referendum question should not ask two 
deliberative matters simultaneously as this confuses people’s decision-making. In this 
respect, voters should not be forced to vote for more than one matter. Thirdly, the 
ballot question should include an option to retain the “status quo”. Maintaining the 
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status quo prevents boundary conflicts and preserves the interests of peace and 
security, given the importance of the territorial stability of states’ authority.  
 
The following section elaborates on three different patterns of referendum questions. 
These examples will illustrate the inconclusive will of the people due to the content of 
the question put to the voters.  
 
3.1.1 Ballot question with the influence of elite-driven undertakings 
This sort of ballot questions is requested from a certain number of smaller elite 
groups, such as a political party leader or the leader of the opposition. An example of 
such an elite-driven referendum is the British Cameroons. British Cameroons was a 
mandate territory under the League of Nations entrusted to the British Empire until 
1946. After this, the status of Cameroons shifted to Trust Territories under the United 
Nations. In terms of territorial administration, the British Empire administered 
Cameroons as an integral part of Nigeria and had shared the political advances in 
Nigeria. There was a division of territory in Cameroons: the northern part was 
administered as a part of the Northern region of Nigeria whereas the southern part 
was separated from Nigeria as a separate unit. Thus, British administration was 
indirectly controlled over these two areas with the commitment to release these 
territories as a full self-government within the year 1960.340  
Prior to a referendum in 1961, there was a persistent objection to the colonial power 
from the western educated elites. They demanded independence and reunification of 
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Cameroons.341 In 1961, the British Cameroons referendum was organized by the 
United Nations after consultation with the political leaders of the territory on the 
content of referendum questions. The different referendum questions were proposed 
by the Kamerun National Democratic Party (KNDP) and the leader of the opposition 
respectively. The KNDP requested secession and the maintenance of the Trusteeship 
Agreement before reunifying with the French zones whereas the opposition requested 
integration with Nigeria instead. 342  After listening to these proposals, two 
referendums were carried out separately in the northern and southern parts of the 
Cameroons343 because local populations had dissimilar opinions about their future 
destiny.  
In the Northern parts of the Cameroons, the question posed on the ballot paper was 
multiple-choice but specifically implied a particular outcome to join Nigeria: 
1) Do you wish the Northern Cameroons to be part of the Northern Region of 
Nigeria when the Federation of Nigeria becomes independent?  
  2) Are you in favour of deciding the future of the Northern Cameroons at a 
later date?344 
These two questions were biased because they reflected the agenda of the former 
British colonial rulers for the Cameroons to join Nigeria.  
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In the Southern parts of the Cameroons, the question posed on the ballot paper was 
also multiple-choice, but asked whether the people wanted to join Nigeria or 
Cameroon. The two questions asked:  
1) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent 
Federation of Nigeria? OR 
2) Do you wish to achieve independence by joining the independent Republic 
of Cameroon?345  
This question option in on the ballot in Southern Cameroons leaves some doubts 
about its neutrality. The questions did not give the people a chance to choose self-
government. The referendum question in the Southern parts of Cameroon did not 
offer the status quo option as remaining a Trusteeship under another country’s 
administration. The first option also satisfied the British colonial authorities’ aim to 
integrate Cameroons with its former colony, Nigeria. Likewise, the referendum 
questions in the Southern parts of Cameroon did not respond to the Anglophone 
minorities. Further, it could be argued that the people were not consulted about the 
question, and therefore no alternative to the choice between integration with Nigeria 
or reunification with Cameroon was provided. For example, the traditional rulers of 
Southern Cameroon had requested a sovereign Southern Cameroon state without 
association with either the French Cameroons or Nigeria.346 This was not presented as 
an option in the question.  
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3.1.2 Biased and misleading questions 
Having considered the biased and misleading questions, there were three related 
issues. First, the question on the ballot paper used either positive or negative phrases 
with a one-sided character.347 Respondents are limited in their answer. Second, the 
use of vague words or statements could influence how people understood and 
answered the questions.348 Third, the wording of the proposed referendum question 
contained several questions in one sentence.349 Some of these questions were also 
biased, implying that the electorate would be lead to a particular outcome.  
It is also relevant to look at some equivocal statements on ballot questions. To 
illustrate what I mean, consider two different formats for ballot questions: in Croatia 
and the USSR’s union referendums. In the case of Croatia, the wording does not 
include a straightforward question. A Decree calling for a Referendum on the 
Independence of the Republic of Croatia was issued with two sets of options. The 
content of the wording offered on the ballot paper was:  
1. Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia, as a sovereign and independence 
state which guarantees the cultural autonomy and all civil liberties of Serbs 
and members of other nationalities in Croatia, shall enter into an association of 
sovereign states together with other republics (according to the suggestion of 
the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia for solving of the state 
crisis in the SFRY)?  
2. Do you agree that the Republic of Croatia shall remain in Yugoslavia as a 
unitary federal state (according to the suggestion of the Republic of Serbia and 
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the Socialist Republic of Montenegro for solving of the state crisis in the 
SFRY)?350  
The referendum phrasing implied the possibility of a territorial arrangement made by 
the administrative power of Yugoslavia. When considering the content of the first 
question, this phrasing did not deliver a fair test and allow for a decisive expression of 
the wishes of the population. The wording did not reflect the reality of the situation, 
as it did not directly ask people to express their views on further negotiations leading 
to secession. Rather, the first question and statement only implicitly referred to the 
actual independence of Croatia. It also contained the possibility of integration or 
association with other republics.351 This type of question, which forces people to 
deliberate multiple matters simultaneously can potentially confuse people. In terms of 
wording, the second question seems clearer to ask people to remain territorial status 
quo with Yugoslavia. However, the two questions did not reflect the demand of the 
Serbs (i.e. ethnic minorities) residing in Croatia, as they requested for a greater level 
of political autonomy in Croatia.352  
Similarly, the referendum conducted in the former Soviet Union illustrates a number 
of different scenarios in the referendum process. In 1991, the President of the former 
Soviet Union, Gorbachev, proposed a plan for organizing the USSR’s all-union 
referendum. The proposed date for the all-union referendum was 17th March 1996. 
The purpose of holding referendums in the Soviet Union was to maintain the Soviet 
Union Federation by using a referendum to ensure that the will of the people was 
evaluated within a democratic process. At the early stage, the USSR’s all union 
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referendum question was boycotted by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania Georgia, Armenia 
and Moldova. Accordingly, these former republics set up their own referendums on 
independence.    
The construction of the question in the USSR’s all-union referendum seemed to be 
more purposive, with the aim being to “preserve the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics”. It asks: 
“Do you consider necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic as a renewed Federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the 
rights and freedom of an individual of any nationality will be fully 
guaranteed?”353 
In this regard, Russia claimed “the question posed was tantamount to asking whether 
republics had the right to secede”. 354  Within the content of this question, the 
referendum proposal misleads people as to whether or how to renew the federation or 
how the new constitutional arrangement should be constructed. In addition to this, the 
paper contained several questions to which people could only answer “Yes” or “No”. 
A different set of referendum questions in the Baltic Republics adopted a simpler 
approach, with one sentence requiring an answer of “yes” or “no”. The package of 
referendum questions asked:  
 Do you want the independence of the Republic of Estonia to be restored?"355 
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"Do you support the democratic and independent statehood of the Republic of 
Latvia?"356 
“Are you for the independent and democratic state of Lithuania?357 
In this group, the language of the referendum questions in Estonia stressed the 
restoration of independence. It did not consult people about the creation of a new 
state. The purposive approach was clear in the sense of regaining independence after 
the illegal occupation by the Soviet Union. The phrasing of “democratic statehood” in 
Latvia and Lithuania also implies an objective of independence so as to pursue a 
democratic political system and establish democratic institutions.358 However, this set 
of questions demonstrates how the wording of the questions was not neutral in 
meaning. It contained a one-sided character, which supports state independence.  
Likewise, on 5th March 1991, the road to independence for Georgia began with the 
declaration of secession by the Georgian parliament. The form of referendum 
questions in Georgia was a one-sentence question. The content of the wording offered 
on the ballot paper was:   
"Do you support the restoration of the independence of Georgia in accordance 
with the Act of Declaration of Independence of Georgia of May 26, 1918?"359  
The Act of Declaration of Independence of Georgia in 1918 was entered into force in 
the aftermath of the Russia Revolution 1917. Within the content of the Act, the status 
of Georgia was recognized as a sovereign state with a theoretical right to secede.360 
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Georgia’s claim to independence was essentially based on its allegedly illegal 
incorporation into the Soviet Union in 1921.361 The proclamation of independence of 
Georgia can be regarded as a restoration of independence rather than seeking new 
state independence. The referendum question asked people whether they supported 
the idea of an independent state. However, it could be argued that the effect of the 
wording on electoral behaviour was to encourage voters to consider only one response 
-in favour of independence. Another important point was the reaction of the non-
Georgian population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, who largely boycotted the 
referendum. The outcome in favour of pro-independence was therefore open to 
criticism because the non-Georgians voted under constraint with the government 
creating a threatening atmosphere.362   
On 1st and 10th December 1991, two fellow south Caucasian countries, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan decided to conduct independence referendums. Armenia was the only 
Soviet Republic that was seeking its independence in conformity to Soviet law on 
secession, which involves a series of referenda over five years and prolonged 
negotiations with the central authorities.363 
 “Do you agree that the Republic of Armenia should be an independent and 
democratic republic outside the USSR?” 364 
Although the phrasing of the referendum question sounds clear in terms of 
independence, some Armenian opposition leaders pointed out that “the wording of the 
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referendum was virtually impossible to vote “no” because this type of question is a 
leading question to say “yes”.  
After Gorbachev’s resignation and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the 
referendum in Azerbaijan was held under the special circumstances because of the 
ongoing dispute over Nagorno Karabakh. Ultimately, the Azerbaijan Parliament 
adopted the constitutional act on the restoration of the state independence. According 
to the constitution, the status of Azerbaijan was under the current system of 
government follows the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic of 1918-1920. Following 
this, the ballot paper of the referendum included a one-sentence question:  
 “Do you support the Constitutional Act on the State Independence of 
Azerbaijan?”365 
This question took for granted that people knew what the specific act was about. In 
addition, people could respond to the question according to their own interpretation of 
the act.  
On 1st December 1991, a referendum in Ukraine was carried out with two separate 
ballots. In addition to the all-union question, the specific republic question asked:   
“Do you agree that Ukraine should be part of a Union of Soviet Sovereign 
Republics   on the basis of the declaration on the state sovereignty of 
Ukraine?”366 
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As well as these multiple-choice questions, there was also a specific question for 
assessing the will of the populations in the three Western oblasts of Lviv, Ivano-
Frankivsk and Ternopil. Voters were asked to respond to a third question: 
“Do you agree that Ukraine should be an independent state, which 
independently decides its domestic and foreign policies, which guarantees the 
equal rights of all citizens, regardless of nationality and religion?”367 
All things considered, it seems reasonable to assume that the all-union and republic 
wide questions were too complicated to make people feel secure in expressing their 
will to support independence. In addition to this, the various referendum questions 
made a series of contradictory statements about the political implications of each 
choice. Nevertheless, according to the CSCE report on the referendum in Ukraine in 
1991, it appears that over three-quarters of all eligible voters in Ukraine chose 
independence.368  
Referendums in Kirgizia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan faced a lot of resistance from 
the government because these central governments wanted to sustain peace rather 
than become independent states. According to a report on Turkmenistan’s referendum 
on independence, there were two questions on the ballot paper:  
1) “Do you agree with the legislative establishment of Turkmenistan as an 
independent democratic state?” 
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2) “Do you support the statement of the president and Supreme Soviet of the 
Turkmenistan Soviet Socialist Republic on the domestic and foreign policy of 
Turkmenistan and the practical activity to implement it?” 
In this case, the referendum question on independence was presented with a vaguely 
worded question about support for the domestic and foreign policy of the president of 
the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan.369  
The wording question offered on the ballot papers in Kirghizia and Uzbekistan was: 
“Do you consider it necessary the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign states, in which the 
rights and freedoms of an individual of any nationality will be fully 
guaranteed?” 
If one compares this to the question in the USSR’s all-union referendum, the word 
“republics” has been changed to “states”. Notably, it did not directly ask people about 
independence as their conservative governments wanted the union to stay intact. 
Holding a referendum in this case was not necessarily a mechanism to ascertain the 
wishes of the population.370 
Furthermore, it is interesting to look at another example of the referendum question in 
Tatarstan. The wording simply asked voters to choose either ‘yes’ and ‘no’. In 
response to pressure from nationalists, the Parliament of Tatarstan made the decision 
to hold a referendum with a long sentence to determine once and for all the status of 
the republic. The question asked:  
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 “Do you consider that the Republic of Tatarstan is a sovereign state, a subject 
of international law, entitled to develop relations with the Russian Federation 
and other states on the basis of treaties between equal partners?”371  
Looking at the content of the question, the phrase “a subject of international law” 
allowed room for various interpretations.372 The Russian government, the Tatarstan 
president and the nationalist groups all held different views. The Russian government 
believed the referendum was an attempt to secede, and so it challenged the validity of 
the referendum, which was assessed by the First Russian Constitutional Court in the 
Tatarstan case (1992).373 Tatarstan’s president insisted however that by carrying out a 
referendum the intention was not to secede from the Russian Federation but to 
conform their desire for a degree of self-governance. The nationalist groups claimed 
the wording of the referendum could be used to legitimize a secession.  
There are two differing views pertaining to the clear wording of the referendum 
question: the constitutional court’s rulings and the dissenting opinion of Justice E.M. 
Ametistov. The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the Tatarstan case 
stressed that “the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tatarstan violated the 
requirement of clarity and unambiguousness in the wording of questions put to a 
referendum”.374  The wording of the question seemed to influence people to vote in a 
particular direction. It was not a clearly worded question in terms of intelligibility and 
neutrality. It also contained several questions phrased in one sentence forcing citizens 
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to answer more than one question simultaneously. Thus, it could be said that the 
people did not enjoy either freedom of expression, or their right to participate in the 
discussion and adoption of laws and decisions.375 There are three reasons for the 
Constitutional Court of Russia’s ruling to reject the legality of the referendum 
undertaking. First, the wording of the referendum was unconstitutional in the sense of 
clarity and being free from ambiguity. Second, the Tatarstan Declaration of 
sovereignty was the equivalent of an initial unilateral declaration of independence. 
Third, the content of the Tatarstan constitutional amendment implicitly referred to the 
status of Tatarstan as not being a part of the Russian Federation.376  
By contrast, Judge Ametistov supported the transition of the former autonomous 
Tatarstan to the status of a sovereign state:  
“the goal of referendum undertaking determined the universally recognized 
principle of self-determination and equality of peoples, [and] correspondingly 
constructs its relations with the Russian Federation and with other states and 
republics in a new way, on the basis of treaties between equal parties and the 
delegation on this basis of a number of legal powers to the bodies of the 
Russian Federation, [this] corresponds to the interests and will of the people of 
the Republic of Tatarstan as constituted in the Fundamental Law of the 
Republic”.377  
He stressed the relationship between the right to self-determination and the right to 
political participation. If the referendum question lacked clarity and was ambiguous, 
the expression of the will of the people would be violated according to Article 25 of 
                                                      
375 Ibid 42	
376 Sabirjan Badretdinov, ‘Tatarstan Sovereignty, Twenty Year Later’ The Kazan Herald (21 March 2012) 
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=163695060460074&id=393010697473557 accessed 16 November 2015 
377 In the case of the verification of the constitutionality of the declaration of state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan of 30 
August 1990, (n 373) 47–48 
101 	
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, which guaranteed the 
free expression of the voters in how public affairs were conducted directly or through 
freely chosen representatives.378 In addition, he claimed that in terms of universality 
and the indivisibility of human right, the USSR did not fulfil their legal obligations. 
Moreover, he pointed out that the expression of the will of the people was recognized 
by the international community as an act of self-determination.  
From this case, it is vital to note that everyone involved understood the key phrase 
‘state sovereignty’ differently. For Tatar nationalists, the words meant full 
independence from Russia; for Tatarstan’s president, they probably meant a greater 
degree of autonomy from Moscow; and for Moscow itself, they presumably 
represented a legal and constitutional error to be corrected as soon as possible.379 
From the Russian’s perspective, what was in question was the verification of the 
constitutionality of the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Republic of 
Tatarstan of 30th August 1990. On this point, the Constitutional Court of the Russian 
Federation reiterated the supremacy of the laws of the Russian federation. 380 A 
change of status of a subject of the Russian Federation might be done by mutual 
agreement between the Russian Federation and the subject of the Russian Federation 
if it did not contradict the Constitution of the Russian Federation or federal laws.381  
 
 
                                                      
378 In the case of the verification of the constitutionality of the declaration of state sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan of 30 
August 1990, (n 373) 47–48 
379Sabirjan Badretdinov, ‘Tatarstan Sovereignty, Twenty Year Later’ The Kazan Herald (n 376) 
380 Article 76 (5) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that “The laws and other legislative acts of the subjects of 
the Russian Federation may not contradict the federal laws adopted according to the first and second parts of this Article. In case 
of a contradiction between a federal law and an act issued in the Russian Federation the federal law shall be applied”.   
<http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/minoranze/russia1.pdf > accessed 15 November 2015 
381 Article 66 (5) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that “The status of a subject of the Russian Federation may 
be changed upon mutual agreement of the Russian Federation and the subject of the Russian Federation and according to the 
federal constitutional law.” <http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/minoranze/russia1.pdf> accessed 15 November 2015 
102 	
3.1.3 Formulating questions with no “status quo” options 
Territorial stability is a fundamental principle of international law that aims at 
preserving peace and security of states. The “status quo” is considered to include the 
continuity and unity of a state’s boundary and prevention of territorial conflicts. Here, 
there are two comparative examples with such an option pattern provided and not 
provided in referendum questions: Southern Sudan and Crimea.  
In the Southern Sudan case, the ballot question was formulated with two choices: to 
confirm the unity of Sudan or to secede.382 Under the scope of the Southern Sudan 
Referendum Act (2009), article 6, the people of Southern Sudan shall cast vote for 
either:  
1. Confirmation of the unity of the Sudan by sustaining the system of 
governance established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the 
Constitution  
2. Secession.383 
In accordance with the international applicable standard for framing a referendum 
question as set out in the Clarity Act (2000), these multiple options are clearly 
designed to give people the choice of either the first or second option. This illustrates 
an unbiased question that favours no particular outcome because there are no 
intentions to obscure the will of the people.  
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In contrast, the Crimea referendum in 2014 ballot question was designed with two 
unclear options. In this case, instead of yes or no answers, voters needed to select a 
first or second choice. The two questions in the Crimea case were:  
1) Are you in favour of unifying Crimea with Russia as a part of the Russian 
Federation?  
2) Are you in favour of restoring the 1992 Constitution and the status of 
Crimea as a part of Ukraine?    
The multiple choices in the Crimea referendum question were ambiguous since these 
questions implicitly led to incorporation into Russia.384 The first question used a 
biased word to consult people about returning to the Russian Federation. The second 
question did not give people any information about the content of the 1992 
Constitution. In addition, there was no choice for voters to choose the status quo.385 
Therefore, the referendum in Crimea was not democratic and the outcome not 
legitimate because the wording of the question did not provide enough choice for the 
Crimean people to accurately express their will. In other words, these questions 
offered people an illusion of choice as they had only two options, either to integrate 
with Russia or remain a part of Ukraine. The referendum question was established in 
favour of Russian’s demands rather than the interests of the Crimean people.  
In conclusion, any referendum question must be as clear as possible so that voters 
understand the important choice they are being asked to make. In this regard, a 
decisive and fair expression of the wishes of the population should derive from the 
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clear wording of questions in referendums. This element reflects to an appeal for 
legitimacy in referendums so that their outcomes might be respected. Another 
advantage of clarity is that all citizens can easily understand a question rather than a 
complicated sentence formulated with the reasoning of administrative bodies 
disguised so as mislead the people in a particular way.  
 
3.2 Majority and minority relations 
In the case of the Re Secession of Quebec in 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada 
directly referenced the Canadian constitution, which provided a fundamental basis for 
accommodating connection between a democratic procedure and the sovereign will of 
the people had to be ascertained, regardless of their cultural or group identity.386 It 
continued that all people could exercise their right to self-government through the 
democratic process.387 The Canadian Constitution notes that the will of the people 
should not only rely on the will of the majority, but equally that minority interests 
should have an equal footing when participating in a political agenda.388 Under the 
Constitution, a democratic society should combine the ultimate power of the people 
and a legal framework to allow participation.389 Finally, the Court ruled that the 
reconciliation of a majority and the dissenting voices of a minority are also 
recognized as the highlights of a functioning democracy.390  
In a pluralistic society, balancing the interests of the majority and the minority is 
inevitable. Democratic legitimacy depends on this interplay between a wide variety of 
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group interests.391 Importantly, the fundamental freedoms of all people must be 
equally protected, regardless of their racial, ethnic or linguistic background. This 
includes freedom of expression, association, assembly and free elections.392 Any 
person belonging to a minority is recognized by the international community as 
having the right to these freedoms. In practice, they therefore should have the right to 
express themselves individually or collectively, through political parties, religious 
organizations, or other identity-based associations.393 In other words, all people within 
a state have the ability to check and control the governmental authority. The supreme 
authority of the people is recognized by the highest laws in the state as crucial to 
balancing the power of the government. 394 If a state guarantees this popular authority, 
this will promote democratic equality and the inclusion of minorities in any decision-
making process.  
From the example, the Canadian Constitutional text and structure conforms to the 
republican liberal concept that stresses on the balancing the needs of public interests 
with limiting government authority. Democracy is accepted as a fundamental 
component in the constitution.395 It seems clear that the very function of democratic 
systems is to encompass the right of the minority to engage in and express their will 
whilst simultaneously upholding majority rule.396 Thus, the people’s will does not rely 
solely on the majority rule of the people, but must be reached through compromise 
with minority interests. These elements consist of constitutionalism, individual right 
protection, minority rights, participation, and public deliberation. 
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The term ‘constitutionalism’ refers to the modern form of constitution, which is 
associated with the people’s sovereignty, equality, and the rule of law. In other words, 
constitutionalism balances the sovereign power of the people and governmental 
authority. When a state writes a constitution, public law experts suggest that the 
content should include the rule of law, the need for due process, and equality before 
the law.397 As Dicey points out “the rule of law permeates to the constitution”.398 
Popular constitutionalism implements the ‘rule of law’ because the constitution 
increases the people’s authority and limits governmental power. One of the ultimate 
aims of the rule of law is to distribute justice amongst different groups of people in 
society. A fair, democratic decision-making process is accepted as a mechanism to 
give equal opportunity to the people. A fully legitimate constitution not only functions 
as a supreme law but also ensures the political participation of all citizens. 399 Within 
a pluralistic society, people’s inclusion in the democratic decision-making process is a 
necessary element for equality. In order to justify the legitimacy of any decision-
making process, “it must be determined by the critical judgment of free and equal 
citizens”.400 
At an international level, the rule of law is a complementary principle to the national 
law of individual states.401 It relates to minimum standards of fairness both in the 
substantive content and the procedural content of a constitution. Substantive and 
procedural elements of the rule of law consist of: the supremacy of law, equality 
before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
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arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.402 It is undeniable that the rule of 
law is a meaningful concept, which guarantees the rights of all people to participate in 
democratic decision-making processes whilst simultaneously upholding human 
rights.403  
By contrast, the protection of minority rights is a principle which aims to balance the 
diversity of the population. The division and separation of minorities weakens their 
identity. The categorization of minority people is based on their ethnic, language, 
cultural or religious differences. With reference to the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966, the protection of minority rights is spelled out in 
Article 27 that:  
“persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
conformity with  the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, 
to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language”.404 
In addition, Francesco Capotorti (the Special Rapporteur of the UN Sub-Commission 
on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities) and Jules 
Deschenes (a Canadian member in the Sub-Commission) offer a definition of 
‘minority’. They state that:  
“A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a state, in a non-
dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the state- possess 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of 
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the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed 
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language”.405 
“A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-
dominant position in that state, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic 
characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, 
having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by 
a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the 
majority in fact and law”.406 
The above definition refers to the non-dominant status of minority groups of people 
within a society. It is important therefore for minorities to have ‘the right to an 
identity’ in order to prevent their potential assimilation by the central government and 
to preserve their ethno-cultural background. 407  Given that the right to self-
determination is recognized as a collective one, the protection of minority rights is 
also seen by the international community as a group protection.408 In other words, 
people belonging to certain ethnic, linguistic or cultural groups should enjoy their 
right to self-determination and consequently their rights of citizenship - to vote, to 
organize politically, and to advocate their views publicly with a fair hearing.409 A 
major concern about the legitimacy of a self-determination procedure is that there is 
fairness in the decision-making process. From an international perspective, the 
protection of minority rights entails two aspects: the rights of the individual members 
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in a minority group, and the rights of the group itself. The former refers to the rights 
held by individuals which protect their fundamental freedoms of expression, 
association, assembly, and movement.410 These latter refer to the rights of minority 
groups within a society to participate in determining their future status.411  
Civic participation is a way of expressing a sense of belonging to a constitutional 
association. People participation in the exercise of their sovereignty involves a 
democratic procedure, allowing them to take part in the conduction of public 
affairs.412 Participation demonstrates the degree of people’s inclusion in the decision-
making process, given that “citizens can deliberate meaningfully and efficiently in a 
referendum process.413 As a referendum process is used to affect constitutional 
change, one matter for consideration is the role of national decision makers, including 
people who can be involved in designing their future destiny through a democratic 
process. People’s engagement with a referendum process is necessary to ensure their 
commitment to participating in decision-making and to allow them to articulate their 
positions in a democratic polity. The total number of people participating in a 
referendum process is used to evaluate the genuine will of the people. The minimum 
requirement of voter turnout in the registration process is essential to assess the 
strength of popular support. When a poll shows an overwhelming majority of voters 
in support of independence or the status quo, a “yes” side expresses clear evidence of 
public opinion. A positive vote in an independence referendum can be taken as the 
desire of a majority of the population to establish a new state. It often appears that the 
public has not been highly engaged in the constitution-making process. Many make 
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their decision quickly because of certain pressure groups, which are closely related to 
political parties. Thus, the constitution-making process with a well-conducted 
procedure is useful to build stable and peaceful states.  
Within the liberal theory, the supremacy of the will of the people over the interests of 
the government is the target of participatory democracy. The will of the people is also 
considered to be the highest authority in a democratic polity. People participating 
democratically is   recognized as symbolic of the legitimacy of a collective decision-
making process. However, existing accounts of the liberal theory refers not only to 
active participation, but highlight the equality of all people to participate. Liberal 
democratic theory emphasizes that all citizens of a particular community should enjoy 
the right to have their preferences taken into account in public decisions.414 The 
relevance of liberal theory and democracy can be expressed through the ‘consent 
theory’. It is generally agreed that a democratic regime relies on the consent of the 
people rather than the coercive power of governments to ensure the rule of law.415 As 
the consent of the governed is essential to legitimacy, the fairness of democratic 
procedures are also perceived as useful elements with which to assess the efficacy of 
citizen participation.  
Another essential aspect of republican liberal theory, which relates to the democracy 
is the non-domination characteristic.416 All citizens are perceived as having power, ‘a 
master of rights’, and should not be coerced by an external body or government. 
Evaluating people’s   ability to express their will can help to measure the level of 
legitimacy of the democratic process within a particular state. Traditional or classical 
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republican theory strongly supports public deliberation through equality, participation 
and consensus. Modern republican liberal theory develops this support offering a 
powerful promotion of constitutionalism, and the active will of the people that this 
requires.417 One proponent of republicanism, Philip Pettit, advances the idea that 
people’s participation in the democratic process should be written into the law. The 
republican liberal theory also requires “more than a mere fact of majority support in 
the population to change the laws”.418 An inclusion of all persons, including those 
belonging to national minorities, can integrate the differences and similarities of the 
communities in order to reach some form of agreement through the process of public 
consultation.419  
As indicated by its subtitle, the relationship between the majority and the minority is 
illustrated by considering the numerical rule of majority assessment and minority 
concerns. 
3.2.1 Majority rule and counter-majoritarian difficulty 
The strength of support is another condition with which to identify public opinion. “If 
public opinion is healthy, democracy will put into power citizens, which reflects the 
general, informed and deliberate spirit of the majority of the citizens”.420 This formula 
gives a sensible reason for trusting the people’s will through majority rule.  
The majority vote of a referendum is typically referred to as the level of support 
which can be evaluated in the form of qualitative data.421 The majority concept is 
generally recognized within a democratic regime, and can be defined as the 
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participation of the majority of a people in reaching decisions collectively. In other 
words, democracy is a method of deciding issues by majority voting.422  
During the course of a referendum, the test of majority support in a referendum 
process typically evaluates two components: the percentage of registered voters 
participating and the percentage of approval amongst those participants. To give an 
illustration of the relevance of the percentage of registered voters and the percentage 
of approval, the European Commission for Democracy through Law pointed out that   
“The number of registered voters is valid if a certain portion of the registered 
voters takes part in the vote whereas the number of approval from electorates 
depends on the approval by an enhanced percentage of the electorates”.423  
Further, the Commission made the following observations on the minimum turnout 
requirement: “a minimum turnout of 50% of the registered voters seems appropriate 
for a referendum on the change of state status”.424 By this account, it could be said 
that a low turnout would weaken the legitimacy of a referendum result. Thus, a 
specific percentage of the majority approval is necessary, to make the claim that a 
referendum is consistent with the wishes of the population.  
It was also apparent that the precedence in the Re secession of the Quebec case and 
the code of good practices on referendums attempted to set minimum requirements 
for the number of people needed to carry out a referendum. In the former case, the 
Supreme Court of Canada defined a level of support with a quantitative evaluation. 
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The latter made an observation about the use of threshold or quorum rules, which deal 
with particular levels of turnout or support for a referendum outcome.  
The clear majority will of the people would confer legitimacy on demands for 
secession. “An expression of the democratic will of the people must be free from 
ambiguity both in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it 
achieves”. However, the court did not give any explanation for the high level of 
support, except a qualitative evaluation.425 Later, the Canadian Parliament passed the 
Clarity Act so as to set out the importance of gaining a majority support and the 
requirement of democratic legitimacy on how to gather numerical data in a 
referendum. 
The preamble of the Clarity Act also gives emphasis to a clear majority support. The 
provisional rule states that: 
“A clear majority in favour of secession would be required to create an 
obligation to negotiation secession and a qualitative evaluation is also needed 
to determine whether a clear majority in favour secession exists in the 
circumstances”.426 
Furthermore, there are three factors for identifying the clear majority will of the 
people. These are endorsed in section 2 (2) that:  
“In considering whether there has been a clear expression of a will by a clear 
majority of the population of a province that the province cease to be part of 
Canada, the House of Commons shall take into account  
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(a) the size of the majority of valid votes cast in favour of the secessionist 
option;  
(b) the percentage of eligible voters voting in the referendum; and  
(c) any other matters or circumstances it considers to be relevant.427  
From the above provision, the Supreme Court of Canada did not clarify the exact 
percentage of a clear majority, which was to be considered legitimate. The question 
remains: of the amount that constitutes gaining majority support is 51 % of voters 
sufficient to claim a clear, majority will of the people? On this point, it could be 
argued that the majoritarian danger of the use of a referendum represents a dominant 
of a majority over a dissenting individual or minority. Thus, the assessment of 
majority rule by numerical number is not sufficient to identify the genuine will of the 
people. The will of the people would be legitimate if all concerned groups of people, 
whether majority and minority, participated in a process without discrimination.428 
The full participation from different ethnic groups in a referendum process is another 
condition to claim popular legitimation of decision-making processes. 
Apart from the simple majority requirement, the numerical rule of popular support is 
elevated to the qualified majority requirement. The basis for majority rule has been 
challenged by a higher demand for popular support. The main reason for requesting 
the qualified majority requirement is to ensure that holding a referendum is credible in 
terms of balancing the will of different groups of people in particular territories. This 
was exemplified in the cases of Montenegro and Southern Sudan. In Montenegro, a 
proposition of 55% was made, for the qualified majority to be valid. This level of 
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support was presumably in order to achieve legitimacy if there was a low turnout. In 
the case of Southern Sudan, the requirement of the qualified majority was 60% of 
registered voter. Qualified majority voting is the most common method of decision-
making, particularly in sensitive issues. In this case, this requirement of support was 
needed to reflect a broader consensus among indigenous ethnic groups of people. The 
exact number of majority identification or supermajority requirement is utilized as a 
mechanism to increase minority involvement in the decision-making processes.429  
A critical example of this clear majority (or a certain proportion of the population 
voting one way) is the Montenegrin path to independence. The Montenegro 
referendum followed the rule of a clear majority as set out in the Clarity Act during 
the Quebec attempt to secede. Obtaining a clear majority was established in this Act 
as a requirement for legitimizing the outcome of the referendum.430 The Law on 
Referendum on State-Legal Status of the Republic of Montenegro ratified the need for 
a majority, requiring a minimum of 55% in favour of independence according to the 
European Union proposition.431 The result was 55.5% in favour of independence with 
a turnout of 86.4%.432  
The Southern Sudan Referendum Act 209 set out a specific quorum requirement: 60% 
of registered voters were needed plus a simple majority of 50 % plus one for one of 
the choices was also necessary to be certified.433 The establishment of a minimum 
turnout requirement is not unusual however it is not a guarantee that a percentage of 
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the population will definitely vote. Counting those who have registered to vote does 
not guarantee their vote in a particular direction; they might abstain. The European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) has elaborated on 
this matter. A turnout quorum has a direct consequence on the interests of whichever 
choice has a minority to support. Because people know that the percentage may work 
against them, they are more likely to abstain as a protest vote than to vote in a 
particular direction. This has a disproportionate effect on the minority side. A turnout 
quorum may therefore be a problem if a majority vote approves a proposal without 
the quorum being reached. The majority side will feel that they have been deprived a 
victory without an adequate reason.434 However, the requirement of a turnout quorum 
is essential to estimate the degree of public participation in the voting process. This 
regulation is often illustrated in Central and Eastern European countries’ constitution 
as a precondition to validate the referendum process, for example there was a 
minimum turnout requirement for the independence referendum in Slovenia (1991).435  
These standards had been specified under the section 41 sub-sections 2 and 3 of the 
Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009:  
a) The Southern Sudan Referendum shall be considered legal if at least (60%) 
of the registered voters cast their votes. 
b) If this threshold was not reached the referendum shall be repeated under the 
same conditions within sixty days from the declaration of the final results. 
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Subject to Sub-Section (2) above, the referendum results shall be in favour of 
the option that secures a simple majority (50+1%) of the total number of votes 
case for one of the two options, either to confirm the unity of Sudan by 
maintaining the system of government established by the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement or to secede.436 
In this case, the overall turnout was 97.58 % of registered voters, with 98.83% of 
those who cast a ballot choosing separation.437 In addressing the point of a certain 
percentage of possible majority requirements, the clear majority will of the people 
was represented, ensuring that almost all registered voters in Southern Sudan were 
able to exercise the right to self-determination. However, the quorum of 60% 
participation was in question on how much percentage of indigenous people and 
minority people in Southern Sudan took part in a referendum process. In this case, the 
quorum participation was not consistent with a simple majority vote of 50 % plus one 
to identify either secession or unity. Not all registered voters were required to express 
their views in voting procedures. This condition did not illustrate either strength of 
majority or minority involvement.  
3.2.2 Minority involvement  
One legitimate criterion of liberal theory not only references the majority rule but also 
the elevation of minority interests. According to the General Comment Number 23 of 
the Human Rights Committee, minority protection is undeniable. Positive legal 
measures of protection are required to ensure the effective participation of minority 
                                                      
436 Southern Sudan Referendum Act 2009 (n 382), section 41   
https://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Referendum/SS%20Referendum%20MOJ-Englis.pdf accessed 1 November 2015 
437 The Carter Center, (n 316) 11 
118 	
communities in decisions which affect them.438 In addition, they also have the general 
rights, for example, freedom of association and assembly and freedom of 
expression.439    
Liberal theory suggests that all citizens should be treated with genuine equality, 
requiring not only identical treatment but also differential treatment in order to 
accommodate differential needs amongst all citizens.440 As the meaning of democracy 
extends to the consideration of minority concerns, the legitimacy of holding a 
referendum should not only be assessed by the majority percentage outcome but 
should also consider the implications for ethnic minority participants. The concept of 
liberal democracy can be applied to take into consideration the equality of people’s 
political rights. A broader feature of liberal democracy entails the public engagement 
in collective decision-making among all citizens and the balancing between majority 
and minority.  
The protection of group-differentiated and ethnic minority groups should be ensured 
with a view to promoting their equal political participation. The authentic deliberation 
of all citizens is considered as “legitimate expressions of the collective will of the 
people”. 441  Equality should be ensured between a proposal’s supporters and 
opponents. The term “minority” is regularly informed by the notion of ethnicity.442 
During the course of referendum, the ethnic minority groups of people should be able 
to advocate their views, whether in agreement or disagreement. The fairness among 
different groups can be illustrated through decision-making procedures within 
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democratic mechanisms. The meaning of fairness is that the interests and perspectives 
of the minority be listened to and taken into account.443  
The balance between majority rule and the ethnic sense of minority protection was a 
central issue in the Baltic States when carrying out independence referendums, 
particularly in Estonia and Latvia. After the forcible annexation of the Soviet Union 
in 1940, there was large-scale immigration of Russians wanting to work in the 
industrial and administrative sectors in Estonia. This dramatically affected their 
demographic composition across the Baltic States.  
In Estonia, the native populations steadily decreased among the ethnic Russians. For 
instance, 88.1 % of the population was ethnic Estonian in the census of 1934, 
compared to 61.5 % in the census of 1989.444 Prior to the national referendum on the 
independence of Estonia in 1991, there were many Russians and other non-Estonian 
populations residing in Estonia who had the right to vote. It appeared that a high level 
of support was derived from the non-Estonians. The total turnout in the referendum 
was 83%, and 78% of participants voted “yes”. More than half of non-Estonian 
respondents (approximately 38%) voted for independence.445  
Similarly, the demography of the population in Latvia was composed mostly of 
Russians and other Slavs who arrived after the forcible annexation in 1940. A large 
proportion of non-Baltic populations in Latvia also expressed their will in favour of 
independence. In Latvia, there was a requirement that 50% of eligible voters turn out 
for the referendum to be valid.446 The overall turnout in the referendum was 88%, and 
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73.7 % of participants voted “yes” while 24.7 % were in opposition.447 A referendum 
outcome from 9 of Latvia's 15 rural districts showed overwhelming support for 
independence among ethnic Latvians, ranging from 83% in the Jekabpils region of 
eastern Latvia to 98% in the Talsu area of western Latvia. In one of the six districts in 
heavily Russian Riga, 75% of the voters supported independence. 448  Pro-
independence was endorsed with a large support by the non-Baltic population in 
particular Russian citizens.  
 
In the case of Estonia and Latvia, these exemplify the diversity of people’s consent, 
giving greater legitimacy to the result. According to a survey, there were three factors 
support for voting independence among the non-Estonian population; these were 
knowledge of the Estonian language, the length of residency and a higher standard of 
living.449 In part of Latvia, according to Graham Smith, there was evidence to suggest 
that the Russian community were satisfied to vote in favour of independent statehood. 
Many Russians preferred to live in Latvia in order to guarantee employment and other 
economic reasons.450  
 
It can be observed that large minorities of Russians and other nationalities had a 
decisive influence on the independence referendums in Estonia and Latvia as these 
groups of people had strong and long-standing attachments to their territories. In the 
absence of unanimity, non-discrimination and equality for all citizens could be used in 
order to contribute to the democratic legitimacy of referendums. The showing of 
support for independence by almost half of the non-Baltic population in Estonia and 
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Latvia greatly strengthened the drive towards independence in the Baltic States.451  
Conversely, the Lithuanian ethnic composition was the most homogenous of the three 
Baltic States. Lithuanians had an absolute majority of nearly 80% of the 
population.452 The rest of the population included 9.4% Russian, 7% Poles, a small 
proportion of Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, Latvians and Jews.453 The overall 
turnout was 84%, and 90.5% of participants voted “yes”.454 In this case, the strength 
of public opinion demonstrated a broad consensus on particularly important rules 
relating to sovereignty.  
Within the liberal sense, the proper treatment of minority is developed from the idea 
of human rights protection. Liberal theory needs a broader political opportunity for 
minority. Fundamental freedom of all citizens is guaranteed to ensure that all voters 
have adequate information to make their own choice. One element to minority rights 
protection, according to the Human Rights Committee, is the preparation of materials 
and information about voting in minority languages.455 This strategy is to ensure that 
the ethnic minority is not excluded from the referendum vote. However, holding a 
referendum is not an absolutely necessary condition for the right to self-determination 
to be exercised in a proper way if the referendum process is not guaranteed the 
principle of equality between the members of the political community.  
 
During the Slovenian and Croatian independence referendums, minority rights were 
upheld to different extents. In Slovenia, the Assembly adopted the Plebiscite on the 
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Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia. The decision in favour of 
independence was adopted by a majority of 88.5% out of 92%.456 In this case, the 
Badinter Commission indicated that Slovenia’s independence was supported by a 
referendum with a majority even though Slovenia failed to negotiate internal 
agreements with Yugoslavia for its future status. In terms of human rights protection, 
Slovenia had established various systems to protect and respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. Equality among different groups of people and the use of 
minority languages in education and legal proceedings were guaranteed in domestic 
constitutional provisions. 457  This factor contributed to an increase in minority 
participation. In contrast, when Croatia held an independence referendum in 1991, the 
governmental authority did not incorporate minority people in the voting process. 458 
One of the main concerns was that the Serbian population in Croatia should be able to 
exercise their right to self-determination. However, the Serbian population was not 
equally treated as constituent powers, and as a result of feeling that they had been 
mistreated they set up an autonomous territory in Krajina.459  
Another aspect of the equality of the majority and minority constituencies is 
exemplified by the case of Bosnia-Hercegovina. On 1st March 1992, the call for a 
referendum on the future of Bosnia-Hercegovina was necessary to meet the 
requirements of international recognition for a statehood proposed by the Badinter 
Commission. The Commission delivered their opinion No. 4 with regard to 
international recognition of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The 
commission suggested a mechanism to evaluate the will of the people by means of a 
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referendum with full participation of all citizens without distinction.460 The population 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina is composed of three distinct groups: Muslims, Serbs and 
Croats. In terms of political structure, there were three political parties that were 
closely related to the three national groups within Bosnia-Hercegovina. The three 
parties were the Party of Democratic Action (PDA) with the support of the ethnic 
Muslims, the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) with the support of the Bosnian-Serbs, 
and the Croat Democratic Union (CDU) with the support of the Bosnian-Croats.  
Organizing a referendum in Bosnia and Herzegovina illustrated their diverse 
backgrounds: 43% ethnic Muslims, 31% Serbs and 17% Croats. The total turnout in 
the referendum was 63.4%, and 99% of participants voted for independence.461 Even 
though the referendum outcome demonstrated overwhelming support for 
independence, it also appeared that the Serbian population, under the supervision of 
the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), boycotted the vote and rejected the result. The 
main reason for this was the referendum’s unconstitutional basis, as the resolution for 
holding a referendum did not attain a two-thirds approval from the National 
Assembly, as required by the republic’s constitution. In addition, the Bosnian-Serbs 
delegates were absent at the time of passing a referendum resolution.462  
In the context of the right to self-determination application, the status of Bosnian-
Serbs as an ethnic minority people to exercise their external right to self-
determination was considered in the opinion 2 of the Badinter Commission. 
According to the Badinter Commission, the implementation of the external right to 
self-determination by the minority groups of Bosnia-Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina 
was denied. In this circumstance, the Badinter Commission concluded the status of 
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the Serbs people as constituents of the Yugoslavia federation rather than constituents 
of republics. In addition, the right of people to self-determination was also interpreted 
as referring to a chosen territory rather than referring to the right of people. The will 
of the people is accepted as legitimate, if the affected parties can express their will 
freely and fully integrated in political rights.463  
The independence referendum in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1991 provides some 
evidence of both legitimate and illegitimate actions in relation to the will of the 
people. This democratic decision-making process was legitimized by the acceptance 
of the three major ethnic groups of people in Bosnia Herzegovina territory: Bosnian 
Muslim, Serbs and Croats. By contrast, it was illegitimate because the will of the 
people was inconclusive as the ethnic Serbs were not involved.464 As a result, the 
Serbs did not accept the outcome of the referendum because only the Muslims and 
Croats expressed their will to support independence. Meanwhile, the Serbs chose to 
establish their own referendum in a particular area where the majority of residents 
were Bosnian-Serbs. After holding their referendum, the Serbs claimed their 
possessed territory as a self-governing territory. This territory was separated from the 
area where Croats and Muslims clearly expressed their will to be an independent state 
from the former Yugoslavia Federation. However, the international community did 
not recognize the Serbian referendum as being legitimate.  
All things considered, the will of the people would be legitimate if all concerned 
groups of people, whether majority or minority, participated in a referendum process 
without discrimination.465 According to republican liberalism, the balance of power 
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between majority and minority people is a crucial factor to claim that all are treated 
equally, regardless of their backgrounds. Public involvement should not be confined 
to the approval of the majority view but should also elevate minority concerns 
because these groups of people are also affected by the collective decision-making 
process.     
 
3.3 Identification of voters 
As the republican liberal theory stresses the active role of people’s engagement in 
collaborative decision-making, similarly, people are recognized as key players in the 
context of independence referendums. The existence of different categories of people 
is controversial in establishing whether voters are eligible in a referendum process. 
Thus, the categorization of people is done to offer the right to vote to those people 
affected by the outcome of the referendum process.  
 
Popular mobilization has played a crucial role within liberal democracy because 
people are recognized as the ultimate source of political authority. When a state 
decides to extend voting rights to different groups of citizens, a major concern is 
whether the number of enfranchised voters might affect the turnout percentage and 
therefore the validity of the referendum. Furthermore, the inclusion of non-resident 
citizens (who do not habitually reside in a secessionist region) in taking part seems to 
be problematic. This can jeopardize the legitimacy of the referendum466, because 
these groups have no direct impact on the territorial alteration resulting from an 
independence referendum.  
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People are recognized “as a unit for measuring the dimensions of self-
determination”.467 The task of classifying people involves nationalist and republican 
liberal views. From the nationalist view, Tierney points out “ a referendum can tell 
much about the type of nationalist ideology dominant in a specific state or territory; 
particular rules of inclusion and exclusion reveal whether the vision of the nation that 
prevails is more or less civic or ethnic in orientation”.468 Besides nationalist ideas, the 
concept of peoplehood is also found in republican liberal theory. As Sunstein points 
out, citizenship is one of the basic republican components as the citizenship manifests 
itself in broadly guaranteed rights of participation.469 Citizenship is recognized as a 
connecting point to grant the right to vote for people in collaborative decision-making 
process.  
Both views outlined in the preceding paragraph prompt questions around the idea of 
identity. It would appear that the residence-based model is the primary condition to 
grant the right to vote. Thus, the following critical analysis deals with a residence-
based model with the possibility of enfranchising two affected groups of people: 
nationals residing outside a secessionist region and non-nationals people living in a 
secessionist region. The extension of a residence-based model, for the latter group, 
can ensure the legitimacy of a referendum because they are also affected by the 
outcome. The franchise rule emerges with the intent to connect people and territory. 
The franchise rule is the combination of citizenship and territorial based dimensions, 
making an effort to dismiss the state-made distinction between cultural origin and 
rights. The implementation of the franchise rule depends on a negotiation in which 
both involved parties would logically try to favour their preferred outcome.  
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Having examined the theory of peoplehood as an extension of people’s ability to vote, 
it is necessary to explore the genuine link between people and states. There are three 
models to describe people’s identity: firstly, as a common ground to offer them a 
nationality (linking people with a state by birth); secondly, on a territorial-basis (the 
place of residence connects people and state); and thirdly, as cited in republican 
liberal concern as a way to preserve people’s ethnic and cultural distinction.   
 
However, the practical reason for identifying people in a referendum is in a different 
position, that is, the nationality principle is not only a sole standard to consider and 
grant a right to vote for people in a referendum. It comes as no surprise that a 
residence-based model is widely accepted as offering the right to vote for all 
permanent residents. This interpretation automatically approves the inclusion of 
people based on a territorial-basis. Hence, the voter’s list in a referendum not only 
includes native resident citizens but also non-native resident citizens. The latter 
groups of people are likely to be enfranchised because these people have a genuine 
link and a sufficient length of time in a territory to vote at referendum. 
 
There are three main reasons why the residence-based model is used to categorize 
people in a referendum. Firstly, due to the diverse demographic composition, the 
resident-based criterion includes all affected groups of people living in the territory of 
the referendum as these groups have a direct impact on its outcome. Secondly, the 
resident-based principle is connected to the other lists, such as the electoral lists of 
voters or taxpayer lists.470 Thus, the resident-based standard seems to be easy for 
gathering information about the voter’s list. Thirdly, the resident-based model is 
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useful for enfranchising people in a particular territory.471 Those people missing from 
the lists can identify themselves in the registration process.  
 
The following section elaborates on four different situations to consider how to 
extend the franchise rule in particular situations. Firstly, the claim of national citizens 
residing outside a secessionist region was a major concern in the Montenegro 
independence referendum. The rights of Montenegrins residing in Serbia to vote in a 
referendum were denied because they also enjoy the right to vote in Serbia. Secondly, 
the Scottish independence referendum provides further argument for a franchise rule 
settlement. A franchise rule extends to the right of young people, commonwealth 
European and Irish citizens. Thirdly, the extending scope of a franchise rule was used 
to include internally displaced persons and refugees as former residents within 
territory. This is exemplified in the case of Southern Sudan. Fourthly, the recent 
example of Western Sahara case demonstrates a systematic approach towards 
updating the censor list in the hands of the United Nations mission. This aimed to 
extend the right to self-determination to specific indigenous people i.e. Sahrawi 
indigenous people to be involved in the referendum process.  
 
3.3.1 Montenegro and its citizens residing in Serbia  
The main argument of the Montenegro referendum was the extension of voter’s rights 
to those Montenegrin citizens residing in Serbia numbering 260,000.472 This was a 
large number of people, who could have dramatically changed the result of the 
referendum. On this point, it could be said that the extension of the right to vote to 
Montenegrin citizens residing in Serbia should be denied because a large number of 
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Montenegrins residing in Serbia already enjoy the right to vote in Serbia. Apart from 
this, the residency requirement of 24 months led to the exclusion of people who were 
denied the right to vote.  
 
The first issue was a controversy over Montenegrin citizens residing in Serbia. This 
matter was addressed by the European Commission for Democracy through Law 
(Venice Commission). According to the Venice Commission opinion, people deserve 
the right to vote in the municipality where they are registered as permanent residents. 
This means that any Montenegrin who had legally established residence in Serbia 
would have a right to vote in a Serbian referendum.473 If they are also included in a 
Montenegro referendum, they will be granted a double franchise.474 Thus, the Venice 
Commission agreed to support the application of the same voter list in the previous 
electoral process, regardless of Montenegrins inhabitants in Serbia. Furthermore, the 
Commission also pointed out that the constitutional charter does not require equality 
between the political rights of Montenegrin citizens resident in Serbia and Serbian 
citizens resident in Montenegro.475 Montenegrin citizens resident in Serbia had no 
right to vote in elections held in Montenegro. Equally, they had also no right to vote 
in a referendum held in Montenegro unless the law was changed.  
The second issue relates to the eligibility of voters and the length of residency 
requirements. The eligibility of voters was identified in the Law of the Referendum 
on State Legal Status (LRSLS) and other legal documents adopted by the Parliament 
of Montenegro. Those eligible to vote in the Montenegro referendum had to conform 
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to two basic criteria: 1) aged over 18 and 2) permanently resident in Montenegro for a 
period of at least 24 months. 476  
 
Under the scope of the Montenegro Constitution, Article 32 stipulates that: 
“ Every citizen of Montenegro who has reached the age of 18 shall be entitled 
to vote and be elected to a public office. The voting right is exercised at the 
elections. The voting right is general and equal. Elections shall be free and 
direct and voting shall be by a secret ballot”.477  
As the European Commission suggested that the eligibility of voters in a referendum 
is in accordance with the previous electoral registration lists, people’s identity in 
Montenegro, at the time of election, was defined as two tiers: federal (Yugoslavia) 
and republican (Serbia, Montenegrin). Peoplehood involved all citizens who resided 
in Montenegro, regardless of wether they had republican citizenship of Montenegro or 
of Serbia.478  
 
Looking at the content of the specific legal documents for the Election of Councilors 
and Representatives of the Republic of Montenegro (‘the Election Law’ amended in 
2000) indicates certain criteria of the eligibility of voters, excluding Montenegrins 
citizens resident in Serbia. Article 11 states that: 
“1. A citizen of Montenegro, who has come of age, has the business capacity 
and has been the permanent resident of Montenegro for at least twenty four 
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months prior to the polling day shall have the right to elect and be elected a 
representative. 
2. A citizen of Montenegro, who has come of age, has the business capacity 
and has been the permanent resident of Montenegro for at least twenty four 
months prior to the polling day, and a citizen residing on the territory of the 
municipality, as the constituency, for at least 12 months prior to the polling 
day, shall have the right to elect and be elected a councilor.”479  
After Montenegro adopted a new citizenship law in 1999, the eligibility of voters, 
who previously had a right to vote, was denied.480 Only Montenegrin citizens over 18 
years of age, who had resided in Montenegro for two years before the elections, could 
vote. This enfranchised non-national residents living in Montenegro, that is, Serbian 
citizens and Montenegrins temporarily residing elsewhere. The maintenance of this 24 
months criterion was controversial, calling the legitimacy of the referendum into 
question because it denied a right to vote guaranteed by the constitution. A person 
who had voted previously may be denied the right to vote in a referendum due to the 
change in the Citizenship law. This requirement has a direct effect on voting 
eligibility rules in local elections.  
3.3.2 The Scottish referendum and the franchise rule  
In terms of voter eligibility, the focal point of the Scottish independence referendum 
was the broader scope of people through the lens of the ‘franchise rule’. This defined 
the relationship between a people and the state based on a territorial basis.    
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The 2013 Scottish Independence Referendum (Franchise) Act, 2013 (particularly 
Section 2) spelled out who could vote. It was agreed that the eligibility of voters 
should be based on the franchise at the Scottish Parliament and local government 
elections.481 In this matter, Scottish institutions took the main responsibility in 
deciding who should be entitled to vote.482  
According to Section 2 of the Act, a person was entitled to vote if, on the date on 
which the poll at the referendum is held, the person was: 
 “(a) aged 16 or over,  
 (b) registered in either- 
(i) the register of local government electors maintained under section 9 
(1) (b) of the 1983 Act for any area in Scotland, or 
(ii) the register of young voters maintained under section 4 of this Act 
for any such area, 
(c) not subject to any legal incapacity to vote (age apart), and 
(d) a Commonwealth citizen, a citizen of the Republic of Ireland or a relevant 
citizen of the European Union.”483   
The franchise rule did not include non-resident Scots, that is, people born in Scotland 
but now living elsewhere in the UK. This problem would be settled based on the 
future consideration of Scottish citizenship. This group of people would have a 
                                                      
481 SP Bill, ‘Scottish independence referendum (Franchise) Bill explanatory notes (and other accompanying documents)’ (11 
March 2013) 24  
482 Bernard Ryan, ‘The Scottish referendum franchise: residence or citizenship?’ In Ruvi Ziegler, Jo Shaw and Rainer Baubock 
(eds.) (n 471) 6 
483 SP Bill, (n 481) section 2  
133 	
chance to gain Scottish citizenship after the time of Scottish independence. Certain 
conditions needed to be met, that is, “any person with a parent or grandparent who 
qualified for Scottish citizenship could register as a Scottish citizen”. 484 However, 
this left a controversy over how many generations that would be included. 
The franchise rule in the Scottish referendum extended the eligibility of voters to 
those aged 16 and 17. The franchise rule was a Scottish National Party (SNP) parties’ 
policy.485 Of those aged 16 or 17 in the population, it appeared that nearly 110,000 
were registered to vote. This was 3.5% of the total number of registered voters (i.e. 
3,600,000).486 The extension of the right to vote to 16 and 17 year-olds differs from 
UK electoral law which only allows those of 18 years to vote. In practice, the 
administrative organizations and the campaigners were obstructed with the limited 
time (i.e. two months prior to a referendum) to plan and undertake targeted activity to 
register young voters.487 In addition, there were certain legal restrictions with regard 
to the security of young people’s data.488 This legal mechanism was established to 
protect them from campaigners or political parties from accessing their details.  
3.3.3 Southern Sudan and the extending scope of the franchise rule  
The voter’s identification process identifies that certain groups of people should be 
qualified to vote in the referendum. In certain circumstances, some specific groups of 
people include exiled people, indigenous people and groups affected by a mass 
expulsion. Granting the right to vote to non-resident natives is also a controversial 
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matter. Before the referendum process, Southern Sudan had experienced difficulties 
in defining voter eligibility, as this country was experiencing brutal internal conflicts.  
The Southern Sudan Referendum Act, 2009 set out the eligibility criteria. According 
to Article 25 of the Act, a person had to meet the following conditions in order to be 
able to vote:  
“1. Born to parents both or either of whom belongs to any of the indigenous 
communities residing in Southern Sudan on or before 1st January 1956, or 
whose ancestry is traceable to one of the ethnic communities in Southern 
Sudan.  
2. permanently residing, without interruption, or whose parents or 
grandparents are residing permanently, without interruption, in Southern 
Sudan since the 1st of January 1956; 
 3. has reached 18 years of age;  
 4. be of sound mind; 
5. registered in the Referendum register.”489 
The eligibility criteria for the Southern Sudan referendum reflected the intention of 
including ethnic Southerners and long-term residents in a secessionist region. This 
case illustrates the enfranchisement of a large number of internally displaced persons 
or refugees without proof of citizenship. However, the Act posed many contradictions 
in terms of the registration process and the proof of people’s identity. There was no 
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requirement that a voter must be a Sudanese citizen and there was no specific 
provision for the length of time they had to have been in residence.490 
In the case of Southern Sudan, voter registration is likely to have been one of the most 
sensitive aspects of the referendum process, because it left certain issues with regard 
to the types of documentation for proving people’s identity. According to article 26.1 
b of the Referendum Act, for the purpose of Section 25 the identity of the voter shall 
be proved by one of the following: 
 b) A direct oral or written testimony by a competent Sultan from the County. 
According to Article 28.2 of the Act, anyone who satisfied the following conditions 
should register his/her name in the referendum register:  
 a) meet the eligibility requirements as defined in Section 25 of this Act, 
 b) possess identification document or a certificate approved by the 
Administrative Unit in the County or by the local or traditional competent authorities 
as the case may be, and, 
 c) not have been registered in any other location.  
According to the statement above, there was a contradiction between Article 26.1b 
and 28.2b regarding proof of a voter’s identity. The documentation required to 
register as a voter was ambiguous. However, this issue was made clear in the 
Southern Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC) Voter Registration Regulations 
specified in Article 10 [h]: 
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“As proof of identification, an oral testimony by a concerned county official or 
dignitary of the concerned community could also be used”.491 
In assisting with this stipulation of the Act, the SSRC Voter Registration Regulations 
2010 specified that, in case of doubt about the authenticity of any document, the 
Chairperson of the RC should seek the assistance from the Sultan or the concerned 
Chief of the village. There was concern for missing groups of people who had fled 
from the territory during brutal conflicts. As a result of these conflicts large numbers 
of people had been internally displaced and therefore could no longer be recognized 
as former residents within a particular territory, losing their ability to vote. Because 
the SSRC could not set out a list of ethnic and indigenous communities eligible to 
participate, 492 the eligibility criteria for many potential voters involved the oral 
testimony and approval of the chief of the village. The contributive role of the chief of 
the village or the Sultan to confirm the identity of people was crucial to identify the 
number of people in a specific area who were eligible to vote. Although in this case, a 
solution was found, in general of there is no systemic, civil registration or proof of 
identity, it is difficult to claim that the free will of the people has been ascertained if 
large numbers have been unable to participate in the process.  
3.3.4 Western Sahara and long-term settlement of voter’s qualifications 
The Western Sahara referendum faced a lot of difficulties when granting the right to 
vote. A key sticking point was the complexity of the identification of voters for the 
referendum. Both sides were determined to win by proposing their needs for a greater 
inclusion of Saharan populations qualified to participate in the referendum. The 
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Frente Polisario relied on the Spanish authorities’ census list in 1974 whereas 
Morocco rejected this census because it included the Sahrawi tribal groups, which 
escaped from the Spanish invasion to the north of Morocco. The Sahrawi tribal 
groups are recognized as indigenous people who left for refugee camps in Algeria and 
Mauritania.493 Morocco suggested the enfranchisement of a larger proportion of 
people, including tens of thousands of applicants of Saharan origin now living in 
Morocco.494 An in-built proportional scale would have had a direct impact on the 
referendum outcome.  
 
To facilitate a free and fair referendum, the United Nations mission for the 
referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was established to deal with the 
identification process. Owing to interference from both parties, the United Nations 
proposed establishing a specific committees, the Saharan Identification 
Commission.495 Its function was two-fold: updating information from the 1974 census 
and making a list of eligible voters. The first stage dealt with updating all the 
information up to the present. While doing so, the collection of census data included 
the number of deaths since 1974 as well as those who were still alive, whether inside 
or outside territory, in order to update the entire voter list. The second stage contained 
more details of the procedure. It started by identifying people and issuing registration 
cards to those who had been granted the right to vote. Then, those who had not been 
included on the list had the right to appeal against the commission’s decisions.496 
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During the technical mission of gathering and updating people’s identity, the Saharan 
Identification Commission struggled with a large amount of tribal groupings. Their 
nomadic lifestyle posed a problem for justifying legal ties of certain people to certain 
territories. To resolve this, research was carried out under the guidance of population 
experts and in consultation with the tribal chiefs. After having completed the their two 
goals, MINURSO’s next task dealt with collecting data, comments and feedbacks 
submitted to the Secretary-General for consideration, in consultation with the 
Chairman of the African Union Organization (OAU).497                     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
After completing the identification process in 1995, the United Nations mediation 
efforts began in 1997 with the appointment of James Baker as a special envoy of the 
Secretary-General of Western Sahara. Compromises were made with the adoption of 
the Houston Agreements. The Houston Agreement tried to settle disputes over the 
implementation of a referendum, including the identification process. It claimed to 
guarantee the freedom of expression and movement, assuring equal access to radio 
broadcasts and detailing the procedure for a free and fair referendum.498 Then, the 
identification process and the establishment of a final voter list were finally 
completed at the end of 1999 with a high number of 131,038 appeals.499 The appeal 
process was a factor that both parties concerned, in particular the procedural review of 
the concurrent oral testimony by two tribal leaders. It would appear that some tribal 
leaders were biased against applicants from the opposite side.500 No agreement could 
be made between the two parties. Morocco insisted that the implementation of a 
referendum was not possible if the Saharans were excluded from taking part in a 
                                                      
497 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General’ (1990) (n 495) para29  
498 Erika Conti, ‘The Referendum for self-determination: is it still a solution? The never ending dispute over Western Sahara’ 
(2008) 16 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 178,183 
499 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General (2001) S/2001/613 para28 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2001/613 [accessed 9 March 2016]  
500 Ibid para34-35    
139 	
referendum. The Frente Polisario requested the repatriation of refugees- the 
indigenous people of Western Sahara (Sahrawis) - and enfranchised these groups of 
people into the voter’s list.  
 
After long discussion on the eligibility of voters, the Identification Commission has 
set out the criteria of electorate voters in Western Sahara referendum as follows:  
“ Those eligible to voter in the referendum are those persons who are at least 
18 years of age and:   
(a) who have been identified as qualified to vote by the Identification 
Commission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western 
Sahara (MINURSO), as reflected on the provisional voter list of 30 December 
1999 (without giving effect to any appeals or other objections); 
(b) whose name appear on the repatriation list drawn up by the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as at 31 October 2000; or 
 (c) who have resided continuously in Western Sahara since 30 December 1999.  
Those eligible to vote shall be determined by the United Nations, whose 
decision shall be final and without appeal”.501 
 
If the list of qualified voters of any person did not appear in the provisional list of 30 
December 1999 or on the repatriation list as at 31 October 2000, the UN had the full 
authority to approve the status of people with two additional criteria. By doing so, the 
UN shall: (a) determine the credibility and legal sufficiency of all such testimony and 
other evidence; and (b) based on that testimony and other evidence, determine who is 
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(and is not) entitled to added to the list of qualified voters.502    
 
The UN announced that only colonial people were categorized as those who could 
exercise the right to self-determination. However, the UN contradicted itself; the right 
of the indigenous Sahrawi people to self-determination provided a broader 
categorization, including people in Non-Self-Governing Territory (NSGT). 503  In 
effect, “the Sahrawi people can exercise their inalienable right to self-determination 
and decide the status of their territory in a free, democratic, and genuine way”.504 
Even though the rights of the Sahrawi people were recognized by the UN resolution, 
the people’s rights were not implemented due to the failure of compromise between 
the Frente Polisario and Morocco.       
 
According to the above criteria, the Western Sahara case indicates that a territorial-
based link is not sufficient to identify the eligibility of voters. The eligibility of voters 
in the Western Sahara referendum as identified to ensure that all concerned people 
were included in the voter’s list. This case demonstrated that assessing the will of the 
people is not realistic if the free will of the people does not conform to the elite 
demands.  
 
From these four examples, non-national residents are shown to be entitled to the right 
to vote with the application of a franchise rule, according to the Venice Commission, 
whereas national people living outside the secessionist region should not be granted 
the right to vote. This contradiction leaves room for discussion about requirements for 
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a specific length of time in which citizens must leave their country or for the length of 
time necessary to become a permanent resident. One of the solutions was well 
illustrated in the condition of Gillot V. France; a proposition of 20 years’ continuous 
domicile was acceptable to determine a genuine link with the territory.505 The 
condition stated that the only realistic way to confirm a voter list was to enfranchise 
the population existing in a territory at the time of their exercise of self-determination. 
In addition, a specific length of residency was required to prove the genuine link 
between the people and their particular territory, for example the requirement of two 
consecutive years for Montenegrin residents. In Scotland, the eligibility of voters 
extends to young people (16-17 years of age) which is different from the conditions of 
the general election voters.  
 
3.4 Human rights concerns  
One aspect of liberal theory is the coexistence between minority rights and human 
rights in the sense that strengthening the human rights protection system helps to 
resolve conflicts arising between different ethnic or cultural groups. Another essential 
aspect of the   republican liberal theory relates to the freedom of the people from the 
non-domination of arbitrary power, that is, a republican view of freedom and equality 
encompasses broader perspectives about human rights and the proper relations 
between states.506 People’s liberty can be verified on a domestic and international 
level. The former relates to the freedom to act without any dominating power by 
administrative bodies, whereas, the latter involves the external domination of other 
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states.507 As the protection of individuals’ rights is included as a component in the 
constitutional texts, balancing their rights is useful in order to achieve justice and 
legitimacy. Individual freedom applies to all people without any distinction based on 
ethnic identity. The protection of individual rights and freedoms relates to democratic 
theory in the sense that everyone has equal rights or equal values. Individual rights 
protection and equal right for all individuals are core values of liberalism. Within the 
republican liberal theory, the representative government is recognized as an institution 
to protect and promote people’s freedom and human rights. The institutional form of a 
representative government is derived from the large scale of society and the modern 
world of nation-states. Democratic ideas proliferate to a larger domain for people’s 
rights protection, individual freedom and personal autonomy within the nation-state. 
Republican legitimacy at a national level deals with the non-arbitrary use of power of 
a state and function under the ultimate control of the citizens.  
 
The relationship between the right to self-determination and human rights can be 
described as a progressive interpretation of liberal and republican theory. People are 
recognized as holders of the right to self-determination and they enjoy freedom and 
non-domination from arbitrary powers. In international law, the external right to self-
determination is interpreted in conjunction with the right to public political 
participation. According to the Human Rights Committee general comment No. 25, 
this right includes the protection of people’s fundamental freedoms during a 
referendum process, including at least the freedom of expression, movement, and 
assembly.508 These individual rights should be guaranteed by law in any decision-
making process. In terms of freedom of expression, when people are recognized as 
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constituents, they are able to express their views freely and independently. Freedom 
of expression also includes the media’s right to create a communicative channel 
between ordinary citizens and the governmental authority. 509  In the context of 
freedom of movement, people have a right to move from one place to another.510 The 
government has no right to expel people because this action may change the outcome 
of the referendum. In addition, people have a right to assemble to exchange their ideas 
or share information to influence governmental policy.511  
 
The interrelation between states, existing institutions (both governmental and non-
governmental organizations), ordinary citizens and civil society is crucial to assess 
effective public participation. During any referendum process, the role of political 
parties, the media, and civil society are contributing factors to ensure the free 
communication of information and ideas between ordinary citizens and governmental 
authority.512  
 
The main concern of human rights protection is to ensure that all people can enjoy 
their fundamental freedoms and it is the responsibility of the government to ensure 
this. These essential rights are freedoms needed so that people have the ability and 
opportunity to vote effectively.513  The interpretation of these substantive freedoms 
coexists with the right to political participation. An important question is how to find 
a balance between the government’s use of power and the demands of the people. 
Giving people the chance to take part in the collaborative decision-making process 
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gives credibility and legitimacy to the use of referendum process. If the process is 
seen to be open and transparent, people will believe that they have full authority to 
access and be involved in a particular issue that affects their lives.  
 
During the independence referendums in Eritrea (1993) and East Timor (1999), the 
protection of human rights was in question.  The secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 
1993 provides an example of a consensual secession with a UN-sponsored 
referendum. During the course of the referendum, human rights protection in Eritrea 
was problematic, specifically freedom of movement. After registering for the voting 
list, it appeared that certain groups of people were expelled from the country based on 
a perceived risk to the national security of Ethiopia. These people therefore did not 
have a chance to vote in the independence referendum. Subsequently, the Ethiopian 
government noted that because these people claimed to be Eritrean, it was impossible 
to accept their citizenship because Eritrea did not exist at the time of their 
registration.514 In addition, no process or institution to ensure democratic governance 
existed at the time. Thus, the establishment of an institutional framework for civic 
education was crucial to increase the level of public participation, guaranteeing 
freedom of expression.515 Overall the protection of human rights in Eritrea was in 
development; on the one hand, certain people’s freedom of expression was violated, 
but on the other hand civic education was introduced, contributing towards people’s 
ability to freely express their will in the future.516 
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In the case of East Timor, Portugal and Indonesia reached an agreement on giving the 
citizens of East Timor an opportunity to determine their future under the UN 
administering system.517 The population appeared to support independence, but there 
were concerns over the protection of human rights.518 During the referendum, there 
was widespread intimidation of people, in particular pro-independence supporters. 
The Indonesian military troops (TNI) threatened and used violent measures against 
the people in East Timor to influence their behaviour.519 In addition, the work of the 
United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) struggled against the intimidation 
of the TNI before and after the vote.520 As a result, the people’s freedom of expression 
was breached as they were dominated by governmental forces, reducing the 
legitimacy of the expression of their will.  
 
The following section elaborates on three substantive rights relating to referendum 
processes: freedom of expression, freedom of movement and freedom of assembly 
and association. These considerations can also be applied to scrutinize the role of 
political parties, medias and civil societies involving in referendum.  
 
3.4.1 Freedom of Expression 
Freedom of expression means the liberty to communicate ideas and to try and 
convince others of their plausibility. Such freedom is accepted as a foundational 
freedom in any free and democratic society as this is a necessary condition for the 
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realization of the principles of transparency, accountability, and the protection of 
human rights.521 “Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations 
of a democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each 
individual’s self-fulfilment”.522 As a democracy flourishes freedom of expression, 
people or a group of persons could enjoy their right in public debate.523 Freedom of 
expression is also an integral part of the enjoyment of a wide range of other human 
rights, such as freedom of opinion, freedom of assembly and association, and the right 
to vote.524 In the context of an independence referendum, people’s freedom of 
expression consists of the expression of their wishes in accordance with the rules 
prescribed by law.525  
 
In the Kevin Mgwanga et al v Cameroon case, the authors sent a request to the UN for 
a third choice in the referendum in Southern Cameroons in 1961.526 The UN rejected 
their proposal to include the choice of independence in the referendum question.527 
The Southern Cameroons people (who also called themselves ‘Ambazonian’) only 
had the chance to join either Nigeria or Cameroon.528 As a result, the Southern 
Cameroons people faced negative consequences, such as discrimination against 
Anglophones. As English native speakers, they were denied equal representation in 
the national and federal governments.529  
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The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) pointed out two 
important matters concerning human rights. Firstly, the ACHPR highlighted that 
respecting the people’s will is necessary during any decision-making process, 
particularly in self-determination practices. They put forward a number of democratic 
mechanisms including referendums and free elections as a means of creating national 
consensus. In this case, the people of Southern Cameroon also qualified as a “people” 
because they identified themselves as having a separate and distinct identity.530 
Secondly, the Commission also reached a decision with respect to freedom of 
association. The ACHPR stated that the detention of activists or people taking part in 
demonstrations, the suppression of demonstrations, and the use of force against 
demonstrators all violated the people’s rights and freedoms of expression, of 
association and of assembly, guaranteed by the constitution or by international human 
rights standards.531  
 
The Human Rights Committee delivered their views regarding the Ambazonians 
people’s freedom of expression in the Fongum Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon.532 In this 
case, Mr. Fongum Gorji-Dinka, a Cameroon born citizen, claimed that he was refused 
Ambazonians nationality and his name removed from a referendum voter’s list 
without any reasonable grounds according to the law.533 The Committee pointed out 
that the author’s name was arbitrarily removed from the voter’s list, without any 
motivation or court decision. This action violated the right to political participation 
and failed to guarantee the free expression of the people under Article 25(b) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).534  In addition, the 
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Committee also referred to their previous general comment (No. 25) in which outlined 
the grounds on which people might be deprived of their voting rights. The action 
required specific legislation detailing criteria for reasonable grounds, such as mental 
incapacity, or a higher age requirement.535Another claim was based on the arrest and 
unlawful detention were punitive measures to punish him for the publication of his 
political pamphlets. Accordingly, this action deprived his freedom of expression 
under article 19 of the ICCPR.536 However, the Committee pointed out that the author 
did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claim. The Committee did not find 
that detention was a direct consequence of such publications.537 
 
3.4.2 Freedom of Movement 
Freedom of movement concerns freedom to choose a residence,538 the right of a 
national to enter their own country and protection against alien expulsion without due 
process of law. During any referendum process, it is a state’s obligation to provide 
domestic legal rules, administrative, and judicial practices for protecting the people’s 
freedom of movement.539 A state is not able to prohibit people from residing in a 
particular territory based on the state’s desire for control. 
In the case of Gillot V. France, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) considered the 
appropriate number of years of residency which should prevent violation of the 
freedom of movement. A condition for the future referendum of New Caledonia in 
2020 has set out the eligibility of voters, pursuant to which: 
                                                      
535 International Covenant on civil and political rights, ‘General Comment No.25 (57) (n 36) para4 
536 Fongum Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon, (n 532) para3.4 
537 Fongum Gorji-Dinka v Cameroon, (n 532) para4.8 
538 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 13(1) and (2); European Convention on Human Rights (Protocol no.4) Art 
2(1) and (2) http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf accessed 15 November 2015    
539 Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.27 Freedom of movement (Art.12)’ UN.DOC CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 
(1999) para3  
 
149 	
“Persons registered on the electoral roll on the date of the referendum and 
fulfilling one of the following conditions shall be eligible to vote: 
(f) They must be able to prove 20 years continuous residence in New 
Caledonia on the date of the referendum or by 31 December 2014 at the 
latest.”540  
In this case, the Human Rights Committee noted that eligibility to vote based on 
having resided in a territory for twenty years was not unreasonable. They pointed out 
that those people who could sufficiently prove their strong ties to a particular territory 
should be allowed to vote on decisions which would concern them. 541  One 
observation was that the Human Rights Committee did not provide a clear answer to 
the issue of people who had temporarily left during those twenty years.542 This had a 
direct consequence on people’s freedom of movement and the exclusion of their 
voting rights.    
3.4.3 Freedom of Assembly and Association 
Freedom of assembly and freedom of association deal with joint actions of individuals. 
The focal point is the constitutional implications of the coordinated action of 
individuals and the modes of how collective decisions are made in the polity.543 
Campaign groups and political associations are tools, which stimulate public 
discussion. Freedom of assembly consists of the protection of public health or morals 
or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.544 Freedom of association 
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comprises the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of one’s 
interests.545  
 
Freedom of assembly and association are essential component of democracy. 
Individual and group of individuals can enjoy their right to participation in public 
affairs.546 The use of clear and predictable process is legitimate if the will of the 
people is clearly expressed with uncertain outcomes. To achieve a legitimate aim, 
human rights protection is a necessary element to ensure that individuals and groups 
protection are respected to hold their opinion freely and independently. 
 
From a liberal perception, freedom of association is not only defined as the political 
power of religious power but also the power of private groups to exercise their power 
over their own members.547 The right to freedom of peaceful assembly consists of 
organizing and participating indoor and outdoor activities, such as referendums. 
People’s expression of opinion is a legitimate part of the exercise of the right.548 
 
The case of Stankov and the United Macedonian Organization Ilinden v Bulgaria 
provides a useful example of the freedom of minority groups to peaceful assembly. 
The organization of Iliden was established to unite all Macedonians in Bulgaria on a 
regional and cultural basis.549 The aim of the peaceful meeting of Iliden was to allow 
the free association of minority Macedonians to demonstrate their activities freely. In 
the Bulgarian government’s view, because the Illiden were requesting secession the 
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meeting was a threat to their national security. 550 In this case, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) applied Article 11 of the Convention concerning to the right 
to peaceful assembly. The court reiterated that freedom of assembly and peaceful, 
open debate were important values to a democratic society. Thus, the action of 
preventing the peaceful meeting of the Iliden was denied.551  
 
The focal point of this case is about the secessionist groups’ right to enjoy freedom of 
assembly. The court did not deny the secessionist-seekers their right of assembly and 
association. With respect to the right to self-determination, the collective right of the 
Macedonian minority in organizing activities did not prohibit with the legal basis of 
country’s territorial integrity.552  The Court reiterated that “demanding territorial 
changes in speeches and demonstrations does not automatically amount to threat to 
the country’s territorial integrity and national security”.553  
Another example of the freedom to peaceful assembly is the Crimean referendum in 
2014. Both pro-Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar ethnic minority groups were prohibited 
from raising dissenting voices. Both groups were excluded from giving any political 
opinions or cultural expression. The two groups were denied their right to assembly 
both prior to and after assemblies. Prior to assembly, they were restricted on time, 
location and type of activities. After the assembly, it would appear that the Crimean 
Tatars activists were detained and punished under the Russian criminal code.554 By 
contrast, pro-Russian organizations and other civic associations were able to assembly 
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freely.555 Any restrictions on freedom of assembly were dominated by Russia. Under 
new Crimean legislation that entered into play in August 2014, the organizers of 
public assemblies must be Russian citizens and must officially request permission to 
hold an assembly no more than 15 days and no fewer than 10 days prior to the 
planned event.556  
When considering the content of legitimacy and the political authority of people, it 
could be argued that what was lacking in Crimea was “the democratic constituency to 
exercise their rights to rule themselves in democratic decision-making process”.557 In 
a modern democratic society, freedom of peaceful assembly provides a legitimate 
way for activists and ethnic minorities to be involved in the process. They have a right 
to organize peaceful assembly to share information and discuss their different 
positions on political issues. But, in Crimea there was no chance for dissenting groups 
who were against Russia to take any actions in expressing their views. In addition, it 
would appear that there were no negotiations among stakeholders in order to ensure 
the legitimacy and credibility of referendum.558  
3.4.4 Role of political parties, civil societies, and the media 
In the modern democratic state, political parties, media coverage and civil societies 
are significant in influencing people’s political positions in their decision-making. 
International standards for legitimizing the outcome of a referendum include 
examining of the role of political parties, the media, and non-governmental 
organizations. These elements also illustrate the stability or volatility of referendum 
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outcomes because these particular bodies have a lot of influence on voting behavior. 
Usually, voters reach their opinions from information acquired over the course of a 
referendum campaign.  
 
In the context of referendums, the role of political parties, the media and civil society 
are integral to guaranteeing the fundamental freedoms of people, as they must 
conform to basic democratic standards. In its Advisory Opinion (2005) on the 
international legitimacy of the Montenegrin referendum, the Venice Commission 
noted:  
“For a referendum to give full effect to these principles, it must be conducted 
in accordance with legislation and the administrative rules that ensure the 
following principles: the authorities must provide objective information; the 
public media have to be neutral, in particular in news coverage; the authorities 
must not influence the outcome of the vote by excessive, one-sided 
campaigning; the use of public funds by the authorities for campaigning 
purposes must be restricted”.559  
 
Political parties are the main bodies which organize public opinion and communicate 
public demands to the governmental authority.560 During a referendum process, there 
are two-sided interactions between ordinary citizens and political parties. Ordinary 
citizens can express their views, both in support of or against the referendum, which 
can in turn affect the political parties’ campaign. Meanwhile, political parties are able 
to communicate with ordinary citizens to gain a broad variety of information. After 
gathering public opinion, the political parties take the people’s will into account when 
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creating policy. Sometimes, the parties act as mediators, translating public opinion 
into the governmental action. In the absence of political parties, it can be argued that 
voting outcomes are uncertain because people do not get enough information before 
reaching their decision.561  
 
Civil societies play a crucial role in legitimacy as they “diminish the government-
citizen confidence gap and build mutual trust”.562 The confidence-building element 
strengthens democratic governance on behalf of the people.563 The main function of 
the civil society sector, for example, is to provide a range of information and raise 
people’s awareness during the decision-making processes. Civic education plays a 
crucial role during a referendum process in developing the vitality of a just, political 
order.564 Furthermore, strengthening civil society can contribute to legitimizing a 
referendum process. The assertion of democratic governance in external self-
determination practices includes processes, mechanisms and systems to promote 
people as constituent powers. In order to improve democratic governance, civil 
society plays role at local, national and international levels. At a local level, they 
engage in community development. At a national level, civil society organizations 
“perform a watchdog function to improve the quality of electoral and parliamentary 
processes and seek the accountability of public officials”.565 At an international level, 
the UN and other bodies encourage civil society to implement their policies and 
treaties dealing with civil and political rights.566 The institutions of civil society act as 
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intermediaries, compromising between the needs of persons and states or international 
institutions.567  
 
Having examined the interrelation between political parties and civil societies, the 
Human Rights Committee noted that, “citizens also take part in the conduct of public 
affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their 
representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves”. In addition, the 
Committee stated that all voters should be treated with equal value and respect. Any 
information and materials should be available in minority languages. 568   The 
interdependence between political parties and civil societies in a referendum process 
can be exemplified in the cases of Ukraine and Catalonia.  
 
In the case of Ukraine, civil society organizations (i.e. Popular Movement of Ukraine 
for Reconstruction-Rukh) contributed to the democratic consolidation of state 
independence in 1991. The Ukrainian popular movement worked to improve public 
awareness and run a campaign for a Ukrainian independence referendum. Rukh 
activists made an attempts against Soviet Union with non-violent actions.569 The 
activists had a close relationship with the opposition parties to pursue their political 
goal towards independence.570 Due to their non-violent tactics, the Rukh were able to 
unify around 280,000 people from East and West Ukraine.571 These actions illustrated 
the collaborative work between political parties and civil societies in encouraging 
public involvement with the goal of independence. 
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Catalan civil society had a lot of influence on the people’s right to decide their 
political future. The strength of civil society in Catalan at the time can be seen 
through the wide range of activities that took place, such as interpersonal 
communication, demand for Catalonia’s new Statute of Autonomy and the political 
movement for self-determination.572 In 2013, popular mobilization known as the 
‘Catalan way’ put pressure on the Catalan politicians to keep their promise to institute 
a referendum on independence.573 The demonstration of civil association in Catalan 
was characterized as a bottom-up phenomenon which pressurized the local 
government. On this point, the CIU (Convergence and Union) party was substantially 
responsible for the civil pressure for the pro-independence position.574  
 
The media is equally recognized as an essential component for “any functioning 
democracy and state governed by the rule of law” 575 During a referendum process, 
the main function of media is to distribute information about public and political 
issues between citizens, and their elected representatives through electronic media and 
published materials. The media is considered an intermediate body carrying out 
popular sovereignty and contributing to the common good.576 The media can only 
legitimize a referendum process on the basis that it is transparent and credible. If the 
government controls the media the people are then dominated because they are 
exposed to biased information.   
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The mass media is a powerful tool for promoting democracy.577 Any state-controlled 
restrictions on media publications violate the freedom of expression, if such 
restrictions are justified as ‘protecting the public’s interests’. The media can improve 
the credibility and legitimacy of independence referendums. Within the referendum 
process, reporting systems are the common measure for securing the implementation 
of human rights obligations.578 This includes the establishment of self-assessments or 
compliance audits examining particular aspects of human rights protection. This 
should guarantee that the Media and Independence Commission take further steps to 
protect freedom of expression within a democratic regime. The media and the press 
therefore play an important role that they are free from intervention from 
governmental authority.579 The role of the media is also relevant to censorship of 
information, which could sway public opinion.580 
 
There    are    two     examples     which  illustrate the censorship of the media during a 
referendum process: Southern Sudan and Crimea.   
 
The referendum conducted in Southern Sudan in 2009 was perceived to be a peaceful 
vote. It was mandated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 2005 (CPA) signed 
between the central government of Sudan and the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Movement (SPLM). Its purpose was to provide a democratic avenue for Southerners 
to express their right to self-determination.581 In fulfilling the mandate of the CPA, the 
free will of the people was respected and the right of the people of South Sudan to 
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self-determination was upheld.582 In addition, the Southern Sudan Referendum Act 
2009 included specific reference to freedom of expression but it did not specifically 
indicate the role of the media.583 So although the population did not appear to be in 
doubt, the Sudanese government was able to take control of the media “on the basis 
that their reporting constituted a threat to Sudan’s stability and security”.584 In the 
northern area, there was censorship of newspapers that supported pro-separation 
views. In the southern area, national or local radios also broadcasted in support of 
secession.585 This illustrates the circulation of one-sided information to the public, and 
was observed by the European Union Election Observation Mission in Sudan, which 
made some suggestions. However, “no major improvements on the qualitative level of 
referendum coverage could be observed”.586 There were different challenges for the 
media in northern and southern Sudan. In northern Sudan, there was regular 
harassment and attacks on freedom of expression on voting days, whereas, in southern 
Sudan, a major problem was the lack of financial support for publications.587 For 
these reasons, the media campaign was inefficient because it failed to provide 
accurate information among voters.  
 
In Crimea, according to the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the 
Venice Commission), the referendum did not conform to international and European 
standards of protecting freedom of expression and freedom of media. One 
questionable matter was that public media, particular news coverage, was under the 
control of the Russian military forces. It appeared that online media and print outlets 
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had to register with Russian state authorities. The media in Crimea was prevented 
from freely expressing views against Russia. A referendum was not therefore 
conducted in accordance with democratic governance588 because it turned out that no 
international observers were admitted to report on the referendum situation.589 
 
In conclusion, human rights concerns are a necessary component of referendum 
processes to ensure that people’s freedoms are protected. Human rights protection is 
also perceived as alternative sources of legitimacy in referendum if fundamental 
freedoms of people are guaranteed. People power allocation in multiple levels of the 
society is evident to achieve non-domination of the nation state over the people. 
Furthermore, all relevant actors, such as political parties, medias and civil societies, 




3.5 The role and functions of international organizations 
At its inception, ‘the will of the people’ is also accepted as a basic component of 
legitimizing governmental authority.590 The UN General Assembly resolution 1514 in 
1960 and the practical application in resolution 1541 made it clear that dependent 
territories (i.e. colonial territories, trust territories, and non self-governing territory) 
required the ‘freely expressed will and desire of people’ without any distinction of 
race, creed, or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and 
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freedom.591 People in the NSGTs and dependent territories were entitled to exercise 
their right to self-determination within democratic processes to determine their future 
status. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1966 
proclaimed in Article 1 “all peoples have the right of self-determination”592 and 
“every citizen has the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs”.593 The UN 
General Assembly resolution 2625 in 1970 addressed the UN function as the main 
organization for taking responsibility for administering the Trust Territories and the 
NSGTs territories.594 In addition, the resolution 2625 specified the elaboration of the 
procedural arrangements in territorial alteration in collaboration with the 
administering powers of the UN.595  
 
The General Assembly resolution 45/150 in 1992 emphasized fundamental freedoms 
and human right protection. The ‘determination will of the people’ requires an 
electoral process that provides an equal opportunity for all citizens to put forward 
their political views. A domestic constitution is a formal mechanism to give legal 
recognition to the legitimacy of the will of the people individually or collectively.596 
In the context of international involvement, states can make a request to the UN when 
they need any assistance during the conduct of a democratic process. 597  Other 
additional resolutions are confirmed by the Security Council resolution 745 in 1992 
and resolution 1244 in 2012, which address the right to self-determination 
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implementation and the protection of human rights. The latter mentions multi-level 
participation between international institutions and regional institutions in order to 
promote democracy, stability, and regional cooperation.598  
 
Since the republican liberal theory can be interpreted in conjunction with democratic 
procedures, it is inevitable that we examine how international institutions commit 
themselves to international democracy. International organizations can support 
democracy operationally through a variety of activities, e.g. administering, 
supervisory and advisory roles. These functional duties aim to ensure that the wishes 
of the local populations in the decision-making process are expressed and adhered to 
in a free and fair democratic process.  
 
When determining external self-determination practices, international institutions are 
responsible for ensuring that ‘the right to democratic participation’ of people is 
essential to maximize degree of public participation as a condition to assess 
transparency of decision-making processes.599 The rights of people to democratic 
participation include citizens being consulted with and collaborating in the decision-
making process. International organizations function in partnership with local 
institutions for long-term peace and security purposes. From a legal standpoint, the 
UN Charter 1945 opened up the door to UN involvement in specific missions dealing 
with popular consultation in territorial arrangements.600  
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The following section elaborates on the functions of the UN and the non-UN 
organizations in referendum processes. The classification of international 
organizations’ involvement in territorial alteration is divided into three different roles: 
administrative, supervisory and advisory.601 The administrative role includes the task 
of the ‘United Nations’ own functional duties in a referendum process. The UN takes 
direct responsibility for a popular consultation when disputing parties send them a 
request, for example, the attempt to identify voter’s qualification by the United 
Nations mission for a referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and framing 
referendum questions in British Togoland and British Cameroon. The supervisory role 
aims to ensure that people determine their future with freedom and impartiality. 
Certain recommendations on weak points are provided in the form of a reporting 
system. Some instances of the UN supervisory power include the UN commission for 
Eritrea (UNOVER), the United Nations mission in East Timor (UNAMET), and the 
UN involvement (e.g. UNMIS and UNIRED) in Southern Sudan referendum 2009. 
As part of its advisory role, the UN participates in consultations with the aim of 
ensuring international human rights standards are met. These organizations are 
entitled to follow-up and scrutinize any violations of human rights during the 
referendum process. Their legal advisory opinions are useful when examining the 
evolving interpretation of international human rights standards.  
 
Apart from the UN, the non-UN machinery is also needed in administering, 
supervising and advising during a referendum. The Venice Commission of the 
Council of Europe and the regional based human rights, for example the African 
Commission, are involved in human rights monitoring system in their regions. One of 
                                                      




the main features of the role and functions of these non-UN organizations are to 
ensure that the fundamental freedoms of people and human rights are guaranteed. 
 
3.5.1 Administrative role  
The UN administration system was used comprehensively in the territorial 
arrangement of the British former colonies. A common feature of international 
administrations authority is that they have their distinct identity separate from the 
communities which they govern.602 The local community does not participate or give 
consent in the process. The UN administration system normally performs its duty 
under the mandate of the Security Council or the General Assembly.  
 
There are two instances of the UN playing an administrative role in Trust territories: 
Togoland under British Administration in 1956 and Northern Cameroon in 1959 and 
1961. The General Assembly Resolution 944 (X), dealing with the future of Togoland 
under British Administration, mentioned the use of a plebiscite as a mechanism to 
assess the wishes of inhabitants.603  The use of a referendum in British Cameroon, 
however, was specified in the General Assembly Resolution 1350 (XIII) to 
recommend the UN as the official administering power.604 The use of referendums in 
the Trust Territories aimed to consult local populations in the transitional process 
from dependent territories to self-governing or independence.605 The right to self-
determination was identified in the Trusteeship Agreement, particularly that people 
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should have the right to freely express their needs to their political system.606  
 
Prior to holding a referendum in British Togoland, UN visiting missions were 
conducted in 1949, 1952 and 1955 respectively. These missions intended to study the 
possibility of conducting a popular consultation on the status of the territory. This 
example clearly demonstrates the importance of the UN visiting missions in 
influencing the UN General Assembly. The role of the UN visiting missions was to do 
a preliminary survey, make specific recommendations and later submit reports back to 
the UN General Assembly. In the context of the UN visiting missions, it could be 
argued that the sources of information were not reliable because the visiting missions 
did not employ systematic tools for gathering data-like sampling, polling and focused 
interviews. Instead, most information related to Togoland’s problems was provided 
by British and French officials.607  
 
In British Togoland, there was a considerable discussion about the ethnic composition 
of the people, in particular the Ewe tribal groups of people.608 Based on the first and 
second visiting missions’ reports, the mission teams proposed a referendum as a way 
to consult the ethnic Ewe’s populations for unification of Togoland.609 Later, they 
found that the unification process was in fact opposed by the majority of people and 
this process was used as a political maneuver by local political parties.610 Then, the 
third visiting mission teams decided to propose a referendum as a democratic 
mechanism to assess the will of the local populations. Following the recommendation 
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of the third visiting mission, the UN representatives of the Administering Authority, 
in collaboration with a United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, organized a 
referendum under the supervision of the UN. The UN administering authority and the 
Government of the United Kingdom decided to set up specific legal instruments to 
regulate the referendum process. Under the scope of the Togoland under United 
Kingdom Trusteeship Order 1955, there were three components relating to the 
referendum process: setting the referendum questions, the eligibility of voters, and 
defining the geographical categories of self-determination.611   
 
The referendum question clearly provided two choices: whether to integrate with the 
Gold Coast or to separate with the continuity of Trusteeship under British 
administration.612 The question put to the voters was the same as that recommended 
by the visiting mission. In practice, the political leaders were permitted to interpret the 
meaning of the question to the voters.613 This action was easily misunderstood by the 
voters because political parties might offer only one-sided information. In terms of the 
eligibility of voters, the establishment of the Order Council in accordance with the 
recommendations of the United Nations visiting mission, granted the right to vote in 
the plebiscite to every person who: (a) was of the age of 21 years or older; (b) had 
resided in Togoland under British Administration for at least twelve months in the 
two years preceding registration; (c) was residing at the time of registration in the 
ward in which they had applied to be registered; (d) was not disqualified by such 
causes as conviction, insanity, etc.614 From these requirements, it was noted that the 
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eligibility of voters was mainly based on residency. One exception was taxpayers, 
who had paid for the previous two years. For this group, it was not compulsory to be 
permanent residents.615  
 
The Administering Authority under the UN General Assembly set up voting units for 
the referendum according to similarity of public opinions.616 In other words, instead 
of the units being based on geography, they were grouped together based on the 
people’s views within certain areas. The people were divided into four different units: 
(a) the Northern section as a whole; (b) Buem-Krachi District in the north and the 
Akan Local Council Area in the south; (c) the balance of Buem-Krachi District; and 
(d) Kpandu and Ho Districts taken together as a single unit.617 This division of the 
territory into Northern and Eastern parts did not reflect the cultural differences 
between the people because the north-south division was in accordance with the 
colonial administrative units from 1955. In the Northern part, most people were in 
favour of integration with the Gold Coast. In the Southern part, public opinion was 
divided between preferring integration with the Gold Coast or independence for a 
unified Togoland.618 The majority of people expressed themselves in favour of 
separation from the Gold Coast (Ghana) Two months after holding a referendum, 
there was a general election in Togoland to confirm the will of the people. The UN 
Plebiscite Commissioner was involved in an electoral process. The Commissioner 
believed that the fate of the referendum was bound up with the results of the general 
election. However, the referendum result differed from the subsequent election, when 
the majority of people selected the parties which ran a campaign to integrate with 
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Ghana.619 These two democratic processes questioned whether the local population 
wanted to separate from Ghana or if they preferred to integrate.  
 
In the case of Northern Cameroons, the UN agencies took the main responsibility for 
collecting information from the visiting mission representatives. In 1958, the 
Trusteeship Council asked the Visiting Mission to set up a consultation mechanism in 
Northern Cameroon under British Administration. The UN’s role was clearly to 
formulate the referendum question. Significantly, the UN General Assembly agreed 
with the visiting mission representatives to frame the referendum questions separately 
in the Northern and Southern Cameroons. Referendums were held twice in the 
Northern part. 620  Firstly, the Northern Cameroons people were asked to decide 
between incorporation into Nigeria or maintenance under the trusteeship system. The 
majority of people chose to maintain their territorial status under the trusteeship 
system. Secondly, the referendum asked voters to select whether to integrate with 
Nigeria or unify with Cameroon. The majority of people selected to join Nigeria. In 
this case, the UN organized formal meetings and invited representatives from the two 
political parties to give more information about the demands of the local populations. 
The UN acted as a mediator between two differing views and brought these together 
to design the referendum question. One observation is that the consultation process 
represented the demands of the local populations through their political 
representatives. The UN, in particular the General Assembly, played their role based 
on the desire of local elite leaders to satisfy the outcome of referendum rather than 
concern the wish of populations.621 
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Another two examples of the UN administering power are the MINURSO specific 
mission in Western Sahara and the presence of the UNAMET for the East Timor 
referendum. These instances are illustrated the institutional framework of the UN that 
free and fair referendums on self-determination were performed.  
 
The referendum process for the people of Western Sahara was governed by the United 
Nations in collaboration with the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The United 
Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was a specific 
agency under the Security Council mandate to ensure a fair and impartial 
referendum.622 The Special Representative of the Secretary-General had an exclusive 
responsibility over matters relating to the referendum and were assisted by an 
integrated group of civilian, military and civilian police personnel.623   
 
At its inception, the UN Secretary-General and the chairman of the OAU held 
consultations with two parties of the conflict in Western Sahara, Morocco and the 
Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente 
Polisario). The main task of the MINURSO administering power was during the 
voter’s identification and registration process, specifically, granting the right to vote 
for the Saharawi indigenous people. Its other two functions were the establishment of 
the conditions for a referendum campaign, and the conduct of the voting without 
interference or intimidation from state agencies.624  
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Firstly, an identification commission was appointed to handle the list of voters. The 
identification commission aimed to include a number of Saharans living in the 
territory of Western Sahara, a number of refugees, and non-residents qualified to 
participate in the referendum.625 Apart from the identification commission, the special 
representative of the Secretary-General was also a relevant component of MINURSO. 
The special representative was responsible for maintaining law and order in Western 
Sahara during the transitional period and ensured that no one was intimidated in the 
referendum process. They acted as a coordinator to communicate with the two 
conflicting parties and the representative of the OAU.626 In addition, the Secretary-
General designated a referendum commission to undertake its role with the special 
representative in all aspects of the referendum process, for example, the campaign and 
the voting system. 627  The referendum commission gave advice to the Special 
Representatives dealing with referendum campaign. There were some significant 
areas, including the fundamental freedoms, the rights of the media regarding the 
referendum, the facilitation of the peaceful return of those eligible to vote, the 
settlement of complaints and disputes, and the maintenance the law and order.628  As 
part of the voting system, the referendum commission assisted the Special 
Representative in matters of considerable importance, such as the specific date of the 
referendum, the polling stations, the ballot boxes and ballot forms, the association of 
the official observers from the parties and the representatives of the OAU, the results 
of voting and the determination of offences.629   
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In the context of East Timor, the UN Security Council passed resolution 1246 on 11th 
June, 1999, to organize and conduct a popular consultation in East Timor. The 
resolution established the so-called UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to proceed 
with a referendum process as a people-consultative mechanism. Based upon the 
Security Council proposal, the UNAMET had three primary responsibilities: the 
registration process, the guaranteed freedom of all political and other non-
governmental organizations to carry out their activities, and the provision of all 
necessary information to the East Timorese people.630 In terms of the administering 
power, the UNAMET began its own initiative to control the registration process. In 
the absence of sufficient documentation, the UNAMET instituted an affidavit 
procedure to identify eligible voters. People who were born in East Timor had to be 
sworn before a religious leader or village chiefs and witnessed by a registered 
voter.631 However this method is not widely accepted because the religious leaders or 
village chiefs are arbitrarily decided based on their interests. This action had a direct 
impact on the referendum outcome. 
 
UNAMET took further action creating legislative regulations in order to ensure that 
all interested parties or populations enjoyed their rights equally. A code of conduct for 
the referendum was proposed by the UNAMET to provide a framework and guideline 
for people to understand the process. The code of conduct for the campaign covered 
the ballot papers, in particular how to facilitate voting for illiterate voters. On this 
point, the UNAMET worked in collaboration with two pro-autonomy groups: these 
were the United Front for East Timor Autonomy (UNIF) and the National Council of 
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East Timorese Resistance (CNRT). They proposed using flag symbols for illiterate 
voters: the Indonesian flag for autonomy, and the CNRT flag for independence.632 In 
addition, the UNAMET’s public information was available in four official languages 
of the consultation process: Tetun, Bahasa Indonesia, Portuguese, and English.633 The 
UNAMET is seen as successful in their active role to motivate people to be involved 
in the process through various activities, such as publishing referendum information 
in different languages, and providing a variety of communication channels. 
 
In addition, UNIRED in Southern Sudan took responsibility for contributing voter 
registration in collaboration with the Southern Sudan Referendum Commission 
(SSRC). In terms of voter registration, the SSRC launched the voter registration 
exercise throughout the country. It took about three months from the beginning until 
the end of the registration process. If the applicant could not provide authentic 
documentation, or did not have personal identification documents, the Sultan or the 
chief of the village came to assist and approved the status of the candidate. 
 
3.5.2 Supervisory role  
Another dimension of the UN involvement in territorial arrangement is the function of 
advising and assisting in the preparations for public consultation. Compared with the 
administering power, the UN supervisory role is wider in scope and covers all the 
organizational aspects as well as the observational. Creating a transparent referendum 
is a vital step towards achieving widespread democracy; international institutions act 
as contributors for encouraging democracy along with respect for human rights and 
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the rule of law.634 Free and fair voting systems are a necessary component of allowing 
people to participate in the decision-making process. 
 
When the requirement of the will of the local population becomes a determining 
factor in legitimizing the referendum process, the UN monitoring missions can ensure 
that the implementation of self-determination practices is fair and genuine. In order to 
assess the efficiency of the UN engagement in a referendum, the UN supervisory role 
encompasses various activities, such as making observations, monitoring referendums, 
submitting reports to highlight weak points and how to improve the referendum 
process in conformity with international legal standards. The UN supervisory mission 
aims to ensure that people can make their choice within free and fair voting system.  
 
There are two examples of the UN and the EU supervisory role in referendum 
processes. These are the mission of the UNOVER for Eritrea in 1993 and the UN 
involvement in Southern Sudan referendum in 2009. 
 
The Eritrean right to self-determination struggled because of the illegal, forced 
annexation to   the Ethiopian federation in 1952. At that time, the Eritreans contended 
that this action was organized against the will of Eritrea’s people because there was 
no referendum or other democratic mechanisms to assess their will.635 After the 
Ethiopian government agreed on Eritrea’s right to self-determination, the appointment 
of the UN commissioner in Eritrea adopted the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 390 (V) to take the primary step of a visiting mission to discuss the 
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possibility of holding a referendum.636 It was apparent that there were two views in 
Eritrea: those supporting independence and those reluctant to express their wishes due 
to lack of political experience.637 Then, the UN Observer Mission to Verify the 
Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER) was established pursuant to the UNGA resolution 
47/114.638 The UNOVER did not only work as a specific agency to protect the rights 
of the Eritreans to self-determination in their future status, but also created long-term 
stability through their technical assistance mechanisms. Initiating the campaign via 
political, educational programs was perceived as an important component of raising 
people’s awareness. In addition, they ensured that the people received sufficient time 
and information before making their decision.639  
The UNOVER’s supervisory role took three forms: voter registration, referendum 
campaign, and the voting procedure.640 According to a 1993 Report of the Secretary 
General, UNOVER recommendations prompted the Referendum Commission of 
Eritrea (RCE) to make certain special arrangements for three groups of people: 
prisoners charged with, but not convicted of, crimes; special arrangements to allow 
members of the Eritrean Popular Liberation Army (EPLA) to register and vote in their 
barracks; and the re-registration of women.641 In addition, an identification board 
established registration districts and took responsibility for enfranchising non-
displaced Eritreans, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).642 Referendum 
campaign focused on the voters’ education in all parts of Eritrea and abroad, 
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particularly in refugee camps outside Eritrea.643 Education efforts included raising 
awareness of the implications of voting for or against independence. Non-
governmental organizations also launched campaigns if they registered with the RCE. 
This strategy kept political campaign signs under control.  
In the case of Southern Sudan, the UN involvement was represented by the UN 
Secretary-General. The UN Secretary General passed resolution 1590 in 2005 to 
establish the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).644 The main function of the 
UNMIS was to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA) 2005.645 Another UN agency involved in a supervisory role in Southern Sudan 
was the UN integrated referendum and electoral division (UNIRED). The role of 
UNIRED’s technical and logistical assistance, in collaboration with the Southern 
Sudan Referendum Commission (SSRC), includes drafting complaint regulations and 
providing voter education materials.646  
 
In the context of complaint regulations, establishing regulations was suggested by the 
UNIRED as a way of providing an appeal process for persons who were rejected for 
registration. The local courts were set up with trained judges to verify people’ identity. 
Meanwhile, civic education was a part of local, civil society campaigns to maximize 
voter participation. This functional duty was carried out in collaboration with the 
UNIRED’s Public Outreach division. Nevertheless, there was a disagreement between 
the UNIRED and the SSRC to broadcast through television and radio owned by the 
Government of Southern Sudan.   
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Another significant supervisory role can be illustrated through the function of the 
international electoral monitoring mission. The main objective of an international 
election observation is to ensure the protection of human rights and rule of law with 
respect to the democratic process in assessing the will of the people. In practice, the 
international election observation carries out their duties in conformity with laws, 
processes, and institutions in referendum process. 647  During a referendum in 
Togoland 1956, the UNGA passed a resolution to appoint a UN Plebiscite 
Commissioner in order to organize and conduct the plebiscite under the supervision of 
the UN.648 The main purpose of the Plebiscite Commissioner was to ensure a free and 
neutral atmosphere for the referendum649 and submit a report to the UN General 
Assembly.650 
 
In addition, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is the 
principal institution of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE). 651  Their mission is to ensure that people’s fundamental freedoms are 
guaranteed. In addition, the ODIHR mission also involves the promotion of 
democracy and the rule of law. The ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field 
of election observation in assessing whether holding referendums is in conformity 
with the national legislation and international standards.652 Then, the findings are 
produced in the form of public reports. These reports provide a summary of events 
and make recommendation to improve the quality of people participation in 
referendum processes in the future. 
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3.5.3 Advisory role  
The advisory role of international institutions includes a duty to construct a minimum 
standard for ensuring the fundamental freedoms of the people during a referendum 
process. Their work is to clarify and interpret practical issues with the aim of 
standardizing free and fair referendums. One example is the work of the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission). The Venice 
Commission is an advisory body under the supervision of the Council of Europe. The 
main functions of the Commission are to uphold democracy, human rights, and the 
rule of law.653 The adoption of the Code of Good Practice on Referendums is not only 
a useful piece of work to present the basis of national legislation on referendums but 
also provides some guidelines on conducting referendums with a legitimate and 
accountable standard.654 Although the advisory role of international institutions has no 
legal binding, the work of the Venice Commission represents a significant 
contribution towards clarifying certain legal issues and advising on referendum 
mechanisms with respect to the interests of people.  
 
There are two cases where the Venice Commission took action in an advisory role: 
Montenegro in 2006 and Crimea in 2014. The former concerned the Montenegrin 
citizens’ right to vote although residing in Serbia. The Venice Commission issued a 
opinion in response to this, in which it advised against a double standard where 
Montenegrins living in Serbia had different rights to Serbians living in Montenegro. 
The Commission advised that both groups of people could only have voting rights in 
one country, but not both. The Venice Commission was involved in Crimea because 
they believed that the referendum was illegitimate, and that several conditions for 
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ascertaining the free and fair will of the people had not been met. The Commission 
released opinion no.762/2014 on 21st March 2014 about Crimea.655 In order to create 
a free and fair process, certain conditions had to be met: a clear legal regulation for 
holding a referendum, respect for people’s freedom of expression, democratic 
deliberation and sufficient time for calling a referendum, the neutrality of 
governmental authorities, and negotiations among all ethnic groups of people in 
Crimea.656 These conditions are useful so that any future referendums may be 
considered legitimate and credible.  
 
When human rights situations are at stake during a referendum process, the Human 
Rights Committee (HRC) is a specific agency which contributes to clarify the legal 
understanding of human rights protection and guaranteeing fundamental freedoms. 
Even though the opinion of the HRC is not legally binding, their opinion is 
worthwhile as it reflects the evolution of human rights practices. The role of the HRC 
in relation to the right of people to self-determination is to set standards of 
international human rights practices and deal with controversial matters regarding 
fundamental freedoms and human rights protection. The HRC has additional 
responsibilities for interpreting the meaning of international law principles and 
ensuring these conform to the minimum standard of human rights protection. The 
HRC also keeps records of states’ reports on promoting and protecting fundamental 
freedoms and human rights. In addition, the regional human rights bodies (i.e. African 
Human Rights Committee, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights) play their 
role in contributing to the development of human rights in practice. 
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An example of a standard-setting accomplishment can be seen from Gillot v. France. 
In this case, the length-of-residence condition for determining a genuine link with 
particular territory is 20 years continuous residence- in New Caledonia. The length of 
residence was related to the right to vote in the future of New Caledonia referendum 
in 2020. The HRC commented on the importance of a genuine link between people 
and their right to self-determination. It pointed out that “a self-determination process 
involving the participation of persons able to prove sufficiently strong ties to the 
territory whose future is being decided”.657 In addition, the 20 years continuous 
residence can prove from other particular ties to the territory, such as possession of 
customary civil status, existence of moral and material interests in the territory 
combined with the birth of the person (after the 1998 referendum). If their parents are 
eligible to participate in 1998 referendum, they are also permitted to participate in the 
coming referendum in 2020.658   
 
From the above, international institutions’ involvement creates institutional 
framework to guarantee free and fair process of referendum for identifying  “the will 
of the people”. Referendums have been supported by the administering, supervising, 
and advisory roles of international institutions, using both UN and Non-UN 
machinery. Considering the expression ‘will of the people’ in external self-
determination practices implicitly includes the international involvement of 
international institutions for prompting the collective will of the people in political 
participation. 
 
                                                      
657 Gillot v. France Communication No.932/2000 (n 206) para14.7 




4. Conclusion  
Republican liberal theory considers how the free and equal status of people is 
recognized when they exercise their right to external self-determination. It provides a 
functional account of legitimacy within external self-determination practices and how 
states operate under the effective control of its citizens. In addition, republican liberal 
theory holds that the assessment of the will of the people involves the presence of 
institutional and legal frameworks to put public opinions into action.  
 
An examination of the differences between consensual and non-consensual based 
referendums can highlight the ideal version of the free and genuine will of the people. 
The consensual based referendum is an instance where there are clear legal 
instruments or a state framework necessary to implement a decision by the will of the 
people. But in practical application, the existence of human rights protection, and 
political participation of all stakeholders to have freedom of expression and freedom 
of peaceful assembly may make it difficult to identify such a will accurately. By 
contrast, the non-consensual based referendum is an instance where there are no clear 
legal instruments or state framework to allow people the authority to determine their 
territorial status. The non-consensual based referendums rely on the active role of 
civil society, non-governmental organizations or political parties in providing 
information to the people, such as civic education, running campaigns, collaborating 
with local governments, establishing civic, religious and cultural institutions.  
 
Due to its character, the discontinuous process of an independence referendum does 
not provide a clear picture of how to carry out public opinions into state institutions. 
Measuring the will of the people via a referendum does not give people the 
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opportunity to discuss or exchange their views, as they simply respond “yes” and “no” 
to a specific question. In order for the government to assess the will of the people 
fairly, post-referendum, it is necessary to set up responsible institutions which uphold 
the will of the people. The existence of legal frameworks is a way of ensuring that the 
people’s right to participate is enumerated in the constitution or equivalent legal 
regulations. If these two frameworks are properly secured to the public opinions, the 
outcome of an external self-determination process may be considered to be legitimate 
























Non-referendum mechanisms: external self-determination and representative   
bodies 
 
1. Introduction  
 
“There were many ways to achieve self-determination. It could be achieved 
through war or revolution. It could be achieved through election but this 
required [a] good view; it could be achieved by agreement by parties to other 
disputes.”659 
 
The quotation above demonstrates that alternatives to referendums (during territorial 
alteration) exist which embrace the people’s participation in decision-making 
processes. It suggests that referendums are not the only way to identify the will of the 
people with regards to self-determination. The will of the people can also be 
expressed through elections and their representative processes.660  
 
This chapter aims to explore the use of non-referendum mechanisms (i.e. elections 
and parliamentary models) in order to illustrate how representative bodies take on a 
responsive role (to people’s opinions) in territorial alteration matters. Representative 
democracy, i.e. the relationship between representative bodies and the people, reveals 
‘a structural identity’ between the rulers and the ruled.661 Representative bodies 
(rulers mandated by the people’s demands) carry out their function whilst being 
                                                      
659 UNSC ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning the Western Sahara’ (2001) UN Doc S/2001/613 para40   
660 Daniel Philpott, ‘Self-Determination in Practice’ in Margaret Moore (ed.), National Self-Determination and Secession (OUP 
2003) 80-81 
661 Duncan Kelly, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Political Theory of Representation’, (2004) 65(1) Journal of the History of Ideas 113, 121 
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responsive and accountable to public opinion.662 The people (the ruled) are involved 
in decision-making processes, such as elections, which enable them to select their 
proper representatives.  
 
In addition, in his theory of ‘representation’ in 1774, Edmund Burke emphasizes the 
importance of popular sovereignty acting through a constitutional government.663 The 
relationship between the representatives and the represented is at the core of 
representational theory. The term ‘representation’ directs attention to the attitudes, 
expectations and behaviours of the represented, and their acceptance of their 
representatives’ decisions as legitimate and based on their own interests.664 His 
argument relies on the preservation of sovereign powers within the hands of a 
Parliament, which is made up of the people’s representatives and carries out the 
people’s demands. In order to verify the authoritative and legitimate power of such 
representative bodies, it is necessary to look at the ‘focus and style of representation’ 
that Burke lays out.665 In other words, he categorizes different ways of doing 
representation. The ‘focus’ of representation means the elected officials make their 
legislative judgments whilst taking into consideration both local and national 
interests.666 The legitimacy of an elected body lies in its ability to find compromise 
between these diverse interests; this provides democratic accountability. The ‘style’ of 
representation refers to the chosen role of legislatures to act either as free agents or as 
representatives with a mandate.667 Free agents are representatives who are elected by 
people in a specific geographical area, but who have the independent discretion to 
                                                      
662 John Stuart Mill, Representative Government (Kessinger Legacy reprinted2012) 54, 61; Bernard Manin, The principles of 
representative government  (Cambridge 1997) 165 
663 Richard Bourke ‘Popular sovereignty and political representation: Edmund Burke in the context of eighteenth-century 
thought’ in Richard Bourke and Quentin Skinner (eds), Popular Sovereignty in Historical Perspective (Cambridge 2016) 215 
664 Heinz Eulau, John C. Wahlke, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson, ‘The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical 
Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke’ (1959) 53(3) The American Political Science Review 742, 743 
665 Ibid 744 
666 Ibid 744 
667	Ibid 748 
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promote the local people interests or not. Their public decisions are based on broader 
values which may encompass many diverse groups of people. Representatives with a 
mandate are officials who adhere to the promises given to the people before being 
elected. Their public decisions depend solely the concerns of the people in the 
specific area they represent.  
 
Regarding international law instruments, article 25 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966, defines ‘a right to public participation’ as taking part 
“in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives”.668 
Thus, the people’s power in decision-making processes is validated at an international 
level. There are three integral components to popular legitimation: non-discrimination, 
the right to take part in public affairs, and free elections. Non-discrimination is the 
right of individuals to vote regardless of their background. The right to take part in 
public affairs, as detailed above, can take place either directly or indirectly. The latter 
is exemplified by ‘free elections’- a democratic mechanism which allows the people 
to express their will. A free election guarantees that the authentic will of the people 
can be expressed independently in order to select their representatives.669 
 
An election is a democratic process during which the people have the chance to vote 
and select the qualified candidates they wish to be their representatives. These elected 
officials hold sovereignty to act as the people’s political agents. With regard to the 
practical application of external self-determination, the indirect expression of the 
people’s will through representative bodies is a constant interaction. There is an 
                                                      
668 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 40), art 25  
669 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (n 538), art 21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 40), art 25; 
Gregory H. Fox, ‘The right to political participation in international law’, in Gregory H.Fox and Brad R. Roth, (n 10) 53 
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interplay between the expression of the will of the people through an election and the 
elected officials’ actions. The relationship between these two reflects the nature of a 
democratic ‘dynamic and ongoing process’.670 Elected officials form representative 
bodies which then carry out their function in state institutions, putting public concerns 
about boundary alteration into action. In the context of self-determination practices, 
two types of representative state institution can be identified: the Constituent 
Assembly and the local, federal or national legislatures. Although both act as 
legislative bodies, the main difference between them is the issue of time and scope. 
The former is responsible for drafting a constitution or amending an existing 
constitution for the future of the nation. 671 The latter works as a state’s legislative 
organ to facilitate public involvement in its legislative processes672, including setting 
an agenda for requesting a greater degree of autonomy or dealing with an attempt to 
secession. 
 
The democratic legitimacy and credibility of expressions of external self-
determination from these bodies depends on a number of conditions. Firstly, it is 
important to look at the constitutional position of representative bodies. A constitution 
or statute mandates the representative bodies’ use of power. In the absence of this, the 
representative processes are perceived as legitimate if they use their power to promote 
the people’s interests. Secondly, a proportional number of representatives must be 
distributed between different groups of people in a society. This can help to create 
political unity and reduce the polarization of diverse, political opinions gathered from 
the voting processes. Thirdly, if the constitutional court overrules the will of the 
                                                      
670 Michael Hereth, Alexis De Tocqueville: Threats to Freedom in Democracy (Duke 1986) 15 
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people, the people then have the right to invoke or appeal the court’s ruling, or limit 
the latter’s power using other state institutions.673 There is then a shared responsibility 
between the parliament and other state institutions to ensure the people’s demands are 
met.674 These conditions are difficult to meet for a number of reasons, and republican 
liberalism proposes a way to resolve these problems and therefore ensure that the 
representatives’ actions are legitimate.  
 
Republican liberalism supports the notion that external self-determination should 
uphold the power of the people through representative processes which are ongoing 
and dynamic. It proposes a complex and continuous balance of power between the 
people and their representatives. Two key aspects of republican liberalism are 
people’s broader participation in discussing public policies and the central role of 
state institutions in realizing public opinion. 675  It stresses the interactive work 
between the people and state institutions both pre-election and post-election. This 
interplay can help to balance the people’s power with governmental power in order to 
achieve democratic legitimacy.  
 
Republican liberalism specifies three, distinct functions of representative bodies: to 
implement people’s decisions676; to communicate with people in the form of a 
dialogue677; and to write popular authority into the constitution.678 
 
Firstly, republican liberalism believes in the people’s influential power to control the 
representative bodies. Ordinary citizens can exercise their power both pre-election 
                                                      
673 Ibid 4; Philip Pettit (n 17) 174-175 
674 Quoted in Jon Elster, (n 671) 192 
675 Philip Pettit, (n 17) 225-229; John Mayor, (n 17) 155-168 
676 Philip Pettit, (n 17) 199 
677 Philip Pettit, (n 17) 183-185 
678	John Mayor, (n 17) 150-151 
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and post-election. Pre-election, an electoral institution plays an important role in 
encouraging public debate and political parties’ expression of their commitment to 
people through their policies. Then, post-election, people are also able to check, 
contest or challenge policy implementation through formal and informal means, such 
as media, civil society, or petitions to a state independent body. A debate-based form 
of decision-making is perceived as vital in reaching reasoned decisions among 
different groups of people in a society.679 This presupposes that people are capable of 
contesting and discussing their attitudes. The power to debate and contest can be in 
the form of individual or collective action. People can choose to exercise their rights 
individually or collectively through non-governmental organizations or independent 
state organization (Ombudsman). The advantage of a debate-based form of decision-
making lies in bringing together interested groups or stakeholders to engage and 
negotiate their political concerns through compromise to reach a decision.680 In 
addition, republican liberal theory’s requirement for broader political participation 
will have been met and the external self-determination practice is more legitimate, 
that is, minority groups of people are able to express their views in support of or 
against policies. This can reduce the potential for a majority to hold influential power 
over minorities.  
 
Reciprocity can be seen during and after all kinds of elections. The people can use 
their power in different ways. Firstly, they can appeal during the electoral process if 
their names are missing from the voter’s lists, exercising their electoral rights.681 
Secondly, their satisfaction or dissatisfaction is indicated by their re-election (or not) 
of their representatives. The people can also influence different levels of 
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governments: local, federal, national parliament and the Constituent Assembly. 
Meanwhile, regional levels of governing bodies are expected to act as communal 
representation to protect the local people’s interests. The establishment of a 
communicative channel with the public is an example of reciprocity, which 
consolidates a balance of power between the people and the state, where popular 
authority prevails over state authority. This in turn increases the degree of legitimacy 
and accountability of representative bodies.  
 
Secondly, republican liberalism stresses that the very design of state institutions must 
create transparency, contestability and impartiality. 682  Both existing and new 
institutions should be designed based on these three requirements. Transparency 
means open to the public. Contestability is the opportunity to challenge or oppose a 
specific policy or legislation. Impartiality is the availability of forums where 
challengers can expect an unbiased assessment. 683 From these perspectives, the 
establishment of certain measures to increase the people’s authority is necessary for 
reducing the arbitrary will of representative institutions. 
 
In terms of institutional development, there are three ways to interpret the concept of 
a ‘balance of power’. Firstly, the balance of power refers to the classical 
understanding of a separation of power between legislative, executive and judiciary 
bodies in responding to the people’s demands.684 Secondly, the balance of power 
means the distribution of power between different level of governments, like in the 
federal system. The balance of power allows competing groups within a society to 
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mutually check each other in terms of legislation and execution.685 This can ensure 
that the different groups’ interests are promoted and protected within the governing 
process. Thirdly, the balance of power is the interaction between representative 
institutions and people. The representative institutions (i.e. parliament, executive or 
judicial bodies) can help to guarantee the people’s interests through legislation, which 
allows for greater public participation.686 These three perspectives can improve the 
quality of interaction between the people and their representative institutions.  
 
Thirdly, republican liberalism addresses instances where there is no clear legal 
instrument to determine the general will of the people. Representative bodies can 
ensure that the right to public participation is an unconditional characteristic of the 
constitution.687 This mechanism guarantees the mandate of representative bodies to 
carry out their mission in accordance with public preferences.688 In republican thought, 
a constitution is recognized as instrumental in guaranteeing the people’s authority.689 
A constitutional government is a way of ensuring that the people’s fundamental 
freedoms are enshrined as constitutional principles. 690  Thus, the constitution 
represents a fundamental structure for reaching collective decisions in a democratic 
way.691 It consists of a due process of law- which guarantees and limits governmental 
dominating power over ordinary citizens, and a way to reform if the substance of a 
constitution does not legislate to treat all as equals.692 The people’s representatives 
can then implement a constitution within which the right to public participation is 
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respected by representative bodies and is accepted as a part of checking and balancing 
the power of state institutions.  
 
Within the ongoing representative process, elected officials are responsible for 
constitutional reform through legislative institutions. In addition, the promotion of 
public communication will help to decrease the dominating power of representatives 
over the people if the constitutional right guarantees the political authority of the 
people. If there is a constitutional basis for these checks to take place, then the 
balance of power between the people and their representatives will be maintained, and 
this can ensure that the will of the people remains central, which is exactly the 
requirement of republican liberal theory. Moreover, the process of external self-
determination will be made more legalized.  
 
 
2. The typology of consensual and non-consensual representative processes 
This section aims to highlight the distinction between consensual and non-consensual 
representative processes, both for the Constituent Assembly’s elections693 and the 
function of national, federal or local legislatures, in responding to the public 
opinion.694 The differences between consensual and non-consensual representative 
processes will reveal the four main aspects of legitimacy; the equal distribution of 
power for representative bodies,695 public awareness through the media coverage,696 
                                                      
693 For example, Namibia Constituent Assembly’s election in 1978 and 1989 
694 For example, East Pakistan national election in 1970 and Catalonia election in 2012 and 2015 
695 For example, Czechoslovakia institutional and constitutional reform see Katarina Mathernova, (n 24) 471,480; Claudia 
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696	There was an example of equal time allocation broadcasting for each party in Czechoslovakia’s 1990 election. See 
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the involvement of civil society in local governments and federal parliament,697 and 
the role of political parties as mandated representatives.698 
 
The first condition for classifying a consensual-based process is that a mutual 
agreement must exist between parties or representative bodies to identify the will of 
the people; non-consensual based representatives do not have this agreement. A 
consensual-based election occurs when there is an agreement between the former 
administrative powers and international institutions. 699  The agreement formally 
accepts the process of a free and fair election with the legitimizing contribution of an 
international institution framework, for example, the 1978 case in Namibia.700 By 
contrast, a non consensual-based election happens when there is no agreement 
between the two interested parties (i.e. the governments involved). The elective 
process identifies the will of the people in order to find representatives who set a 
public agenda within the state institutions, such as in Bangladesh in 1970.701  
 
The second condition for classifying a consensual-based process is that a clear legal 
instrumental framework with a constitutional basis exists to ensure the expression of 
the will of the people is carried out. Drafting a new constitution or amending an 
existing constitution in a consensual-based process automatically proceeds as a 
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continuous action of representative bodies (i.e. Constituent Assembly).702 By contrast,               
constitution-making in non-consensual based representative process may be an 
initiative by the local or federal government with which to insist on identifying the 
will of the people. They may be the result of civil society or other social organizations 
pushing an agenda which is in the interests of the people.703  
 
Consensual action within the parliamentary model is seen in Czechoslovakia in 1993, 
when both the Czech and the Slovak people’s representatives voted for the dissolution 
of the Czechoslovakia federation.704 By contrast, the parliamentary models in Kosovo 
(1999-2007) and Catalonia (2015) illustrate non-consensual action; both Serbia and 
Spain denied their right to unilateral secession.705 However, in Kosovo, a temporary 
commission was set up in the form of a local parliament by international institutions 
to administer Kosovo’s territorial and administrative arrangements in the state’s 
transitional period.706 In Catalonia, the regional parliament had a mandate from the 
local people themselves to contest and challenge the policy of the national parliament 
(i.e. Spanish Congress). In this case, the people’s control over their representative 
body originated from the bottom-up characteristic of civil society. 707  Non-
governmental organizations in Catalonia were unique in having the collective strength 
to push their own agenda through their local parliament.  
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The following observations about consensual-based and non consensual-based 
representative processes demonstrate that both have the potential to carry out 
legitimate and illegitimate consequential actions, under different circumstances. 
However, some practical applications show that the unfair distribution of elected 
officials can affect voting and constitution-making, such as Czechoslovakia. 708 
Human rights protection can also be problematic in consensual-based processes, in 
particular the freedom of expression and the promotion of civil society function, such 
as in Namibia.709 By contrast, non-consensual based representative processes are 
systemized with the attempt of local or federal governments to strengthen the free 
expression of the will of the people. Representative bodies can be held more 
accountable than in consensual based representative processes, because they are 
committed to responding to and implementing public opinions.710 Human rights 
protection is considered a vital component of legitimizing democratic processes. 
Political party and civil society involvements clearly carry out their duties in response 
to the informed consent of the people.711 
 
3. The application of republican liberalism to representative processes  
The right to external self-determination is defined as the people’s right to political 
participation; an election is recognized as a basic form of this participation.712 From a 
liberal perspective, ‘democracy’ is considered to be the people participating and 
deliberating in politics.713 Republican liberalism emphasizes broader participation 
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which advocates for deliberative and inclusive democracy. A deliberative model of 
democracy is perceived as the free association of citizens  in   exercising  their right to  
discuss and reach a consensus. An inclusive model of democracy considers the 
equality of all people in this decision-making process.714   
 
When applying the republican liberal theory to representative processes and elections 
in particular, the interaction between constituencies and representatives is crucial. In 
republican thought, people as constituent powers are involved in political 
participation through representative processes.715 During elections for the purpose of 
territorial alteration, a screening process takes place (such as in republican liberal 
theory), through the people’s choice of their own elected representatives. However 
after the election has taken place, the next step involves the people’s checking and 
balancing of the power of these representative bodies.716 An important element of any 
external self-determination practice is the consequence i.e. if territorial alteration 
occurs or not. Republican liberal theory refers directly to the consequential actions of 
popular participation, specifically through representative processes.717   
 
It is essential to look at five interrelated factors which determine whether the 
representatives’ actions are legitimate, based on the degree to which they express the 




                                                      
714 Philip Pettit (n 17) 195; John W. Maynor (n 17) 128-129 
715 Philip Pettit (n 17) 172-173; John W. Maynor (n 17) 130-131 
716	Philip Pettit (n 17) 214, 221-222; John W. Maynor (n 17) 53-54 
717 Philip Pettit (n 17) 207; John W. Maynor (n 17) 143-145 
194 	
3.1. The nature of the election and the subsequent actions of the elected 
representatives 
 
An election is established to allow the local population’s involvement in deciding 
their future status. It provides an equal opportunity for all citizens to become 
candidates and put forward their political views, individually and collectively with 
others.718 The election is a way to give the people’s mandate to representatives in 
order to carry out the people’s demands within state institutions. In allowing the 
people to select their representatives, an election is also the first step of a continuous 
process of external self-determination. During the electoral process, the will of the 
people should be respected by any governmental authority, which then implements 
the outcome - establishing policies or relevant actions according to the needs of the 
people. The outcome of the electoral process is ideally a collective action: the will of 
the people is integrated into the agenda set by their representatives.  
 
Looking specifically at external self-determination practices, the consequences of an 
election and the representative bodies’ functionality can be measured in two different 
ways: either by there being a constitutional amendment or by the newly elected 
officials requesting a greater level of self-government in an autonomous territory. 
Ideally, the right to vote should be guaranteed within the national constitution or other 
specific laws. Drafting a new constitution or constitutional amendment is an integral 
part of the process of building a nation identity, like in Namibia in 1989, because as a 
legal instrument, the constitution guarantees the people’s political equality and 
reflects their aspirations. Demanding a greater level of autonomy is another form of 
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continuous action by representative bodies in responding to the people’s will. The 
local representatives act as political agents to put local interest into action at a 
national level, like in Bangladesh and Catalonia. This can help to legitimize the 
mandate of the representatives based on the collective will of the people. 
 
There are two representative bodies to carry out the people’s mandate in external self-
determination practices: the Constituent Assembly and the Members of Parliament 
(MPs). The Constituent Assembly’s primary role is to write a new constitution (or 
amend the existing constitution); a legal mechanism dictating how any new governing 
authorities play their roles, whilst reflecting the local population’s aspiration, creating 
a new national identity. The purpose of the Constituent Assembly’s election is to 
divide the electorate according to community and constituency. 719  Thus, the 
Constituent Assembly consists of a number of representatives from different 
communities. This practice helps to reflect local populations’ interests in national 
development when drafting a constitution or requesting an amendment. Meanwhile, 
elected MPs represent the people and having MPs from different territorial 
constituencies promotes local interests. MPs put ‘the verdict of the people’ into 
action,720 and do this in two ways. They set the agenda according to the people’s 
demands in the local and federal parliaments, and they uphold the people’s interests in 
the National Assembly through checking and balancing the power of the state. For 
example, MPs are able to vote or abstain from passing any law, such as a 
constitutional amendment. Thus, the Constituent Assembly and MPs are involved in 
guaranteeing and transferring the mandate of the people into action.  
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Within republican liberal theory, the expression of public opinion is perceived as 
necessary for governments and representative bodies to claim legitimacy. The theory 
dictates that political participation must take place- i.e. the expression of the will of 
the people- in order to recognize the governmental authority.721 The theory also states 
that the consequential effects of such governmental action contributes towards 
legitimacy; if the people’s demands are met by their representatives then the 
government can claim itself to be legitimate.722 If representative bodies make their 
decisions with discretionary power rather than based on the people’s demands, their 
actions are not legitimate.  
 
The following section will explore the use of representative processes in three 
different consensual and non-consensual processes: Namibia in 1989, Bangladesh in 
1971, and Catalonia in 2012-2015. Namibia is a clear instance where external 
international involvement helped to create an independent territory with legal 
legitimacy. Significantly, the process included two elections (the first being 
considered illegitimate in the eyes of the international community) and therefore 
demonstrates the intricacies of representative processes, even in consensual cases. 
Moreover, the Namibian case illustrates how collaborative action between 
international institutions and the national governing agencies can produce an ideal 
electoral process – including  its outcomes, and consequent constitution-building. The 
example of Bangladesh’s general election illustrates a non-consensual representative 
process which forever changed the power balance between East and West Pakistan. 
Significantly, the national election of Pakistan in 1970 demonstrated a popular 
mandate in order to identify the communal representation between East and West 
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Pakistan.723 The national election did not directly mention the local request for 
independence but presented itself as a democratic process to draw a federal distinction 
between East and West Pakistan.724 The Catalonia elections in 2012 and 2015 
demonstrate how representative bodies can provide an institutional mandate for 
independence through regional parliaments.  
 
3.1.1 Consensual action in Namibia 
During the thirty-year period from 1960 to 1989, the Namibian transitional for 
independence encouraged a broad discussion about how to reconcile the involvement 
of international institutions in organizing fair elections and the local population’s 
demands on territorial matters. International institutions, particularly the UN and its 
subsidiary bodies, were involved in agenda-setting to provide a long-term of peace 
settlement.  
 
In 1920, the status of South West Africa (Namibia) territory was as a mandated 
territory of South Africa. 725 Then, after the dissolution of the League of Nations, 
South West Africa was under the supervision of the UN General Assembly and its 
Trusteeship Council. After the UN General Assembly terminated its mandate in 1966, 
South Africa refused to withdraw its ruling power in legislative and executive 
authority over South West Africa.726 Following this, Namibia was placed under the 
supervision of the UN Council for South West Africa. 727  Under the scope of 
Resolution 2248 adopted on 19th May 1967, the UN Council function was “to 
administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum possible 
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participation of the people of the territory”.728 In addition, the UN Council took 
responsibility “for promulgating laws, decrees and administrative regulations until the 
establishment of a legislative assembly following elections”.729   
 
According to Resolution 2248 [1967], the UN council’s task was to establish an 
election to identify the will of the Namibian local populations to exercise their right to 
self-determination. 730 From 1967, the UN was involved in every step of the electoral 
process in Namibia. This electoral supervision entailed working with the national 
authority to ensure the election in South West Africa was free and fair, ensuring the 
freedom of the people in voting and the impartial action of the national authorities.731 
These actions were in accordance with Resolution 1514 [1960], which mandated that 
the transfer of power to people must take place in reference to the freely expressed 
will of the people, enabling them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.732 
Apart from the UN Council for South West Africa, there were two authorities 
involved in the electoral process for Namibian independence: the Administrative-
General (AG), appointed by South Africa and the Special Representative (SR), 
appointed by the UN Secretary-General.  
 
There are four significant events during the Namibian transition to independence 
which show, to varying degrees, how the general will of the people was respected by 
both international institutions and the national government. The first event was the 
appointment in 1973 of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) as 
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the people’s representatives within the framework of the United Nations. The second 
event was the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference in 1975-1977. This conference 
was sponsored by South Africa to discuss a constitutional amendment for the future of 
South West Africa. The consequential establishment of the Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance was the compromise of different ethnic groups. The third was the first ever 
Namibian national election in 1978 and the subsequent establishment of two interim 
governments as well as the attempt to draft a constitution for independence between 
1979 and 1988. The final event was the election in 1989 to select the Constituent 
Assembly, whose purpose was to create a constitution reflecting the future aspirations 
and identity of the nation.  
 
1973: the appointment of SWAPO 
Before the appointment of the SWAPO by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
and the UN as a political party,  SWAPO was  a political movement  which conducted  
political liberation activities on behalf of the people. As a movement, it was approved 
by the National Convention (created in 1971) which was a product of negotiation  
between political groups inside Namibia including SWAPO, the South West Africa 
National Union (SWANU), the South West Africa National Independence 
Organization  (SWANIO), and the National Unity Democratic Party (NUDO).733 
 
The appointment of SWAPO as the people’s representatives was a unilateral action by 
the UN. SWAPO was recognized as the Namibian representative by the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 3111 (12th December 1973) and the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 31/146 (20th December 1976). These resolutions stated that: 
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“The national liberation movement of Namibia, the South West Africa 
People’s Organization (SWAPO), is the authentic representative of the 
Namibian people, and support the efforts of the movement to strengthen 
national unity”.734 
 
The UN’s decision to recognize the status of SWAPO as the sole, legitimate 
representative of the people did not conform to the expressed will of the people.735 On 
the date of approval, the local Namibian people had no chance to express their will. In 
other words, the SWAPO leaders were not recognized as elected officials by the local 
indigenous people. One observation of the SWAPO appointment is that the UN 
employed its discretionary power without providing a channel for the people to 
participate in a collaborative decision-making process. Another contrasting 
observation is that the UN’s intention was to create proper representation of the 
Namibian people by appointing SWAPO and therefore to obstruct South Africa’s  
military activity which was preventing the people from achieving independence.736 
Given that this action on South Africa’s part was labelled as illegal occupation on 
South West Africa’s territory by the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion 
in 1971,737 the actions of the UN to counter this could be considered as legitimate. 
 
1975-1977: The Turnhallle constitutional conference 
On the 1st September 1975, the Turnhalle conference opened in Windhoek and 
concluded its work in March 1977. The meetings were held in the Turnhalle (a former 
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German gymnasium). 738  The conference was the national discussion about the 
constitutional development of Namibia. The conference was convened by the ruling 
white population in the territory with the support of the South African government.739 
The participants included various ethnic groups. As a consequence, they agreed to 
form a new political alliance of eleven ethnic political parties called the ‘Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance’ (DTA).740  
 
The first session was generally about the importance of the future constitutional 
structure. A ‘declaration of intent’ was issued to outline the objectives of the 
conference, including specifically the constitutional development of the country and 
the desire to respect the wishes of local populations: 
“We, the true and authentic representatives of the inhabitants of South West 
Africa, hereby solemnly declare:  
That in the exercise of our rights to self-determination and independence, we 
are voluntarily gathered in this Conference in order to discuss the 
constitutional future of South West Africa;  
That mindful of the particular circumstances of each of the population groups 
it is our firm resolve in the execution of our task to serve and respect their 
wishes and interests; 
We therefore decide  
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(a) To draft a constitution for South West Africa as soon as possible and, if 
possible, within a period of three years;  
(b) To devote continuous attention to measures to implement all the aims 
specified in this Declaration”.741 
The second session was held from 10th to 14th November 1975. The participants of the 
conference agreed to set up four different committees to hear expert evidence on 
particular issues. The first studied the question of discriminatory practices. The 
second focused on economic development for inhabitants. The third studied social 
development. The fourth dealt with educational facilities. These committees needed to 
report their findings in the third session of the conference.742Apart from this, the 
Constitutional Conference, at its second session, decided that:  
“(a) Representatives of the Conference be appointed overseas, when it is 
deemed expedient, in order to keep governments and institutions informed of 
developments at the Conference;  
(b) Evidence by minority groups and other institutions which espouse a 
peaceful resolution of the problems of South West Africa should be accepted, 
in either written or oral form, but that each such request to present evidence be 
considered on its merits;  
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(c) A Committee will be appointed at an appropriate time in order to 
investigate the question of the return to South West Africa of exiles from the 
Territory”.743  
One noteworthy observation is that SWAPO and the UN representatives did not join 
the conference. From SWAPO’s standpoint, this conference was an attempt by South 
Africa to reclassify the Namibian ethnic people by incorporating them into a 
confederation of Bantustans. 744  From the UN’s standpoint, the conference was 
established to acknowledge South Africa’s illegal occupation regime. In addition, the 
conference did not include the people’s representative organizations (i.e. SWAPO).745 
After the conference, South Africa established an interim government for the territory 
and the South African parliament approved a draft constitution. This action was 
questionable in terms of its legitimacy due to the lack of popular recognition of 
SWAPO. 
The ‘Western Contact Group’ (i.e. France, UK, US, Canada and Germany) (WCG), 
acted as mediators, initiating an ongoing discussion with South Africa. There were 
four crucial processes that the Western Contact Group proposed. Firstly, they selected 
holding a national election as a way to identify the local population’s will. The elected 
officials worked in the Constituent Assembly which performed its role in the 
constitution-making process. Secondly, both South Africa and the UN could each 
appoint one official to govern the territory until independence: the Administrative 
General (AG) of South Africa and the UN Special Representative (SR) respectively. 
Thirdly, it dictated the unconditional return and release of all Namibian people in 
exile, Namibian detainees and political prisoners. Fourthly, South Africa needed to 
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withdraw its troops from Namibian territory and the UN forces were to replace them 
during the election to maintain law and order.746   
1978: the first Namibian national election 
After the Turnhalle constitutional conference, in December 1978, public political 
participation took place through an election to decide whether to approve an interim 
government under an interim constitution. Before holding the election, the UN 
Security Council passed a resolution to construct a proper framework with which to 
achieve free and fair elections. According to the UNSC Resolution 385 of 1976, the 
Namibian people had the right to determine their own future through an election 
process under the supervision and control of the UN. 747 The resolution specified that: 
“The people of Namibia may be enabled freely to determine their own future, 
it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the 
United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity”.748  
 
A free and fair election was designed to ensure the Namibian local population’s 
authority to determine their future destiny through self-determination. The UN. 
Secretary-General’s Special Representative was appointed to maintain law and order 
during an election. 749  This election was organized based on a proportional 
representation voting system, a type of electoral process that allocates seats on the 
basis of the number of votes each party receives.750 The advantages of proportional 
representation are that there are representatives from different political parties, and a 
promotion of the demands of   diverse groups of people. 
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Meanwhile, South Africa’s AG was nominated to be a continual presence during the 
electoral process. South Africa took part in establishing an interim government. The 
DTA which was established during the Turnhalle Conference, won a majority of 82% 
(41 out of 50 seats in the Constituent Assembly).751 The UN. Secretary-General’s 
Special Representative (i.e. Martti Ahtisaari) and SWAPO did not recognize the 
elected Constituent Assembly because the latter was excluded from full participation 
in this election.752   
 
However, Resolution 385 [1976] was not implemented because there was a 
disagreement between the SR and AG to approve certain of its conditions. In terms of 
the AG, South Africa intended to prevent the fulfillment of decolonization process 
under the UN control.753 Meanwhile, the SR. was not able to transfer the power to the 
people of Namibia with a free and fair election.754  
 
In 1978, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 435 to replace the previous 
resolution, which established the use of elections in assessing the will of the people. 
However, after Resolution 435 was passed, an electoral process did not take place 
smoothly. There was a severe armed attack by the South African military forces on 
SWAPO forces in Okahenge.755 This action was the main cause of the delay of an 
electoral process as a first step for Namibia independence. 
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In the aftermath of the election, there was a lot of obstruction preventing 
independence, caused by two competing parties (i.e. the UN and SWAPO, and the 
DTA and South Africa), in particular a constitutional deadlock. In April 1984, a 
multiparty conference convened to reach a consensus on a new, permanent 
constitution.756 In 1985, the second interim government and Council of South West 
Africa were established to draft a national constitution that would be submitted to the 
electorate for approval. The Council finished their work within two years but the draft 
constitution did not gain unanimous support. The DTA withdrew and South Africa 
ignored the second interim government and the work it had achieved.757  
 
In 1987, the UN General Assembly released a Decision 42/417 concerning military 
bases and installations in colonial and NSGT.758 In its opinion military bases in the 
NSGT were major obstacles to the administering powers for ensuring the people’s 
right to self-determination. 759  The General Assembly demanded the urgent 
withdrawal of all military bases in the international territory of Namibia. All violent 
armed conflicts against the people of Namibia and their national liberation movement 
would cease.760 This resolution was an important step in bringing peace to Namibia. 
 
1989: the election of the Constituent Assembly 
Apart from acting as a mediator between South Africa and SWAPO, the Western 
Contact Group played a role in designing the revised version of an electoral 
framework in Namibia. The UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) was 
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implemented to ensure that a free and fair election could take place. Before the second 
election in 1989, international involvement was divided into three stages: pre-election, 
during the election, and post-election.761  
 
Pre-election 
Firstly, organizing an electoral system in a fragile state was an attempt to consolidate 
democracy and a new political regime in the aftermath of civil war.762 Before the 
electoral process in Namibia 1989, it was necessary to cease military intervention and 
resolve armed conflicts. The liberation war was a guerrilla war between the nationalist 
South-West Africa people’s organization movement (SWAPO) and others against the 
apartheid government of South Africa at Okahenge.763 The armed conflicts spread out 
in wide areas along the border of South West Africa and in Zambia, Tanzania and 
Angola, where a number of exiled SWAPO leaderships were. The long conflict had 
come to an end with the signing of an agreement, the so-called New York Accord, in 
December 1988. The tripartite agreement (i.e. between Cuba, Angola and South 
Africa) was signed to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) as a 
path for Namibia independence.764  
 
During the election 
Secondly, an election is a democratic mechanism used as a means of achieving 
governance. In the aftermath of violent conflicts, elections represent an important step 
towards democratic consolidation.765 In the case of Namibia, the proposal of an 
election was the result of negotiations and collaborations between SWAPO, South 
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Africa, the Western Contact Group, the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, 
Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), and UN officials. The Western 
Contact Group established the principles for a free and fair election (i.e. Resolution 
435) which were accepted by the UN.766 The purpose of the election was to select 
representatives who would make up a Constituent Assembly and create a Constitution 
for an independent Namibia.767 This election was a predetermined pathway to assess 
the will of the people. Holding an election was a way to create a smooth transitional 
process to independence, and this lack of violent conflict would make the subsequent 
nation-creation more legitimate. In 1989, the UN Security Council agreed to 
implement Res 435 of 1978 (which had replaced Res 385) which involved holding an 
election. This document was a product of a negotiation process between all involved 
parties, with the support of the South African Government, all Namibian political 
parties and SWAPO, to bring peace and transfer power to the people of Namibia. The 
UN Security Council Res 435 was fully implemented, and importantly, emphasized 
two elements of the electoral process. One, that the election was a selective 
democratic process to create a representative body (the Constituent Assembly) which 
would then create a Constitution for Namibia. Two, that the election would facilitate a 
smooth transitional process to independence.  
 
The election was held from the 7th to 11th November 1989. The main aim of the 
election was to guarantee the distribution of power between the political parties. The 
proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation stated that: 
“The purpose of the electoral process is to elect representatives to a 
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Namibian Constituent Assembly, which will draw up and adopt the 
constitution for an independent and sovereign Namibia”.768  
 
Under the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation, it was set out that the 
UN’s Special Representative (SR) held responsibility for controlling and supervising 
an instrumental framework and practical action.769 The UN’s SR was responsible for 
guaranteeing fairness and appropriateness during the electoral process, limiting the 
power of South Africa to intervene in the election.770 
 
In addition, the UN’s instrumental framework referred to annulling all restrictive and 
discriminatory regulations that were unfair to Namibian populations living in South 
African territory. The practical action was to release all political prisoners and 
detainees, allowing them to return home to Namibia.771 A free and fair election in 
Namibia was possible, then provided that there was no intervention from South Africa. 
This is an example of how international intervention and standard-setting can help to 
alleviate tension and crucially prepare the ground for a free and fair election to take 
place, making its outcome more legitimate.  
 
One noteworthy observation is that although the election was an attempt to 
democratically identify the will of the people, in practice, there was no clear way to 
balance power between the South African’s Administrator General (AG) and the 
UN’s SR in the electoral process.772 The former was able to maintain its power of law 
and order until Namibian independence. The UN had no enforcement power to stop 
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breaches in the law and partisan actions by SWAPO. The UN’s SR ignored 
everything except anti-SWAPO activities, because SWAPO represented the majority 
of the people and was recognized by the international community.773 Any action taken 
against it would severely undermine the outcome of the election. Those people, who 
disagreed with SWAPO, were excluded from participating.774 Other political parties’ 
activities were ignored as they had no effective implementation of law and order.  
 
Another observation is that an election was a democratic way to officially empower 
SWAPO, raising them from a people’s liberation movement to a political 
organization.775 In terms of international law, the election helped to legalize the status 
of SWAPO from a pre-independence liberation movement to a political party (a key 
actor under democratic principle) able to represent South West African’s demands.776 
 
Post-election 
Thirdly, the legitimacy of an election is proved through the action of the Constituent 
Assembly, specifically its adherence to the will of the people while creating the 
Constitution. After the election in Namibia, the constitution-making process became 
part of the international peace-making operation; the elected Constituent Assembly 
convened on 21st November 1989.777 The constitution-making process is important 
democratically: the free election of representatives and the protection of fundamental 
rights are issues which are discussed. The establishment of a national identity and the 
people’s aspirations are incorporated into the substance of the constitution.778 In 
general, the Namibian constitution-making process was a product of compromise 
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between different interest groups (i.e. South Africa, the Western Contact Group, 
SWAPO and other ethnic parties). These interest groups tried to influence the ultimate 
outcome of the nature of the Namibian state to suit their own interests. 779 Without the 
efforts of the UN to ensure that the Constituent Assembly fairly represented the 
people of Namibia, this constitution-making process would have been dominated by 
South Africa. 
 
The Constituent Assembly was a political institution derived from the Namibian 
people’s mandate. Under the scope of Resolution 435, after the Namibian local 
populations took part in the election, the Constituent Assembly then convened and 
adopted a Constitution for an independent Namibia.780 This step illustrates an instance 
where the will of the people is carried out by a representative body. The Constituent 
Assembly was composed of all the political parties that gained seats in the election. 
The result of the election confirmed that the majority of the Namibian population 
supported SWAPO. SWAPO gained a majority of 41 seats out of 72 seats in the 
Constituent Assembly.781  Other parties received different levels of support: the 
Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) 21 seats, the United Democratic Front (UDF) 4 
seats, Action Christian National (ACN) 3 seats, the Federal Convention of Namibia 
(FCN) 1 seat, the Namibia National Front (NNF) 1 seat, and the Namibia Patriotic 
Front (NPF) 1 seat.782 On this point, the Constituent Assembly was consisted of 
different ethnic people representation. This can ensure that the different groups’ 
interests are promoted within the constitution-making process. In addition, the 
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electoral process was utilized to formally and democratically legalize the status of 
SWAPO, consolidating their dominant position as representatives of the majority of 
the people. The electoral process legalized the status of SWAPO as a political party 
with formal political powers. Then, the 72 members of the Constituent Assembly 
unanimously selected their leader, Sam Nujoma, as the first president of an 
independent Namibia.783 
 
In general, the degree to which the demands of the people are respected is dependent 
on two factors; the amount of time the Constituent Assembly is in power and the 
people’s involvement in the constitution-making process. The Constituent Assembly 
usually only exists for a short period and this factor directly impacts the extent of 
participation during the constitution-making process.784 The local populations were 
not consulted during the process either before or after the Constituent Assembly 
approved the constitution of an independent Namibia.785 In Namibia’s case, the UN’s 
framework provided a continuous, step-by-step process which upheld the local 
population’s right to participate in decisions over their future status. The UN also 
created a template for the Namibian Constitution, guaranteeing the freedom of the 
Namibian people to participate in political decision-making in the future. UNTAG 
was appointed as a subsidiary body to ‘supervise and organize’ the country’s electoral 
process to guarantee the ‘fairness and appropriateness of all measures affecting the 
outcome of that election.786 In addition, governmental authority is generally perceived 
as more legitimate when the representatives are concerned about the participation of 
people in legislative action e.g. constitution-making processes. However, the 
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Constituent Assembly committed itself to finishing its work within only 80 days. This 
was in order to ensure that the Constitution was in place before UNTAG withdrew 
from the Namibian territory.787 The 72 members of the Constituent Assembly passed 
the constitution on 9th February 1990. Then, the leader of the SWAPO became the 
first president of Namibia.788   
 
The election for a constituent assembly in Namibia is an example of external 
involvement setting up an electoral system and the application of external self-
determination being a continuous process. The case in Namibia also provides a clear 
demonstration of how external involvement can facilitate the people’s mandate being 
expressed through elected officials. However, only the elected officials had input into 
the new constitution; the people had  no  chance to read or provide feedback on a draft  
constitution before it came into effect. Significantly, this lessened the degree of 
legitimacy of the constitution-making process-and of course the constitution itself.  
 
3.1.2 Non-consensual action in Bangladesh 
The election in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) is an example of non-consensual action 
where the Awami League acted as a representative government on behalf of the 
Eastern Pakistan people. The justification for holding this election was to identify the 
will of the people, despite the federal government in West Pakistan being opposed to 
such a democratic procedure. The example of Pakistan serves two purposes for this 
thesis. Firstly the creation of a Constitution is the first step towards guaranteeing the 
people’s will in any decision-making process. In Pakistan although there was a 
struggle to create the Constitution due to different demands from East and West, 
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eventually it served to increase the level of autonomy of the people of East Pakistan, 
allowing them, despite being a minority, to participate in decision-making at a 
national level. Secondly, the example demonstrates that an election alone is not 
sufficient to ensure that the people’s will is respected. In Pakistan, after the election, 
the East Pakistan people’s representatives failed to perform their duty and put public 
opinion into action. Therefore external self-determination should include more than 
one process to ensure that the people’s rights are included during territorial alteration.  
 
East and West Pakistan: constitutional disagreements 
After partition from India in 1947, there were clear distinctions in territory, language, 
religion and culture between East and West Pakistan. According to the legal study of 
the Secretariat of the International Commission of Jurists, East and West Pakistan 
were each large enough in population and territory to constitute separate nation 
states.789 In East Pakistan, 98% of the population spoke Bengali and only 2% spoke 
Urdu which was the principle language of West Pakistan.790 This linguistic factor 
demonstrates the homogeneity of society in East Pakistan, potentially making political 
negotiation easier, and a more politically equal atmosphere in society.  
 
The first election for the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was held in 1949. This 
election attempted to balance power between East and West Pakistan.791 In terms of 
the constitution-making process, the first Constituent Assembly failed to complete the 
task of framing a constitution. The second Constituent Assembly replaced the first in 
1955 and the ‘late constitution’ of Pakistan was adopted in 1956.792 The second 
Constituent Assembly was composed of 80 members, half each of East and West 
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Pakistan residents. This constitution lasted for only two and a half years. Between 
1957 and 1960, the country was placed under the military’s authoritarian rule. 
Political parties and popular political activity were prohibited. Instead, the military 
leader, Ayub Khan, made an attempt to implement ‘basic democracy’ policy. In his 
opinion, the Pakistan people were not ‘mature’ enough (or had sufficient 
understanding of democracy) to have a right to rule.793 Thus, basic democracy was the 
first step towards creating a decentralized system. According to the Basic 
Democracies Ordinance 1959, local people (those over 18) were trained to learn the   
democratic system by giving them opportunities to select representatives. 
Consequently, 80,000 Union Councillors (40,000 in each province) were elected and 
this Union Council could vote on law-making process and who should become 
president.794 In 1960, the elected councils were asked to vote ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the 
referendum question; “have you confidence in President Ayub Khan?”. 95.6% voted 
to support him. 795 After this, the President decided to create a national constitution.  
 
As part of the 1962 constitution-making process, the Constitution Commission was 
established to study and gather information for a new constitution. The Commission 
submitted its report in May 1961. The Commission’s proposition to draft a new 
constitution was not considered satisfactory by the military leader (i.e. General Ayub 
Khan).796 Then, the Cabinet appointed a sub-committee to examine the report to 
submit its own. In addition, the Administrative Committee, which consisted of the 
Cabinet Secretary, the Additional Chief Secretaries to the Governments of East and 
West Pakistan and another Central Secretary also examined the Constitution 
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Commission’s report. The constitutional proposals were finally discussed at the 
Governor’s Conference from 24th-31st October 1961. The Governor’s Conference 
appointed a drafting committee to write the national constitution.797  
 
On 1st March 1962, the second constitution of Pakistan came into effect. The 1962 
constitution was a legal instrument giving centralized authority to the president and 
preserving the territorial integrity of Pakistan. The constitution was not based on the 
theory of separation of powers because the President had a veto power in the law- 
making process. 798  The parliament structure was sub-divided into National and 
Provincial Assemblies.  The establishment of two Assemblies was an attempt to 
balance the power of the representative governments. The aim of the first chamber 
was to promote the people’s interests whereas the aim of the second was to deal with 
province and federal state issues.799  
 
As a result of the policy of centralization put in place by the military, East Pakistan’s 
population suffered severe and systematic discrimination from the government in 
Islamabad. They were dissatisfied with the economic inequality between the two. In 
the Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan, there was a demand for a greater level of 
autonomy. In 1966, the Awami League proposed full provincial autonomy with the 
declaration of a six-point program. (At the same time, there was a popular uprising 
from which various student organizations developed a more detailed eleven-point 
program. This latter proposal in 1968800 aimed to ensure complete freedom for the 
East Pakistan people to determine their own destiny. The six points were: 
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“1. Pakistan would have a federal structure of government based on spirit of 
the Lahore Resolution of 1940, with a parliament elected on the basis of 
universal adult franchise; 
2. The central government would have authority only in defense and foreign 
affairs and all other subjects would be handled by the federating units of the 
state of Pakistan; 
3. There would be two freely convertible currencies for the two wings of 
Pakistan or two separate reserve banks for the two regions of the country; 
4. The power of taxation and revenue collection would be vested in the     
 federating units; 
5. There would be two separate accounts for foreign exchange reserves for the 
two wings of Pakistan; 
6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia or paramilitary force as a 
measure of its security”.801 
 
One relevant observation of the six-point program is that the ALP established a path 
to self-governing purpose. The proposals from the ALP on behalf of the East Bengal 
population were persistently denied and ignored by West Pakistan. The people’s 
liberation movement was obstructed by a central government which needed to retain 
its power in the constitution-making process.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
Restoration of democracy and universal adult franchisee. 4) Nationalization of banks, insurance and big industrial units. 5) 
Reduction of taxes upon agriculture. 6) Payment of proper wages to laborers. 7) Introduction of a flood control plan in East 
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Withdrawal of the National Education Commission Report, the Hamid ur Rehman Commission Report and the University 
ordinances. See Riaz Ahmed Shaikh, ‘Military Dictatorship and People’s Movement in Pakistan’ (2009) 13(1) Jadavpur Journal 
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In 1969, President Yahya Khan succeeded his father as President of Pakistan. He 
abrogated the 1962 constitution and issued the 1970 Legal Framework Order (LFO) 
as an outline for the National Assembly election and its task of framing a future 
constitution.802 The preamble included the phrases, 
  
“WHEREAS provision has already been made by the Electoral Rolls Order, 
1969, for the preparation of electoral rolls for the purpose of election of 
representatives of the people on the basis of adult franchise”. 
and 
“WHEREAS it is necessary to provide for the constitution of a National 
Assembly of Pakistan for the purpose of making provision as to the 
Constitution of Pakistan in accordance with this Order and a Provincial 
Assembly for each Province”.803 
 
Significantly, these phrases constitute a legal condition that any National Constitution 
must be created, based on the outcome of a national election.  
 
In addition, the LFO clearly suggested a federal system of government804 to be 
preferable and that the structure of the National assembly should be reformed. After 
the LFO took effect, the National Assembly consisted of 313 members; three hundred 
seats were elected from constituencies and thirteen seats were reserved for women.805 
It had 120 days from the date of its first meeting to frame a constitution and on its 
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failure to do so would stand dissolved.806 The power to amend any provision in the 
LFO was reserved by the President.807  
 
Above all, the constitutional crisis in Pakistan stemmed from military intervention. 
All decision-making powers were held by the military leader. The East Pakistan 
people requested a federal system, suggesting it to be more appropriate than the ‘one 
unit’ structure. The federal system was a way to give equal power to local populations 
in both East and West. In the context of the National Assembly, local populations had 
no chance to check or challenge any governmental policies because the second 
National Assembly was nominated not by the people, but by the military leader 
during the state of emergency. The weakness of the parliamentary system (i.e. the 
Provincial and National Assemblies) was a major cause of limiting opportunities for 
effective public participation.  
 
Pakistan’s national election in 1970 
A general election was held in 1970 throughout West and East Pakistan using the one-
man, one-vote principle for the first time, which assured East Pakistan a majority of 
votes and seats at the National Assembly.808 The distribution of seats in the National 
Assembly was based on the proportional numbers of the population. As a 
consequence, the outcome was a clear distinction between the number of East and 
West Pakistan representatives. In East Pakistan, where, according to the 1961 census, 
54% of the population was Bengali809, the Awami League Party (ALP) was the main 
representative; meanwhile the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) became the people’s 
representatives of West Pakistan. Representatives for seats in both the National and 
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Federal Assemblies were elected in 1970, and the result showed a clear distinction of 
political will between East and West. The ALP had no seats in West Pakistan while 
the PPP had no seats in East Pakistan.810 For the East Pakistan Federal Assembly, 
which had less power than its West Pakistan counterpart, there were 870 candidates 
contesting 162 seats. The ALP won 97% (i.e. 160 out of 162). At the National 
Assembly therefore, ALP elected officials secured 160 out of 300 seats – a 
majority.811  
 
The newly-elected National Assembly officially created a Constituent Assembly on 
17th April 1971.812 Because the East Pakistan people gained a majority through the 
national election, they were able to pressure the central government in Islamabad to 
construct an administrative system of power between East and West Pakistan. 
However, there was a military intervention in East Pakistan to obstruct the 
constitution-making process. Widespread human rights violations occurred; over a 
million Bengalis were killed and nearly 10 million exiled to India.813 Despite the fact 
that the Constitution was unfinished, the process of external self-determination was 
facilitated by its presence. The process of creating the Constitution provided the 
groundwork for increasing the autonomy of East Pakistan. When the UN intervened 
to stop the human rights violations against the East Pakistan people, the journey 
towards independence was based on the Constitution which had started in April 1971. 
In January 1972, the President of West Pakistan officially declared the unconditional 
release of East Pakistan.814 
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The 1970 election demonstrated that the collective will of the people in East Pakistan 
was to increase political and economic equality and future independence. West 
Pakistan’s PPP representatives emphasized the centralization system, because this 
would ensure that West Pakistan would retain power over policies, budgets and 
political activity.815 Although the ALP advocated for the Federal System instead, it 
never proposed the East Pakistan people’s desire to become independent. After 
gaining a majority, the ALP’s purpose was to build political independence for East 
Pakistan, according to the people’s will: developing its autonomy under the federal 
system.816 However, the ALP did not mention full independence as a separate nation-
state in its six-point program. 
 
The role of the Awami League: from constitution-making to the proclamation of 
independence order 1971in East Pakistan  
In 1970, a national election was held to give a higher degree of autonomy to East and 
West Pakistan. As a result, the ALP gained an absolute majority in the East Pakistan. 
The Awami League leader made great efforts to promote the local population’s 
demands for self-governance. Even though the Awami League gained the majority of 
support from the local population, this dominant position poses a question. To what 
extent was the general will of the people respected during the negotiation process 
between the representative bodies of East and West Pakistan?  
 
Regarding the role of the ALP in post-election 1970, there are two factors to consider: 
the mandated representatives in the National Assembly and the legitimacy of the 
Proclamation of Independence Order in 1971.  
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The task of the National Assembly in East Pakistan was to act as a mandated 
representative to adopting a constitution and performing the role of an ordinary 
legislature.817 From the beginning of March to April 1971, East and West Pakistan 
representatives could not agree on a draft constitution. The negotiation process was 
conducted between the President of Pakistan and the ALP leaders. The President 
proposed using the 1962 constitution as a legal framework for administrative and 
executive duties until the National Assembly finished a new draft constitution, as he 
needed to retain his veto power. In contrast, the ALP’s position was that a higher 
degree of autonomy in East Pakistan was required. This was in conformity with the 
local population’s demands in the national election in 1970.  
 
During the constitution-making process, there was a disagreement between the ALP 
and the central government in Islamabad. The National Assembly did not successfully 
write a new constitution and the President of Pakistan made an announcement to 
postpone the National Assembly session. After the President’s official declaration of 
postponement, there was a public reaction; uprisings took place in Dacca and the 
main cities in East Pakistan. The East Pakistan people demanded an outright 
declaration of independence for their region of Pakistan.818 In their opinion, the 
Awami League was the undisputed people’s representatives in East Pakistan. Thus, 
they expected that their representatives would act in accordance with their demands. 
They proposed that to draft a constitution, the ‘six-point program’ should be included 
in the Confederation of Pakistan. But in reality, the Constitutional Bill passed by the 
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National Assembly clearly conflicted with the LFO and the six-point program, 
ignoring the people’s wishes.819 
 
The ALP declared independence in East Pakistan as ‘Bangladesh’ on 10th April 
1971.820 The Proclamation of Independence Order had a mandate from the elected 
members (i.e. East Pakistani’s representatives) in the National Assembly and the East 
Pakistan Provincial Assembly.821 It was adopted to safeguard the Bengali people’s 
right to become the makers of their own destiny. According to Chowdhury, the 
Proclamation of Independence of Bangladesh by the ALP in 1971 was recognized by  
the international community as the East Bengali people exercising their right to self-
determination.822 In addition, the Proclamation of Independence was evidence of the 
role of the ALP as a government by the people to frame a new constitution that 
reaffirmed their rights. The Proclamation of Independence included the phrases, 
“Whereas free elections were held in Bangladesh from 7th December 1970 to 
17th January 1971, to elect representatives for the purpose of framing a 
constitution”.823 
and 
“We the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh, as honour bound 
by the mandate given to us by the people of Bangladesh whose will is supreme 
duly constituted ourselves into a Constituent Assembly”.824 
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Significantly, these phrases constitute the representative’s mandate as legitimate state 
officials who could act on behalf of their people to declare independence. 
 
The importance of the Proclamation of Independence 1971 was that it validated of the 
unilateral action for independence. The substance of the proclamation was reliant on 
the right of people to self-determination. 825  The Eastern Pakistan people were 
recognized as supreme powers. Thus the representatives mandated their authority with 
the approval of the people. According to the Proclamation of Independence Order 
1971,  
“…………in order to ensure for the people of Bangladesh equality, human 
dignity and social justice, we declare and constitute Bangladesh to be 
sovereign people’s Republic and thereby confirm the declaration of 
independence already made by Bangabandu  Sheikh Mujibar Rahman”.826 
 
From the previous statement in the Proclamation Order 1971, the East Pakistan 
people’s right to self-determination was identified through the continuous action of 
the ALP as their representatives. The elected representatives officially created a 
Constituent Assembly on 17th April 1971. This shows the effectiveness of the 
governmental authority evidenced by popular support in pressuring the central 
government in Islamabad to release the East Bengali population as a self-governing 
territory. In terms of the people’s mandate, it was apparent that the unity of people in 
East Pakistan was a crucial factor in distinguishing themselves from the West 
Pakistan populations.  
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The case of Bangladesh provides a clear example of a local population’s will to 
implement external self-determination. The success of Bangladeshi independence was 
derived from the unity of the local population in requesting self-governance.827 
However the example shows that framing a new Constitution to guarantee the rights 
of the people is an important factor to ensure that the genuine will of the people is 
respected during territorial alteration. In addition, the people’s representatives are 
another consideration; their actions can determine whether the will of the people is 
respected. In this example, the will of the Eastern Pakistan population was clearly 
established through a national election in 1970. However, the ALP deviated from 
putting public opinion into action, demonstrating that elections are not the ultimate 
way of assessing the will of the people.  
 
3.1.3 Non-consensual action in Catalonia 
In 1978, there was a constitutional compromise between the people’s representatives 
in the Spanish Congress. After the constitution entered into force, the development of 
territorial organization began with the establishment of the autonomous entities, 
including Catalonia.828  For local representatives, the purpose of establishing an 
autonomous territory was to decentralize power from the Spanish government and, 
later, put themselves in a position to reorganize the territorial structure. In addition, 
the re-distribution of power to an autonomous region was a way for the latter to 
establish institutions which shared authority between themselves and the central 
government. The Spanish constitution acknowledged ‘the right to initiate the process 
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towards self-government’ of an autonomous territory. 829  The Assembly of the 
autonomous communities could request that the central government pass a bill or 
submit a non-governmental bill to the Congressional Steering Committee or to a 
delegation of three Assembly members.830 Catalonia’s powers and responsibilities as 
an autonomous territory were written under two specific statutes, the Statute of 
Autonomy 1979 and the Statute of Autonomy 2006.831 The amendment in 2006 
approved an electoral process to identify the will of the Catalan people. ‘The right to 
decide’ of the Catalan population was perceived as an initial way to involve the local 
people in any decision-making process as part of the Spanish nation.832 Then, if the 
will of the people was clearly in support of secession from Spain, the local authorities 
could bring the people’s demands to the Spanish Congress for a constitutional 
amendment. By contrast, from Spain’s standpoint, a greater level of autonomy was a 
way of empowering minority groups of people. The development of an autonomous 
system of government would, according to the Spanish State Report to the UN, help 
to resolve problems in their pluralistic society. Self-government is compatible with 
national unity and is an appropriate way of accommodating the diversity of people in 
its territory.833 All Spaniards would be living together within the framework of the 
Spanish constitution while respecting individual characteristics.834  
The case of Catalonia demonstrates two things: how a regional parliament can 
increase the power of a local population’s voice in the national parliament by reaching 
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a consensus amongst themselves first; and how, by gaining support from the majority 
of representatives in this regional parliament, the people can be allowed to determine 
their own territorial status.  
Generally, the regional parliament works in collaboration with civil society to 
represent the local population’s interests. Importantly, however, the people need to be 
able to participate directly in the process of amending a national constitution. It is the 
responsibility of the people’s representatives to promote these interests at a national 
level- in this case at the Spanish Congress. There are three significant events which 
illustrate how the Catalan representatives continuously strove to keep their promise    
of instigating a secessionist movement. 
2005: a proposal of the Statute of Autonomy for a greater level of self-government  
Firstly, in 2005, the Catalan parliament submitted a proposal to the Spanish Congress 
to reform the Statute of Autonomy. This action was an initial step towards requesting 
a greater level of autonomy and expanding the authority of the regional government 
of Catalonia. Before passing the new Statute in 2006, there was a high level of 
support from Catalan representatives and the local population. 89% of the members of 
the Catalan Parliament (i.e. 120 out of 135 seats) approved the proposal.835 The 
Catalan citizens were also asked whether they approved the proposal, through a 
referendum. 73.9% said yes to the proposal, and therefore greater self-autonomy, 
although there was a low turnout of 49%.836 Finally, the Spanish Congress adopted 
the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia on 19th July 2006.  
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The new Statute stated that the main function of the parliament was to represent the 
people of Catalonia, and it specifically increased the local authority’s 
responsibilities.837 It protected the people’s right to submit legal proposals to the 
regional parliament, to express their demands directly and to organize public 
involvement in decision-making processes. 838  This greater level of popular 
participation empowered civil society to work in collaboration with representative 
bodies (i.e. parliament). The self-governance that the Statute mandated (and the 
implicit right to self-determination) legitimized the people’s demands to secede from 
Spain. In terms of autonomy, Catalonia exercises its self-government as an 
autonomous community in accordance with the Spanish Constitution. In 2006, there 
was a request for higher quotas of self-government within Spain.839 One of the main 
purposes was to convert Spain into a federal or a pluralistic state. 840 
Between 2007 and 2010, there was a massive popular movement in support of ‘the 
right of people to decide and independence’.841 After the victory of the Catalan 
nationalist party (Convergencia I Unio) in an election in 2010, the party leader 
attempted to negotiate with the Spanish Congress in order to instigate some form of 
referendum or public conversation. The new Statute of 2006 stressed the right to 
initiate public discussion: Article 122 stipulated that:  
“The Generalitat (government) of Catalonia has exclusive power over the 
establishment of the legal system, the modalities, the procedure, the 
implementation and the calling, whether by the government or by local bodies, 
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acting with their jurisdiction, of public opinion, polls, public hearings, 
participation forums and any other instruments of popular consultation”.842 
After the campaign and the election in 2010, the Catalan parliament enacted Act 
4/2010, which specified the region’s position on popular consultations, via a 
referendum. The referendum was merely a consultative mechanism and had no legal 
binding effect. The Catalan government had a duty to report the outcome of any such 
referendum to Spanish parliament.843 
2012-2014: an electoral process and a representative body with a mandate 
Secondly, an election of the Catalan Parliament was held on 25th November 2012 in 
order to identify the degree to which the people wanted independence, through 
selection of pro- or anti-independence representatives. The outcome of the election 
revealed that the local people supported the Catalan Nationalist Party’s (CIU) policy 
on creating an agenda for self-determination. The CIU won the election with 71 seats 
out of 135 seats.844 The clear majority, however, went to all the parties which had 
promised to hold a consultation on the political future of Catalonia, including the 
Catalan Republican Left (ERC).845 The leader of the CIU (Artur Mas) signed an 
agreement with the leader of the ERC, therefore, to strengthen the secessionist 
movement. After this, Artur Mas the President of Catalonia, made a commitment to 
the Catalan people about the possibility of Catalonia becoming a sovereign state, 
because the electorate had demonstrated that a clear majority was in favour of the 
proposal. The Catalan parliament therefore voted to start the secession process.846 The 
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vote passed by 72 out of 135 to “begin the process toward the creation of an 
independent Catalan state in the form of a republic”.847As a consequence, the Catalan 
parliament took responsibility for drafting a new constitution for Catalonia 
independently from the institutions of the Spanish State.  
As a preliminary consultation method, the election had provided a channel for people 
to participate in the decision-making process When the Catalan people expressed their 
collective will, this provided legitimacy to negotiate with the central government of 
Spain to amend the national constitution, recognizing the right of an autonomous 
people to decide on their future territorial status. One observation was that people 
participation in the election was remarkably high. The registration was up to 67.6% 
on the electoral day.848 However, the election did not ascertain the will of the people 
in favour of independence. Then, the President of Catalonia made an attempt to save 
his own face by proposing a referendum on independence. The Catalan Parliament 
had to find an appropriate mechanism to consult the local population on the matter of 
Catalonia as a sovereign state. Therefore they decided to hold a referendum to ask the 
population directly and measure their will more clearly.849 
Before this referendum could take place, the Catalan parliament had to provide 
legislative confirmation of the importance of the will of the people in deciding their 
own destiny.850 In 2013, the Catalan parliament released a document recognizing ‘the 
right of the people to decide’ their future destiny. ‘The Declaration of Sovereignty 
and Right to Decide of the people of Catalonia’ was set out thus:  
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“In accordance with the will of the majority expressed democratically by the 
people of Catalonia, the Parliament of Catalonia agrees to initiate the process 
to make effective the exercise of the right to decide so that the citizens of 
Catalonia can determine their collective political future, in conformity with the 
following principles: sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, transparency, social 
cohesion, legality, and participation”.851 
The Catalan parliament had a primary role in encouraging the local population to take 
part in this decision-making process without any interference from Spanish 
authorities.852 However, ‘the Declaration of Sovereignty and the Right to Decide of 
the people of Catalonia’ was unconstitutional according to the ruling of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, using the same reasoning as it had in the case of Basque in 
2008.853 The Court prioritized the territorial integrity of Spain over respecting the will 
of the people. The Court also emphasized that direct or indirect forms of public 
political participation were not sufficient to put forward a constitutional amendment 
that an autonomous territory might become an independent state. It argued that in 
order to validate any legal amendment, the process must be approved by the majority 
of the entire Spanish Congress, including representatives from the whole country, not 
simply those representatives from the regional territory desiring independence. The 
Spanish Constitutional Court judgment 103/ 2008 stated that: 
“A consultation is convened based on the initial recognition of the existence of 
the “Basque people’s right to decide” in respect of opening up negotiations, 
the content and significance of which are indicated in the sole article and 
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which are specified in the explanation of grounds, based on achieving an 
agreement which will establish "the bases of a new relationship between the 
Autonomous Community of the Basque Country and the Spanish state". The 
law includes as subjects of this new relation the Autonomous Community of 
the Basque Country and the Spanish state considering this in its meaning of 
"overall state" and not, as is required in the question of relation to an 
Autonomous Community as "central state". Therefore, if an attempt to attain 
this “new relation” were solely to be made through the reform of the 
Autonomous Statute of the Basque Country there would be no point in the 
referendum, nor would it be appropriate at this initial moment as popular 
consultation is only possible for ratification of the reform once this has been 
approved by the Parliament”.854 
 
The Catalonian government called for a referendum in September 2012 and a 
subsequent election in November 2012 as these were two democratic mechanisms  
which would identify the genuine will of the Catalan population. However, the 
Constitutional Court denied the legal effect of the Catalan Act 4/2010 which extended 
authority to the Catalonia government and called for greater public participation. 
Moreover, the Court stated that ‘a right to decide’ did not equate with the right to self-
determination. The Spanish Constitutional Court ruling 42/2014 stressed that:  
 
“An autonomous community cannot unilaterally call a referendum on self-
determination. Catalonia does not have the sovereign right to unilaterally 
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decide its collective political future; it can, however, be consulted on the issue 
within the framework of Spanish constitutional law”.855 
and 
“The right to decide held by citizens of Catalonia” is not proclaimed as a 
manifestation of a right of self-determination not recognized in the 
Constitution, or as an unrecognized attribution of sovereignty, but as a 
political aspiration that may only be achieved through a process that conforms 
to constitutional legality and follows the principles of “democratic legitimacy”, 
“pluralism” and “legality”, expressly proclaimed in the act in close connection 
to the “right to decide”.856 
 
Significantly, these court rulings illustrate the supremacy of the constitution. Since the 
constitution did not guarantee the right to self-determination, any demand by the 
people which lay at odds with territorial integrity was considered unconstitutional.   
The actions of the Catalan parliament are an example of a mandated representative 
which made decisions based on the concerns of the people in the specific area they 
represent. Despite their demands being denied by the Spanish Congress and the 
Spanish Constitutional Court, the Catalan representatives continued to strive to 
initiate alternative mechanisms to involve the local population in their own future. 
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2015: a continuous action of representative bodies to legitimize secession based on 
the will of the people 
Thirdly, in 2015, a regional election was called two years early in order to identify the 
will of the people over the issue of Catalan independence. Artus Mas tried to frame 
the regional election as a de facto referendum on independence.857 The Catalan 
parliament made ongoing attempts to carry out the local population’s demand for self-
governance with the aim of declaring independence within 18 months.858 The CIU 
gained the majority of support in the Catalan parliament (i.e. 72 out of 135 deputies). 
After the Spanish Constitutional Court’s denial of the unilateral action of the Catalan 
government, the regional government appealed the ruling (42/2014) that an attempt to 
hold a referendum would be unconstitutional. According to the Spanish Constitutional 
Court ruling 31/2015, the expression of the will of people regarding their right to self-
determination should be limited. The court stated that:  
 
“The freedom of a parliament or of the government of an Autonomous 
Community to choose policies is legally limited by the Constitution and the 
Statute of Autonomy. No legislative assembly of an Autonomous Community 
may adopt a resolution to promote policies that are in absolute contradiction 
with the Constitution”.859  
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From the process of submitting an amendment to the Statute of Autonomy in 2005 to 
the post-referendum actions in 2015, while the expressed will of the people has been 
considered as unconstitutional, the Catalan elected officials supported the people’s 
right to decide their own future. When the existing Spanish Constitution did not 
include the constitutional rights to self-determination for people residing in an 
autonomous territory, public opinions can still be ascertained through a state 
institutional framework such as local or federal parliament. The actions of the Catalan 
representatives were in accordance with republican liberal theory, because all the 
people were included in the decision-making process and were ensured a vote without 
interference from Spanish authorities. Non-governmental organizations (i.e. civil 
societies) worked alongside governmental authorities to identify the collective will of 
the people. They were able to check or contest regional government’s policy 
implementation on behalf of the people. 
To sum up, a governmental authority can claim that by responding to and promoting 
the interests of the people, their position as representatives of the people is legitimized. 
The inherent ‘ongoing’ nature of elections and parliamentary models rely, then, on the 
idea of ‘government by discussion’, particularly in territorial alteration processes. 
Manin emphasizes the role of state institutions (i.e. parliament) in providing a central 
arena in which to debate and share public opinions.860 Elections in consensual and 
non-consensual representative processes can claim legitimacy in different ways. 
Consensual representative processes are legitimized within the framework of 
international institutions. By contrast, non-consensual representative processes, 
despite not being officially mandated by a state or international institution, can claim 
legitimacy by putting their promises to the people into action. If the elected officials 
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keep their promises or go beyond their promises to perform their duty based on the 
people’s demands, this is perceived as transferring the genuine will of the people into 
action, and thus legitimizing their position. In addition, the role of the Constituent 
Assembly is a critical factor in justifying the accountable and transparent action of 
representative bodies. After selecting their representatives, the people are able to 
assess and ensure that politically legitimate governments carry out their duty, in 
conformity with the consent of the governed. 
 
3.2 Majority and minority relations 
Contemporary understandings of the democratic system refer to the interplay between 
all involved parties, including stakeholders (e.g. civil society, public sector 
organizations, minority groups or interested parties) in decision-making processes.861 
When considering the relationship between the people as constituent powers and 
representative bodies, there are two noteworthy forms of equality in elective 
participation: equal opportunity for individual concerns and proportional equality.862 
The former refers to the rights of people to vote as constituents. People’s right to vote 
is generally considered to be both an individual right and a collective right.863 All 
individuals have the right to be involved in the elective process and there should be no 
discrimination against minorities. 864  In addition, elections are perceived as a 
collective decision-making process which gathers the interests of all different groups 
in a pluralistic society.865 Proportional equality refers to the number of representatives 
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who have the right to vote in the parliament or the national assembly.866 These 
representatives cannot be held fully accountable to the people if there is a proportional 
number, fairly distributed throughout the population.  
 
The relationship between the elected representative body and the concerns of the 
majority and minority populations demonstrates how those elected officials respond 
to the will of the people and perform their duty. An analysis of the legitimacy of the 
incumbent officials’ actions (in terms of balancing the interests of the majority and 
the minority) can be done from two points of view: the electorate’s and the elected 
officials’. From the electorate’s perspective, all people should have adequate and 
equal opportunity to express their preferences and, crucially these are equally 
weighted during any decision-making process. 867  From the elected officials’ 
perspective, representative bodies should not only promote majority interests but also 
minority interests. Balancing power between majority and minority interests is 
important, because when representative bodies make decisions based on the interests 
of both, the balance of power is fair and the results are more legitimate.  
 
Having examined the relationship between the representative bodies and the balance 
of majority and minority power, it is crucial to perform dual tracking of representative 
processes. Firstly, the effective participation of different groups of people in a 
national election is a necessary to ensure that a representative body is truly 
representative. Secondly, the composition of representative bodies illustrates how 
minority involvement has a direct consequence on the degree of legitimacy in a 
decisive outcome. Thus, in order to ensure effective participation of all diverse groups 
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of representatives, two conditions must be met: the composition of representatives in 
the national assembly or parliaments must be proportional and voting procedures must 
demonstrate participation of each group of people. Therefore, with respect to external 
self-determination practices, a legitimate balance of power exists which allows the 
people to request a greater degree of autonomy or a constitutional amendment. Ideally, 
equal popular participation should be reflected in proportional numbers of 
representatives for majority and minority groups, thus ensuring the legitimacy of their 
actions.868 In addition to proportional numbers of representatives, it is necessary to 
establish certain measures to increase the effective participation of minority groups in 
decision-making processes.869  
 
The following section elaborates on two different cases, showcasing how 
representative bodies perform their ongoing duty to varying degrees, while 
conforming to the people’s wishes. Republican liberal theory requires a democratic 
balance of power between the people and the state, which is gained through broader 
public participation.870 The theory emphasizes the importance of political equality, 
treating everyone’s ability to vote as equal. Therefore no one majority should prevail 
over another.871 The following two cases demonstrate the varying degrees to which 
this happens, and the impact of this on the legitimacy and transparency of the 
representative process; how far do they adhere to the democratic ideal of political 
equality? 
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The two comparable cases below are the consensual agreement of the Federal 
Assembly for dissolution in Czechoslovakia in 1993, and the establishment of a 
special  parliamentary form  during transition in Kosovo in 1999. The Czechoslovakia  
example illustrates the power of minority representatives (i.e. Slovaks) to veto a 
majority decision (i.e. Czech) they dislike. In this case, the Slovak representatives set 
an agenda in the state institution for a constitutional amendment, which would in turn 
create institutional and instrumental reforms, ensuring Slovak political equality.872 
However, the two electoral processes in 1990 and 1992 failed to measure the public 
demand for secession. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia was solely an act by the 
elected representatives who performed their duty based on their interests rather than 
the interests of the people.873 The example of Kosovo reveals a different perspective 
on minority concerns. Although broader participation of minority groups was 
established by an international institution (the UN) to ensure that representatives from 
all minorities were present in the Assembly, these representatives did not act to 
promote the interests of the minority groups they were supposed to be representing. 
Instead they conformed to the interests and desires of the majority representatives (the 
Albanians) when drafting the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Only a 
small minority of representatives (10 Serbs and 1 Gorani) raised their voices against 
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3.2.1 Czechoslovakia: an instance of secession as a result of negotiations between 
representative bodies rather than due to any public demand for independence  
 
In the 1960s, the population in Czechoslovakia was composed of two primary ethnic 
groups: the Czechs and the Slovaks. The former comprised two-thirds of the 
population whereas the latter made up one-third. 875  The unequal numbers of 
representatives in the Federal Assembly directly affected the outcome of voting or 
proposing an agenda, which included the consideration of a constitutional right to 
self-determination and a greater level of self-administration.  
 
There are two points of discussion about the democratic legitimacy of the 
representative processes in Czechoslovakia during the elections in 1990 and in 1992. 
The first is the composition of the people’s representatives within the state institution. 
From 1968, the Czech and Slovak representatives agreed to create two federal states 
(i.e. the Czech Socialist Federal Republic and the Slovak Socialist Federal 
Republic)876 and this legally came into effect in 1969. Each federal state had its own 
legislative and executive bodies within the federal structure. There was a 
constitutional amendment to increase the number of Slovak representatives in the 
Federal Assembly. 877 Having a proportional number of elected officials had a direct 
consequence on the number of representatives who could block and action their veto 
powers. This proportional representation would increase the ability of the Slovak 
representatives to take part in decision-making processes in the Federal Assembly. 
The impact of the amendment on the majority dominating was that the three state 
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institutions (legislative, executive, and judiciary systems) were all restructured in 
1970.878 The total number of representatives for voting and blocking mechanisms in 
the National Councils became proportional which reflected the demands of both 
groups. Despite the increased equality between the Czech and Slovak representative 
bodies, and between 1970 and 1989, their representatives were still not able to find a 
compromise between their dissimilar opinions.879 Thus, as a result two elections were 
held in 1990 and 1992.880 The second point of discussion is that to hold such elections 
to assess the will of the people was unprecedented in Czechoslovakia.881 Previously 
the people had no opportunity to directly participate politically having been under 
Soviet rule.  
 
The attempt for requesting an equal number of the people’s representatives  
The Czech and Slovak representatives made great efforts to amend the constitution to 
rectify this inequality and empower people, in particular the Slovak people (the 
minority). Under the scope of this amendment the Federal Assembly in 
Czechoslovakia would consist of two Houses: the Chamber of the People and the 
Chamber of Nations.882 The former included two hundred deputies who were elected 
by a direct vote throughout the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 883  The latter 
contained one hundred and fifty deputies; seventy-five were elected by a direct vote in 
the Czech Socialist Republic and seventy-five by a direct vote in the Slovak Socialist 
Republic.884 The two houses worked together in decision-making processes when they 
debated governmental policy.885  In addition, the amendment addressed the super-
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majority voting requirements, which immediately made things more equal between 
the Czech and Slovak representatives. The supermajority requirement is a mechanism 
to increase minority involvement in decision-making processes. The amendment 
established a super-majority requirement of a three-fifths absolute majority in the 
Chamber of the Peoples (lower chamber) plus a three-fifths absolute majority of each 
national group in the Chamber of Nations.886 This proportional super-majority of 
representatives in the Chamber of Peoples and the Chamber of Nations was necessary 
to ensure that the constitution legitimately reflected the will of the people. An 
increased number of voting or blocking procedures was a crucial factor in 
guaranteeing the stability of the constitution.  
 
From the velvet revolution in 1989 to the election in 1990 and in 1992 
In 1989, due to the dissatisfaction of students and the Citizens Forums (CF) with the 
monopolized policy of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (CPC), a number of 
uprisings took place, called ‘the velvet revolution’. The demonstrations were a way 
for the people to express their support for a constitutional amendment. It was a 
movement campaigning for federal reformation in the administrative department of 
the Czechoslovakian Federal Assembly. The contention between the Czechs and 
Slovak leaders was based on ethnic tensions that led to the constitutional amendment. 
The constitutional amendment would entail a draft of a new electoral law which 
would increase the level of popular participation in the coming elections. The new 
electoral law aimed to prevent small parties gaining less than 5% from failing to have 
a seat in the parliament.887  
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After the collapse of the communist regime in 1989, the process of agreeing on the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia began. Consensual democratic processes were used to 
form the Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). The first election was held in June 
1990. This election was a poor indicator of public demand. The election question 
asked people ‘are you for change?’.888 This was not clear because the question did not 
clarify what ‘change’ means. Amongst the Czech political parties, Havel and the 
Citizen forums (CF) gained a majority support in the National Assembly and in the 
Federal Assembly. In the Slovak federal republic, the Public Against Violence (VPN) 
gained a majority seat in the National Assembly but less than the rival the Christian 
Democratic Movement (CDM) in the Federal Assembly.889 In the aftermath of the  
election in 1991, the Slovak representatives did offer a variety of choices for 
exercising the right to self-determination, such as a greater form of autonomy, quasi-
independence within a federal structure and full independence as a state.890 In March 
1991, Slovakia’s leading party (the Christian Democratic Union) attempted to put 
sovereignty on the agenda in the constitutional amendment with a great deal of 
support from the Slovak population. According to the AISA poll, 86% of Slovak 
citizens were dissatisfied with the federal administration which suppressed the 
interests of Slovakia. In addition, 22% of Slovak citizens supported separation.891 
Regarding the Czech representatives, Havel disagreed with a right to unilateral 
secession. A democratic secession was not perceived as necessary to allow each 
republic to claim the right of self-determination. Both Czech and Slovak 
representatives could not reconcile their interests over their administrative powers.  
 
                                                      
888 Abby Innes, ‘The Breakup of Czechoslovakia: The Impact of Party Development on the Separation of the State’ (1997) 11 (3) 
East European Politics and Societies 393, 393-394 
889 Bernard Wheaton and Zdenek Kavan, (n 873) 150 
890 Lloyd Cutler and Herman Schwartz (n 708) 511,523 
891 Abby Innes (n 888) 393,410  
244 	
The second election was held in June 1992. Due to the failure of constitutional talks 
between the Czech and Slovak representatives, the question of secession was 
proposed to the public to determine their future.892  In terms of the composition of 
people in Czechoslovakia, there was a clear ethnic heterogeneity (e.g. Czechs 81% 
and Slovakia 86%) residing in each federal unit.893 Even though there was high 
participation (83%) in this election, it appeared that 16% of the Slovak population and 
31% of the Czech population were undecided on their party preferences.894 It was also 
apparent that the will of the Czechs and the Slovaks was not to break up 
Czechoslovakia into two independent states.895After the second election in 1992, 
Meciar, the political leader of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia parties (HZDS), 
passed a document called the “Initiative for a Sovereign Slovakia” requesting full 
sovereignty for the Slovak Republic, and the adoption of a full Slovak constitution.896 
Meciar intended to discuss the matter of sovereignty in the post-election.897  
 
The main argument between the Czech and Slovak people was a different 
understanding of the concept of ‘sovereignty concept’. From the Slovak perspective, 
sovereignty did not mean independent state sovereignty but rather that two federal 
states could function independently along legislative and administrative lines while 
retaining a Federal Assembly. Only one political party (i.e. the Slovak National Party- 
SNS) supported the independent statehood of Slovakia, and even 44% of the SNS 
stood against this policy.898 The Slovak National Council refused to approve the 
declaration of sovereignty as it was unconstitutional and they believed that the future 
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of Czechoslovakia should be decided by the people through a referendum.899 Within 
the substance of this document, Slovak sovereignty meant ‘a confederation state 
sovereignty’ and that the Czechs should treat Slovakia as an equally sovereign 
partner.900 The Czechs however thought that sovereignty meant a federation of two 
independent states.901 From their perspective, it meant an internationally recognized 
bodies (i.e. an independent state).902 This dissimilarity of opinion meant that no 
resolution could be found.  
 
In terms of external self-determination the division of Czechoslovakia into two 
independent states came to an end on 31st December 1992, negotiated between elected, 
political elites (i.e. Klaus of Czechs and Meciar of Slovaks) because neither had 
gained majority support from the second election in June 1992. The Federal Assembly 
agreed that the constitution would be amended to separate the Czech and Slovak 
republics into two independent states.903 The demise of Czechoslovakia was caused 
by the failure to negotiate a political arrangement within the federal system as 
opposed to any popular demand. There was no public opinion pro-independence and 
no clear public demand for secession.904 The case of Czechoslovakia’s consensual 
dissolution therefore is the attempt by elected officials (i.e. the Czech and Slovak 
representatives) to resolve conflict through democratic, constitutional-based reform. 
This action is not considered to be an example of a self-determination process through 
representative bodies. The absence of the expressed will of the people in the decision-
making process lessened the degree of legitimacy of the representatives’ actions. 
 
                                                      
899 Jiri Pehe, ‘Bid for Slovak Sovereignty Causes Political Upheaval’ www.pehe.cz/clanky/1991/199111October1991RFERL.pdf 
[Accessed 15 August 2016]  
900 Milica Z. Bookman, (n 875) 175,176 
901 Sharon L. Wolchik, (n 876) 153, 177 
902 Mary Heimann, (n 704) 319 
903 Ibid 320 
904 Jure Vidmar, (n 150) 71 
246 	
3.2.2 Kosovo and the attempt of minority powers to participate in decision-making 
processes 
The example of Kosovo demonstrates the importance of using republican liberal 
theory to standardize the processes used in practice during external self-determination. 
In theory, Kosovo should have been successful – to an extent – in providing the 
democratic, domestic institutions which balanced power between majority and 
minority groups. International institutional involvement was crucial in setting up these 
democratic institutions. 905 Therefore Kosovo should have served as an example of 
how the people’s representatives can legitimize external self-determination processes, 
acting on behalf of the local population (whether or not they belong to a majority or a 
minority group).906 However, in reality there were practical issues which prevented 
Kosovo from upholding the will of all the people from minority backgrounds, 
preventing the outcome of the territorial alteration being wholly legitimate.907 Since 
republican liberal theory emphasizes the political equality of all people regardless of 
their ethnic background, the guidance contained within the theory should be applied 
to the practical application of all external self-determination processes to ensure their 
legitimacy.908  
 
During the 1990s, the population in Kosovo (a province of Serbia) was just short of 
two million comprising 90% ethnic Albanian, and 7% Serbian with a minority of 
Turks, Bosniaks, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali and others.909 In 1999, ethnic cleansing took 
place under Serbian legislation with the aim of decreasing the population of Kosovo-
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906 UNMIK/REG/2001/9 ‘On a constitutional framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo’ chapter 1.5 
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg19-01.pdf accessed 25 May 2016  
907 James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Explaining Serbia’s Decision to Go to the ICJ’ in Marko Milanovic and Michael Wood (n 705) 10 
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909 Marc Weller, (n 874) 10-11  
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Albanians. 350,000 Albanians were forced to leave Kosovo.910 Any attempt to 
‘change the ethnic balance’ in a particular territory is not recognized within 
international law,911and therefore this action on the part of the Serbians prompted 
international involvement both in the Kosovo election and then also in the following 
creation of the Kosovo Assembly.   
 
In order to verify a legitimate action by the Kosovo Assembly, there had to be a 
proportional distribution of Albanian and non-Albanian delegates. These 
representative bodies took part in the constitution-making processes that reflected the 
needs of the local populations.912 There are two different situations to demonstrate 
how the minority groups’ representatives involve in decision-making processes: 
international institutional framework design of representatives’ composition in the 
Kosovo Assembly and the voting action for the unilateral declaration of in 2008. The 
delegate-places in the Kosovo Assembly were more proportionally distributed 
between the Albanian and other representatives from different minority groups 
incumbent officials. The Kosovo Assembly had the authority ‘directly and exclusively’ 
to decide on amendments to the Kosovo Constitution and to approve amendments to 
the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.913 Regarding to the unilateral 
declaration in 2008, the declaration was adopted by unanimously vote of 109 out of 
120 deputies.914  
 
The United Nation’s Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Regulation No.2001/9 stated that 
the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) were the Kosovo Assembly, 
                                                      
910 Ibid 13 
911 Ibid 62 
912 Ibid 239 
913 Ibid 35 
914 Ibid 231  
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the President of Kosovo, the Government, the Courts and other bodies and institutions 
that may be set forth in any Constitutional Framework.915 According to the Regulation, 
the PISG should work constructively towards ensuring conditions for a peaceful and 
normal life for all the inhabitants of Kosovo. An important step of such institution-
building was to develop multi-ethnic democratic structures that freely expressed the 
will of citizens.916 This procedural system was established to ensure that government 
decision-making was genuinely based on the will of the people. The equal distribution 
of representatives was believed to create legitimate representative processes in 
constitution-making which would reflect the national identity of Kosovo in a 
pluralistic society. Specifically regarding the Kosovo Assembly, Section 9 of the 
UNMIK Regulation addresses its composition:  
“Kosovo shall, for the purposes of election of the Assembly, be considered a 
single, multi-member electoral district. 
(a) One hundred (100) of 120 seats of the Assembly shall be distributed 
amongst all parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives, and independent candidates 
in proportion to the number of valid votes received by them in the election to 
the Assembly. 
(b) Twenty (20) of the 120 seats shall be reserved for the additional 
representation of non-Albanian Kosovo Communities as follows: 
Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and 
independent candidates having declared themselves representing the Kosovo 
Serb Community. These seats shall be distributed to such parties, coalitions, 
citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates in proportion to the number of 
valid votes received by them in the election to the Assembly; and 
                                                      
915 UNMIK/REG/2001/9 (n 896) chapter 1.5 http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg19-01.pdf accessed 25 May 2016  
916 Kosovo Unilateral Declaration of Independence (17 February 2008) Preamble para9 
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Ten (10) seats shall be allocated to other Communities as follows: the Roma, 
Ashkali and Egyptian Communities four (4), the Bosniak Community three (3), 
the Turkish Community two (2) and the Gorani Community one (1). The seats 
for each such Community or group of Communities shall be distributed to 
parties, coalitions, citizens’ initiatives and independent candidates having 
declared themselves representing each such Community in proportion to the 
number of valid votes received by them in the election to the Assembly”.917 
 
The Kosovo Assembly had the authority “directly and exclusively” to decide on 
amendments to the Kosovo Constitution and to approve amendments to the 
Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.918 In theory, the representatives were 
proportionally allocated because the constitutional framework of Kosovo formally 
recognized six minority communities: Kosovo Bosnians, Gorani, Roma Ashkali, 
Egyptians, and Turks.919 These groups were guaranteed reserved seats in the Kosovo 
Assembly. Thus, both the decision-making of the Kosovo Assembly and its voting for 
the Unilateral Declaration for Independence (UDI) later in 2008 should have been 
legitimized.  
 
Between the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999 and the 
UDI in 2008, there were three general elections held to select the Kosovo Assembly: 
2001, 2004 and 2007.920 The final election before the UDI was held on 17th November 
2007 in order to select the Assembly. However the level of popular participation was 
                                                      
917 Ibid section 1 9.1.1-9.1.3 
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919 European Union Election Expert Mission to Kosovo Final Report (25 January 2011) 25-26 
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low; the voter turnout was 43% and most voters were Kosovo-Albanians.921 The 
Kosovo-Serbs still had a strong political connection to the Serbian government who 
encouraged them to boycott the election. Kosovo-Serbs living in northern Kosovo 
boycotted the election in 2007 and proclaimed the right to secession in their own 
area.922 This action had a direct consequence on the seat-allocation in the Kosovo 
Assembly. After the election in 2007, the Kosovo Assembly passed a unilateral 
declaration of independence (UDI) in 2008. The UDI was adopted unanimously by a 
vote of 109 out of 120 representatives in the Kosovo Assembly. 10 Kosovo-Serb 
representatives and 1 Gorani representative refused to attend the discussion meeting 
before the vote was taken.923 However, the Kosovo-Albanians representatives and 
democratically elected representatives identified themselves as legitimate state 
officials who could act on behalf of Kosovar people to declare independence.924 Since 
the Kosovo-Albanians were the majority population in Kosovo their wishes prevailed 
over those of the Kosovo-Serb minority. 925  Importantly given that ‘so-called 
representatives of the people of Kosovo’ did not represent the whole population, the 
action did not respect the involvement of a minority group during the external self-
determination process of Kosovo.  
 
Another consideration was the authority of the authors of the UDI and its 
contradiction with the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. 926  According to 
Resolution 1244, only UNMIK could act on behalf of the Kosovar people which 
                                                      
921 Joe Conway, ‘Kosovo Municipal and Assembly elections observed on 17 November and 8 December 2007’ (Council of 
Europe 31 January 2008) summary para4 
922 Ibid section 4.4 
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entitled the UNMIK representatives to create external relations and attend an 
international conference.927  However, in a special session, the Kosovo Assembly 
passed the UDI and proclaimed themselves to be the ‘Kosovo people’s 
democratically-elected representatives’, 928 making the document, in their eyes, 
completely legitimate.929 By contrast the Serbian government argued that the Kosovo 
Assembly did not represent the will of the Kosovo-Serbs,930 and that only the UN 
Security Council had the power to terminate the international legal regime for 
Kosovo.931 However, the Special Representative of the Secretary General in Kosovo 
did not object to the UDI. Thus, the Kosovo Assembly believed that Resolution 1244 
did not apply because the Declaration was not made by that institution, but by the 
representatives of the Kosovo people.932 After being referred to the International 
Court of Justice, the ICJ found that the UDI was not prohibited by general obligations 
under international law or by Resolution 1244, as the declaration was not made by the 
Kosovo Assembly itself.933 In other words the ICJ did not find that the UDI was 
prohibited by international law as it was proclaimed by the elected people’s  
representatives. However, in the eyes of Serbia, the legality of the UDI should be null 
and void 934 because the Kosovo Assembly violated the UNSC Resolution 1244 and 
the Constitutional Framework.935 The Constitutional Framework stated that “Kosovo 
is an entity under interim international administration. Therefore, the Kosovo 
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Assembly had no authority to establish Kosovo as an independent and sovereign 
state.936  
 
In conclusion, Kosovo provides a clear example of how standards set by the 
international community can increase minority involvement in political participation. 
The proportional number of representatives and the participation of national 
minorities in an electoral process are two conditions which can dictate the legitimacy 
of representative bodies. The inclusive model of democracy was designed to include 
all the minority groups’ representatives in the Assembly. Although seats were 
allocated to the minority groups’ representatives, the absence of Kosovo-Serbs and 
Gorani representatives in decision-making processes lessened the degree of 
legitimacy of the democratic process. 
 
3.3 Pre-voters identification 
Pre-election, it is crucial to establish an institution to manage the voters’ eligibility in 
an election. The eligibility of voters is set by the UN and Central Election 
Commission (CEC) to ensure that all competent voters are granted the right to vote. If 
there are some groups of people missing from the voting list, the registration process 
needs to be flexible enough (particularly time-wise) to allow missing people to prove 
their connection with the territory. It is generally accepted that residency is a primary 
principle for identifying eligible voters in an electoral process. A length of residence 
requirement is imposed to prove a close connection between a person and their 
habitual residence. A list of voters is generally updated at least once a year to prevent 
missing people from the list. In addition, generally the democratic process includes 
people living outside a territory to register to vote in an election.  
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In addition, there needs to be proper mechanisms with independent judges to decide 
upon the final voter list, whilst legal provision must be put in place to ensure that 
there are as few limitations as possible. The consequence of this is that as many 
people as wish to vote, can, and therefore the general will of the people has been 
expressed - making the actions of the people’s representatives far more legitimate in 
the eyes of the international community. 
 
There is a specific state institution (i.e. an electoral commission) which acts as an 
impartial body for the application of the electoral law.937 In the case of Namibia, the 
proclamation of the Administrative General (AG) included the eligibility of voters. 
The Proclamation of the AG, issued on 21st July 1989, granted the right to vote to 
anyone either born in Namibia or with parents born in Namibia. This principle aimed 
to extend the right to vote to 10,000 Namibian exiles in South Africa.938 As part of the 
UNTAG, a Code of Conduct for the electoral process was set up with the approval of 
ten registered parties. The registration process for the electorate ran from 3rd July to 
15th September 1989 before the election in November 1989. Eligible voters included 
every Namibian over 18 years of age at the time of registration. Whoever was born in 
Namibia, or had been a resident in Namibia for at least four years, or the natural child 
of a person born in Namibia could register to vote.939   
 
A problem with the registration process was the requirement for uniform legal 
regulations to apply throughout the Namibian territory. Another problem was that the 
discretionary power of the Administrative General (AG) prolonging the timeframe for 
                                                      
937 European Commission for democracy through law (Venice Commission), ‘Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters: 
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938 Christopher Saunders, (n 761) 17  
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registration in some geographical units.940 This authoritative power provided some 
advantages for certain political parties to gain a high number of supporters.  
 
Regarding Kosovo, in 1999, the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK) took responsibility for establishing voter eligibility. During the 
years 2000-2007, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
was given the role of supervising free and fair elections in Kosovo along with setting 
up the Central Election Commission and its Secretariat; one round of elections in 
2001 with an open list, proportional representation system,941 the second and third 
rounds of parliamentary elections in 2004 and 2007. In addition, the OSCE assisted 
the Assembly of Kosovo in declaring the results of the election.  
 
The eligibility of voters in Kosovo was designed to include habitual residence in the 
territory and outside the territory to vote (if registered before the date provided). One 
could vote without being a citizen of Kosovo. The UNMIK set up the eligibility of 
voters conditions so that:  
“Each person having attained 18 years of age on the day of the election and 
satisfying the other criteria of eligibility to vote as applied to the municipal 
elections held in Kosovo on 28 October 2000 shall be entitled to vote”.942  
One relevant observation of voter eligibility in Kosovo is that the criteria were open 
to all ethnic citizens because they did not limit the right to vote to specific 
geographical areas. Apart from this, UNMIK regulation No. 2001/13 designed 
                                                      
940 Ibid 28  
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registration categories for people to vote in the first Kosovo election in 2001.943 The 
eligibility of voters was extended to include the special needs registration eligibility. 
Under section 3 of the Administrative direction, it specified that:  
“The following categories of habitual residents of Kosovo shall be eligible for 
registration as special needs registrants and shall be eligible to vote:  
(a) Persons who were unable to attend a registration centre and duly register 
on or before 22 September 2001 due to:  
(i) Severe mobility limitations;  
(ii) Residency in a prison, institution, elderly person’s home or hospital for  
mentally disabled; or  
(iii) A well-founded apprehension of serious physical or mental harm through 
intimidation, harassment, actual or threatened violence, or other offensive act 
to the person or his/her property, by reason of the person’s language, religion, 
political, national or social origin or association or lack of association with a 
Community.  
(b) Persons who were continuously incarcerated or detained in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia on or before 22 September 2001 and who were unable 
to attend a Civil Registration Centre or a Voter Service Centre due to such 
incarceration or detention and who were released and returned to Kosovo prior 
to the election; and  
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 (c) Persons who were incarcerated or detained in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia on or before 22 September 2001 and remain incarcerated or 
detained at the date of the election”.944  
There were two reasons for creating additional criteria of voter’s eligibility for the 
Kosovo election in 2001. Firstly, there were a huge number of displaced people due to 
the war in 1999. Secondly, they lacked an accurate census of data for the electoral 
authority to use as a basis for identifying the total number of people in small districts. 
In addition, people, who were residing outside Kosovo were granted the right to vote 
provided that they were in conformity with the section (c) of the direction.  
The criteria of eligibility of voters in the UNMIK regulation 2001/9 and UNMIK 
regulation 2001/13 were implemented in the second and the third round of the 
parliamentary election in 2004 and 2007. The eligibility of voters included:  
“A person is eligible to vote in an election to the Assembly if he/she is 18 
years of age on the day of election and is registered in the Municipal Civil 
Registry Centre in his/her municipality of residence. Persons living outside 
Kosovo and who have left Kosovo on or after1 January 1998 and meet the 
criteria in UNMIK Regulation no. 2000/13 on the Central Civil Registry are 
also eligible to vote.  
An eligible voter who is temporarily residing outside of or displaced from 
Kosovo, is entitled to cast a ballot in the election to the Assembly through a 
by- mail voting programme if she/he has successfully applied for a by-mail 
ballot in accordance with procedures and the deadline of 8 September. The 
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applicants will receive the voting kit containing everything needed to cast the 
ballot”.945  
Voter’s eligibility in Kosovo included people residing inside and outside the territory 
to exercise their right to vote. The main purposes of extending the time of registration 
and the eligibility of voter were to create new census-data and gain a high level of 
participation in the election, in particular the effective participation of the non- 
Kosovo-Albanian population. 
   
3.4 Human Rights protection and people’s fundamental freedoms during elections 
It is necessary to ensure that the determination of the will of the people is free from 
intervention or influence from state authorities. During every stage of the electoral 
process, then, the people’s human rights must be protected, namely, freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement, and freedom of peaceful assembly.946 Promotion 
and protection of this freedom is a way of ensuring the broader participation of all 
stakeholders before taking action in an election. In order for a governmental authority 
to claim that the genuine will of the people has been expressed, fundamental freedoms 
must be respected.947 These freedoms can be facilitated by the media, political parties 
and civil society. Political parties work alongside the people, facilitating peaceful 
assembly, sharing information and creating an environment where deliberative, 
inclusive decision-making can take place.948 Ideally, the media acts as a channel of 
communication between governmental agents and the people, raising awareness 
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amongst people that they have the right to be involved.949 Civil society (such as non-
governmental organizations) takes responsibility for ensuring that people have access 
to a large amount of information, including their own rights. It is an important 
additional channel for gathering the collective will of the people and transferring to 
state institutions.950 If the fundamental freedoms of people are guaranteed, this 
improves the legitimacy of the actions of the officials to act on behalf of the people. 
 
The concern for human rights is one way to evaluate a representative democracy, 
looking particularly at the relationship between the voters and the elected officials 
before, during and after the election itself.951 Prior to an election, a concern for 
human rights is reflected both in the right to be exposed to a variety of accessible 
opinions, and in voter eligibility; whether the people are allowed to vote regardless of 
ethnicity, gender or any other factor.952 During the process of an election, human 
rights concerns are based on freedom of movement, freedom to engage in the political 
campaign, the right to vote without interference, and of course an overall 
discretionary power to place their vote.953 After representatives are elected, people 
must have the right to check and balance the power of the elected officials.954 
Moreover, political parties must act on the people’s behalf in order to promote their 
interests, as promised during the campaign.955 People have the right to expect that 
public opinion will be adhered to in policy and constitution-making. The main aim of 
this section is to outline how guaranteeing these fundamental freedoms of people 
allow a representative government to claim legitimacy.  
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Human rights protection is generally accepted as an important component of 
legitimate constitution-building. The content of the constitution should include the 
empowerment of the people to have collective decision-making rights. People’s 
participation in the constitution-making process includes a variety of activities which 
allow people to discuss a draft version. Thus, raising awareness through campaigns 
and providing civic education are crucial in encouraging public interest in political 
participation. If popular participation is taken into consideration by all key 
stakeholders within a society, the constitution is perceived as a legitimate tool which 
reflects the national identity and the people’s aspirations for the future of the state.  
 
According to the Guidance Note of the UN Secretary-General in the assistance to 
constitution-making processes in 2009, the constitution-making process includes 
strengthening the rule of law, improving democratic institutions and practices, and 
promoting the protection of human rights. 956  Apart from the substance of the 
constitution, other components of popular participation improvement include the 
establishment of a representative body to run campaigns, provide public information, 
and gather the views of people during drafting and post-drafting the constitution.957 
 
In addition, according to Article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the right to political participation is guaranteed to all 
citizens. People’s right to vote is perceived as an individual right (the right of 
expression, the right of movement, and the right to assembly) and a collective right 
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(the right to assembly and association).958 Thus, people’s right to participate in 
decision-making (and thus elections) must be specified in the legal regulations of a 
state to ensure their protection and promotion.  
 
In order to provide legitimate grounds for an electoral process, the presence of 
political parties, media, and civil society are considered integral components of 
promoting effective public participation. To be considered as legitimate by the 
international community, all three components must be free to work independently 
and collectively with each other to maximize the people’s involvement in the political 
process. Therefore each must maintain the freedom to operate without state 
intervention, and the right of each must be protected. The following section will 
describe these fundamental freedoms during the electoral process: freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement, and freedom of peaceful assembly. The connection 
between each of the democratic components (political parties, media and civil 
society) and each of the freedoms (expression, movement and assembly/association) 
is detailed below.  
 
3.4.1 Political party, the media and civil society’s freedom of expression 
Freedom of expression is the liberty of people to freely express their views when 
selecting their representatives, regardless of their background. Freedom of expression 
is reliant on the right of individuals to vote, and to seek or receive information 
without any limitations before expressing their will. 959  In addition, freedom of 
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expression includes the right of political parties, media and civil society to be 
involved in an electoral process.960  
 
Sometimes, political parties represent public opinion. They run their own campaigns 
to persuade people to select them as representative bodies. Within the democratic 
process, policy outcomes can demonstrate the transparency and accountability of a 
political party.961 A political party’s freedom of expression can be expressed as their 
right to communicate with people about their party policies.  
 
During the Namibian election in 1989, there were more than 40 political parties 
representing diverse ideologies of racial and tribal affiliations.962 However, there were 
only two leading parties (the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) 
and the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) which had sufficient funding to run 
campaigns.963 The TV broadcasters also reserved time for these two political parties 
to present their campaign statements each night for the final six weeks of the electoral 
campaign. Other political parties were discriminated against and their freedom of 
expression to convey information to the people was restricted by the state’s 
censorship. By contrast, the first free election in Czechoslovakia in 1990 exemplified 
a fair allocation of 4 hours of free television to every political party to impart their 
message to the public.964 Similarly, before Bangladesh national election 1970, the 
President of Bangladesh decided to allow leaders of every party contesting the 
elections through radio and television.965 
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The media takes responsibility for presenting a variety of information and acts as a 
mediator between the state authorities and the people. Ideally, the media should be 
free from state censorship to ensure that the people receive accurate information to 
assist them in their decision-making process. The free communication of information 
between citizens, candidates and elected representatives is an essential condition of a 
strong, democratic society.966 Media broadcasting plays a crucial role in providing 
information to people and receiving their feedback on any public policy. The media 
can be a mediator between the government and the people, broadcasting the 
representatives’ decisions and the people’s reactions to their work. Even though 
sometimes the media has clearly partisan interests, it is more credible than either 
government or opposition parties.967 Its neutrality and credibility is based on the 
media presenting a variety of facts and information about representative processes to 
the people. If the media is constrained by the government, this factor directly affects 
its accountability. In addition, the media’s function is to give fundamental information 
on voting procedures to all eligible voters. Civic education and campaign broadcasts 
are provided.968 During electoral campaigns in Namibia and Czechoslovakia, freedom 
of expression and media was protected to varying degrees.  
 
During the election in Namibia in 1989, there were two issues with the media 
broadcasting: a plurality of media forms and the neutrality of media broadcasting. 
Firstly, it appeared that 60% of eligible voters in Namibia were illiterate, thus, radios 
were an important alternative source of information.969 The media’s freedom of 
expression includes the right to impart and receive information or idea through 
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multiple channels of communication. Secondly, the neutrality of the media was 
questionable. It revealed armed attacks conducted by SWAPO but concealed the 
hostile actions of South African-funded paramilitary organizations – such as the South 
West African Police Counter Insurgency Unit (Koevoet).970 These actions minimized 
the media’s legitimacy in imparting information to people because they provided 
biased coverage. By contrast, during an election in Czechoslovakia 1992, the media 
was credible in conveying information to the public because the free media 
broadcasted information about both sides equally (i.e. Czechs and Slovaks).  
 
Civil society represents different groups organizing themselves to express the 
people’s concerns, to political parties and also to the media. When appropriately 
supported by the state, it acts as an additional channel of communication from the 
bottom to the top of the political hierarchy. Civil society is also a vital component of 
guaranteeing people’s fundamental right to broader political participation. According 
to Cohen and Arato, modern civil society is created through forms of self-constitution 
and self-mobilization.971 The former is recognized and protected by law whereas the 
latter is voluntarily established in order to promote political stability and social 
differentiation. When the people are gathered together, it is an opportunity for them to 
express their opinions and share their views, either in agreement or in opposition to 
policies. Civil society can help to consolidate the proliferation of interest groups in a 
pluralistic society; these differing views are a key facet of a democratic society.  
Civil society’s freedom of expression is a collective right of individuals or groups to 
express their political opinions to political parties or the media. During the electoral 
campaign in Czechoslovakia in 1992, the Slovak civil society’s freedom of expression 
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was strongly supported by the political parties, who used their influence to then 
propose an amendment to the constitution.972 By contrast, the Czech civil society’s 
freedom of expression was limited by the political parties, because the latter did not 
support public participation in political affairs. The political parties wanted to 
preserve a state-centralized power. Czech civil society ran a campaign supporting the 
use of a referendum as a way to legitimize the division of Czechoslovakia.973 
 
3.4.2 Political party, the media and civil society’s freedom of movement 
Freedom of movement is the liberty of people to freely reside in their territory. The 
freedom of movement includes a procedural guarantee for the return of refugees, 
people in exile and displaced persons entitled to their right to vote.974 In addition, the 
freedom of movement includes the right of journalists and others who seek to exercise 
their freedom of expression. They are able to visit specific locations within a state 
where there are allegations of human rights abuses or violent conflict.975 A state 
cannot limit their right to disclose any information on human rights violations.   
 
Each political party has the right to freely movement in all part of territories to 
communicate their idea and policies to people. The analysis of political party’s 
freedom of movement is conducted to examine how each political party is fully  
accessible to people.    
 
The media’s freedom of movement is a monitoring of states’ and officials’ actions in 
order to ensure people’s freedom of expression and assembly. State authorities cannot 
limit the media’s freedom of movement by preventing it from disclosing information 
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about human rights violations, because it is responsible for informing the public about 
the truth around electoral campaigns. Monitoring is a transparent practice which has a 
positive impact on general respect for human rights and the reduction of acts of 
aggression and violence.976 
 
In order to achieve the protection of media’s freedom of movement, media workers 
clearly identify themselves as independent human rights monitors.977 It is important 
that media coverage on human right allegations is fair and reports based on the fact. If 
the media coverage was failed to perform its duty, this factor can influence people’s 
emotion.978 In March 2004, there was the most violent of the transitional period in 
Kosovo, when Kosovo Albanians forced thousands of Kosovo Serbs to leave their 
homes. Many Serbs villages and towns were destroyed. This ethnic tension was an 
incident when six major problem in Kosovo for many years. For example, during this 
time, Kosovar Albanian children from the Caber village were playing alongside the 
river Iber.979  The majority of people in this village were Kosovar Serb. Instead of 
reporting this event neutrality, the Kosovo-Albanians media workers reported this in a 
biased way, presenting it as an ethnically motivated crime.980 They reported that an 
unidentified group of local Serbs released a dog on the Kosovo Albanian children and 
that four of the children jumped into the river but only one survived. The media did 
not make it clear what had happened to the other two children. Because the media 
circulated one-sided information to the public, it had a direct consequence of ‘inciting 
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hatred’.981 This carelessness increased the level of hatred between the Kosovo-
Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.  
 
Civil society’s freedom of movement is a crucial factor in sharing political opinions 
between the people, political parties and the media. Civil society’s freedom of 
movement should not be limited by time or place for organizing political activities. 
Before Pakistan’s national election in 1970, there were two student organizations  
which jointly formed a political alliance to present an eleven-point program based on 
their dissatisfaction with the economic disparity between East and West Pakistan. The 
movement of student organizations was free and independent in East Pakistan. These 
actions gained a high level of support from local populations because the demands of 
middle-class peasants and workers were included in the eleven-point program.982 It 
also appeared that there was no intervention from state authorities.  
 
3.4.3 Political Party, the media, and civil society’s freedom of assembly and 
association 
Freedom of assembly and association is the right of individuals, groups of people, or 
specific registered organizations to establish political activity. 983  Only peaceful 
assembly is recognized and protected by law. This fundamental freedom is guaranteed 
to everyone (i.e. individuals, groups, unregistered association, legal entities and 
corporate bodies).984 Freedom of assembly includes the right to public political 
participation in a society that ensures the equality of people to express their opinions, 
in particular minority groups of people. ‘The ability to freely assemble’ is a way to 
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provide people the opportunity to express their differing views peacefully whilst 
under legal protection. People’s participation in peaceful assembly can help to ensure 
that all citizens have the opportunity to express their opinions to civil society, political 
parties and the government.985  
 
The right to organize peaceful assembly is an important way of mobilizing supporters 
of political parties.986 It is a way to encourage people to agree overtly with its policies. 
Candidates represent people in state institutions both at a local and a national level. 
Communication between political parties and ordinary citizens is a democratic 
mechanism which influences public opinion. During a national election in Bangladesh 
1970, every political party in East Pakistan had its parallel student’s organization. The 
Awami League was supported by the East Pakistan Student League (EPSL).987 The 
Student League was a mediator to communicate with other sectors in order to build 
multi-level support of political party’s activities. 
 
The equal access of media broadcasting allows the conveyance of information to the 
public freely and independently. The media is a key actor in monitoring the 
implementation of political party’s and civil society’s freedom of assembly and 
association. When a large proportion of the population are restricted in their right to 
peaceful assembly or association, the free media plays an important role in producing 
reports based on their findings. These reports, ideally, lead to a dialogue between civil 
society and government with the aim of advancing the promotion and protection of 
human rights.988 
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Civil society functions to strengthen the implementation of human rights. Civil 
society’s freedom of assembly is not under the control of state’s intimidation. Civil 
society organizations promote the effective participation of all individuals and groups 
in a society. The freedom of peaceful assembly and association can be exemplified by 
the people’s protest in Kosovo, and the strength of civil society in Catalonia, two 
cases which demonstrate the varying degrees to which the fundamental protection of 
people’s right to assembly was upheld by state authorities.  
 
In the case of Kosovo, the freedom to public assembly can be seen from the 
Ombudsman Report 008/2007 concerning the Vetevendosje protest on 10th February 
2007. The non-violent protest opposed the Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo 
Status Settlement. In this situation, it appeared that there was a violent intervention of 
state authorities (i.e. polices and UNMIK officers); two protestors were killed and 
eighty people were injured.989 The Ombudsman noted that the use of fire-arms with 
rubber bullets to the upper bodies of protesters was unnecessary, unjustifiable and 
disproportionate actions. The freedom to peaceful assembly was violated and the state 
authorities interfered.990 
 
By contrast, the freedom of assembly in Catalonia is an example of freely and 
independently-organized peaceful action. Civil associations established a wide range 
of activities to support independence of Catalonia, such as a demonstration in 
Barcelona for amending the Statute of Autonomy 2006, and running campaigns 
through a variety of media channels.991 It is undeniable that a massive involvement of 
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civil society directly influenced the position of the representative bodies in 
accommodating the people’s demand into their decisive action on independence. 
 
Before the National Assembly convened the meeting, an individual-based 
organization run its campaign on independence in Barcelona on Catalonia’s national 
day.992 More than one million people, the three pro-independence political parties (i.e. 
Catalan Nationalist Party, Catalan Republican Left, and initiative for Catalonia 
Greens) gathered to demand independence.993 In addition, the relationship between 
media and civil society is a crucial factor for sharing the sense of nationhood among 
local populations.994 Thus, publication or media broadcastings of civil society activity 
is an additional mechanism to raise public awareness.  
 
In sum, the importance of fundamental rights protection is a crucial factor in 
guaranteeing the effective participation of people in decision-making processes. If the 
minimum standard of freedom protection is achievable, this will increase the degree 
of legitimacy for a peaceful transfer of power. In addition, the function of political 
parities, media and civil society are crucial factors to transfer a wide variety of 
information to the people. These three channels of communication have direct 
consequences on people’s decision-making processes.  
 
3.5 The role and functions of international institutions 
International institutions occasionally play a supportive role in setting up specific 
commissions enforcing the right to political participation. This occurs when a territory 
is not ready to self-govern, and, international institutions can encourage local 
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populations’ involvement in decision-making processes.995 International institutions 
play a role in supervising or observing particular territories to create a viable, 
democratic society and legitimize the actions of the representative body as a result.996 
As the collective will of local populations is gathered through an electoral process, 
international institutions’ involvement aims to guarantee the transitional process to 
independence or at least a greater level of autonomy, as in accordance with the local 
population.997 This can guarantee that the local populations are included in decision-
making processes and the actions of representatives are in accordance with the 
people’s demands. 
 
Within the UN machinery, the function of international institution involvement in 
elections is divided into two dimensions: electoral verification, and electoral 
assistance. Electoral verification involves the presence of the United Nations’ 
observers in the territory. Electoral assistance entails a variety of technical or advisory 
services998 and is established to ensure the transparency and credibility of elections 
involving popular participation.  
 
The role of the UN in elections is to create accountability, ensuring that the 
governmental authority is responsive to the people’s will. 999  The use of international 
observation is applied to “legitimize the election results”. 1000 This mechanism can 
identify the will of the people before proceeding with the independence process. 
Apart from the UN, the Council of Europe is another international institution which 
creates certain forms and conditions to legitimize the electoral processes. The 
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adoption of Resolution 1264 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
in 2001 aimed to “devise a code of practice in electoral matters and to compile a list 
of underlying of European electoral systems”.1001 The Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters would strengthen the credibility of the electoral observation and 
monitoring activities conducted by the Council of Europe.1002  
 
In the case of Namibia, the territorial status of South West Africa in the League of 
Nations was a mandated territory under the administrative power of South Africa. 
After the League of Nations dissolved, South Africa refused to place the territory 
under the supervision of the General Assembly and its Trusteeship Council.1003 
 
The UN-specific agencies in Namibia in 1967 were composed of the United Nations 
Council for Namibia and the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). 
The Council mandated its status as representative of the territory at an international 
level. The UNTAG had taken a supervisory role for the election. 
 
The administrative role of the United Nations Council of Namibia included the task of 
maximizing the active role of the people to determine their future status.1004 The 
General Assembly Resolution 2145 (27th October 1966) stated that:  
“The General Assembly establishes an ad hoc committee for South West 
Africa-composed of fourteen Members States to be designated by the 
President of the General Assembly –to recommend practical means by which 
South West Africa should be administered, so as to enable people of the 
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Territory to exercise the right of self-determination and to achieve 
independence, and to report to the General Assembly at a special session as 
soon as possible and in any event not later than April 1967”.1005 
 
After the termination of the mandate by the United Nations General Assembly in 
1966, the United Nations Council of Namibia was established the following year to 
control Namibia. Under the scope of the UN General Assembly Resolution 2248, the 
Council had administrative authority over Namibia. The function of the Council was 
specified in the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2248: 
 
“The General Assembly decided to establish a United Nations Council for 
South West Africa comprising eleven Member States and to entrust to it the 
following powers and functions: 
(a) to administer South West Africa until independence, with the maximum 
possible participation of the people of the Territory; 
(b) to promulgate such laws, decrees and administrative resolutions as are 
necessary for the administration of the Territory until a legislative assembly is 
established following elections conducted on the basis of universal adult 
suffrage; 
(c) to take as an immediate task all the necessary measures, in consultation 
with the people of the Territory, for the establishment of a constituent 
assembly to draw up a constitution  on the basis of which elections will be 
held for the establishment of a legislative assembly and a responsible 
government;  
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(d) to take all the necessary measures for the maintenance of law and order in 
the Territory; 
(e) to transfer all powers to the people of the Territory upon the declaration  of 
independence”.1006  
 
The task of the UN Council for Namibia was to work under the supervision of a UN 
Commissioner for South West Africa appointed by the General Assembly on the 
nomination of the Secretary-General.1007  
 
The UNTAG’s supervisory role included monitoring the free and fair election and 
working in collaboration with the UN special representatives. The role of UNTAG 
was to supervise and control an election which aimed to assess the free and genuine 
will of the people, such as receiving complaints from citizens, party activists, and 
investigate events where intimidation might take place. Nevertheless, they were not 
able to arrest or institute legal proceedings.1008 The main aim of the UNTAG 
supervision was to ensure that all practices conformed to the fundamental freedom 
protection of local populations.  
 
The legal authority of the UNTAG was implemented through the UNSC Resolution 
435 in 1978. This resolution specified that:  
“The Security Council decides to establish under its authority a United 
Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in accordance with the 
above-mentioned report of the Secretary-General for a period of up to 12 
months in order to assist his Special Representative to carry out the mandate 
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conferred upon him by the Secretary Council in paragraph1 of its resolution 
431 (1978), namely, to ensure early independence of Namibia through free 
elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations”.1009 
 
After releasing resolution 435 in 1978, the UN and UNTAG involved in a negotiating 
process for alleviate tensions in violent conflicts between warring parties. (i.e. South 
Africa and SWAPO’s people liberation movement). During the 1980s, the UN took 
action on peace negotiation and they agreed to grant permission to the South Africa’s 
Administrative General (AG) to control the electoral process alongside the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). There was no formal institutional 
framework to generate the collaborative action between the AG and the SRSG for 
supervising the electoral process. Thus, the impartiality of these two organizations 
was a vital component of claiming legitimacy of their supervisory mission.  
 
UNTAG maintained its role as a neutral facilitator between South Africa’s 
administrative general and the liberation movement of SWAPO. There was three 
components of UNTAG’s mission: the establishment of UNTAG offices, military 
disarmament and civilian policing, and preparations for the holding of elections.1010 
The main purpose of establishing UNTAG office was to coordinate with the UN 
Special Representation and monitor the workings of South Africa’s Administrative 
General.1011 In terms of the military disarmament, UNTAG’s military component 
included a total of 50 countries to provide military personnel and civilian police.1012 
UNTAG military component had three main tasks: restricting to base and disarming 
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South African Defence Force (SADF) and SWAPO, monitoring SADF withdrawal 
out of Namibia and demobilizing the Namibian who fought against SWAPO.1013 In 
addition, UNTAG’s mission included the preparation of local populations’ readiness 
for an election. UNTAG took part in five steps in the electoral process: clarification of 
the legislative framework, registration of voters, registration of parties, the electoral 
campaign and the vote itself.1014 UNTAG brought action for civic education campaign 
in 13 different local languages, provided a wide range of information throughout a 
network with 32 broadcasting television and 201 radio programmes. Other informal 
mechanisms included the distribution of posters, T-shirts, brochures and stickers.1015  
 
Another example of international institutional involvement is Kosovo in 1999. The 
purpose of international institutional invention in Kosovo was to develop a 
democratic process for an autonomous self-government. Under the scope of 
Resolution 1244 (1999), it created a process to establish Kosovo’s final status through 
a ‘political settlement’. International institutional involvement in Kosovo was mainly 
composed of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and the OSCE Mission for Kosovo (OMIK). During the long process of 
negotiation and the transitional period of independence (1999-2008), the main aim of 
the international institutions included democratic proliferation along with the 
implementation of human rights protection and rule of law.1016 
 
This particular instance of UN involvement is remarkable because rather than 
working alone, it worked in collaboration with a domestic institution to create long-
                                                      
1013 Lise Morje Howard, (n 787) 99, 115 
1014 Ibid 99, 122 
1015 Henning Melber, (n 784) 15; Marinus Wiechers, ‘Namibia’s Long Walk to Freedom: The Role of Constitution Making in the 
Creation of an Independent Namibia’ in Laurel E. Miller and Louis Aucoin (eds) (n 699) 99; Lise Morje Howard, (n 787) 99, 114 
1016 Bernhard Knoll-Tudor, ‘The Settling of a Self-Determination Conflict?: Kosovo’s Status Process and the 2010 Advisory 
Opinion of the ICJ’ in Marko Milanovic and Michael Wood (eds), (n 705) 74 
276 	
lasting democracy during the transitional period. The UN interim administration aims 
to prepare for substantial autonomy rather than Kosovar independence.1017 Under the 
scope of the Security Council Resolution 1244 in 1999, the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General for Kosovo (‘SRSG’) was authorized as a mediator to resolve 
Kosovo solutions. The UNSC Res 1244 stipulated that:  
“The Security Council authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of 
relevant international organizations, to establish an international civil presence 
in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under 
which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of 
provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a 
peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo”.1018  
 
Apart from this mediation, the SRSG also contributed to ensure the effective 
implementation of the Kosovar Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (‘PISG’) 
in order to empower people to participate in the self-governing process. The 
development of democratic self-governing institutions gradually evolved under the 
framework of the UNMIK. Regulation number 2001/9 on 15th May 2001 states the 
SRSG had the authority to:  
“protect and promote human rights and to support peace-building activities, 
the SRSG will retain the authority to intervene as necessary in the exercise of 
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self-government for the purpose of protecting the rights of Communities and 
their members”.1019 
 
The function of the European Union was to work in collaboration with other 
institutions to promote democracy and stabilize those regions affected by the Kosovo 
crisis. The UN Security Council Res 1244 emphasized that: 
“The Security Council welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and 
other international organizations to develop a comprehensive approach to the 
economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo 
crisis, including the implementation of a stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion 
of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation”.1020 
 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) took part in a crucial stage 
of the peace mission in Kosovo. The OSCE Mission for Kosovo (OMIK) is a 
component part of the UNMIK. The primary role of the OMIK was to assist the 
process of institutional building and the promotion of democracy and human 
rights.1021 The promotion of democracy and human rights aimed to create a viable 
society for all citizens in Kosovo. The initial step was to create various political 
institutions (legislative, executive, and judiciary bodies) along with preparing people 
to engage with these modern institutional forms of democracy. Kosovar institutional-
building entailed the legislative, executive and judicial organizations, such as the 
central electoral commission (CEC), the Kosovo Judicial Institution (KJI), the 
Assembly of Kosovo.      
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The task of the UNMIK and the OMIK involved domestic institutional reformation 
and empowering people to participate in the decision-making processes. The ‘earned 
sovereignty’ approach proposed to undertake institutional-building with a multistage 
process to transfer sovereign authority to sub-state entity.1022 This process was 
divided into three stages: shared sovereignty, institutional building and final 
settlement. The role of the UNMIK and OMIK was to facilitate these three major 
phases. Shared sovereignty was the first step in planning and designing viable local 
institutions within Kosovo. Then, the role of UNMIK dealt with institutional-building 
processes for the purpose of transferring authority to new emerging Kosovar 
institutions. During the institutional-building process, the UNMIK made great efforts 
to promote democratic institutions and to create democratic culture in Kosovo. This 
mechanism was the preparedness of domestically political institutions to allow the 
sub-state entity to effectively operate as an independent state. 1023 Other conditions 
were also considered as vital components for creating democratically political 
institutions, such as creating the capacity for people to work with these institutions 
and human rights monitoring etc. Finally, in 2007, the Comprehensive Proposal for 
the Kosovo Status Settlement (the Ahtisaari Plan) was endorsed by the UN Security 
Council to terminate the transitional arrangements from external institutional 
intervention. Moreover, the final settlement was focused on the function of the EU 
Special Representative (EULEX) as the International Civilian Representative (ICR) 
and the Assembly to adopt the constitution. The substance of the Ahtisaari plan 
entailed the future constitution of Kosovo. A mandate of the ICR is to check and 
adopt the constitutional provisions before proceeding to the Kosovar Assembly. The 
ICR action is to ensure that the free will of the people is crucially considered as a 
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component for territorial settlement in Kosovo, that is, citizens in Kosovo shall have 
the right to democratic self-government through legislative, executive, judicial and 
other institutions.1024  
 
The intervention of external institutions in Kosovo during these years provided a 
continuous process of identifying the will of the people. In particular these external 
institutions attempted to help Kosovo create a constitutional framework which would 
emphasize the political equality of all citizens within their multi-ethnic society.1025 
From this we can see that international institutional involvement was influenced by 
republican liberal theory which stresses the importance of democratic legislation 
guaranteeing equality between all people. To do this ensures that state authorities are 
able to self-govern. The case of Kosovo from 1999-2008 is a good example of how   
international institutions should not only reform local institutions but should also 
attempt to establish a legal basis for political participation of diverse groups of people 
living in a territory.  
 
To sum up, the function of international institutions in representative processes is to 
reform political institutions within a state and to empower people to use their right to 
engage in decision-making processes. These two tasks aim to promote democracy and 
human rights, encouraging the people’s participation in decision-making process. 
Comparing Namibia and Kosovo, the role of the international community in 
supervising elections has shifted towards facilitating local involvement in decision-
making processes. In the context of Namibia, there was no clear mandate for 
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international institutions to contribute strengthening local state institutions. Its main 
responsibility is to ensure free and fair elections as a legitimate democratic 
mechanism to identify the will of the people before independence. The change of 
SWAPO’s status from popular liberation movement to a political organization is 
unilaterally recognized by the UN. Regarding Kosovo, the UN legal framework in the 
final status of Kosovo was more ambiguous than in Namibia but the local fieldwork is 
clearer than in Namibia to contribute strengthening local state institutions. The 
function of international institutions shifted to a multi-stage action. Kosovo’s 
transition to independence was a continuous action which enfranchised local 
populations in decision-making processes and strengthened local institutions, 
guaranteeing their ability to self-govern in the long-term. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
The will of the people can be identified from representative processes which include 
elections and the subsequent representative bodies. The establishment of an electoral 
system allows local populations to express their will regarding their territorial 
alteration. One advantage of an election is that it encourages the checking and 
balancing of power between competing groups within a particular territory. A 
representative process is dynamic and ongoing because it determines the will of the 
people through electing representatives who work on their behalf. These elected 
officials work in state institutions to put the people’s mandate into action.  
 
When considering consensual and non-consensual representative processes, one 
important observation is that the people’s mandate is put into action to varying 
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degrees. A consensual action has a clear framework for how the will of the people is 
to be considered and respected in state institutions. For example in the aftermath of 
the Constituent Assembly election in 1989, the Namibian constitution-making process 
was recognized as carrying out the people’s desire for independence. However, during 
consensual representative processes with clear state frameworks, there can be issues. 
In Namibia, even though there was a clear UN legal framework for establishing an 
electoral process regarding independence, civil society was not fully developed and 
therefore could not support the people in their decision-making. Instead, political 
parties became involved in influencing people’s decisions. In addition, a consensual 
representative process may not reflect the clear mandate of people, like in 
Czechoslovakia. Prior to the election in 1992, there was no clear mandate from the 
people about the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The separation of the two countries 
was conducted through negotiations between elected political elites.  
 
By contrast, during non-consensual action, such as in Catalonia, the elected political 
elites used an election in order to measure the degree to which the people agreed with 
their representative’s mandate in favour of independence. Nevertheless, the will of the 
people was not clearly ascertained since the pro-independence parties did not win a 
majority of seats in the regional parliament. In addition, in the absence of 
international institutional involvement, a request for a higher degree of autonomy or a 
constitutional amendment in non-consensual action   is   not recognized   as a smooth  
transition.  There  was  a delay in processing the transference of power to the  elected  
bodies. Violent conflict may take place between the two competing parties and may 
become a turning point, like in the aftermath of the national election in Pakistan 1970. 
One observation in non-consensual action is that there is a strong civil society to 
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promote the local population interests, like in Catalonia 2012-2015. This is a way to 


























Non-referendum mechanisms: external self-determination and the model of 
public consultation  
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to explore the advantages and disadvantages of public consultations 
as a process to identify the will of the people. The establishment of public 
consultation aims to encourage popular, political participation. There are two 
objectives of consulting local populations during territorial alteration processes: to 
broaden participation amongst local populations in decision-making and to create 
‘informed and motivated citizens’. Broader participation of the people in decision-
making processes improves democratic legitimacy because it enables all people have 
political equality in decision-making processes. Minority involvement is an important 
way to create political equality; public consultation provides a channel for minority 
people, who are often excluded, to express their political will.1026 Such broadening of 
participation increases the degree of the consultation process and therefore the 
legitimacy of the governmental authority. The second objective of a public 
consultation is to raise people’s awareness, specifically in a diverse or pluralistic 
society, of their right to be involved as ‘informed and motivated citizens’. 1027 Public 
consultation is therefore set up to encourage participation in political issues, 
particularly minority or indigenous groups. If they are able to participate in decision-
making processes which affect them, this will increase the degree of legitimacy of 
governmental authorities after a decision has been reached.  
                                                      
1026 General Assembly Official Record, ‘Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea’ (8 June 1950) Supplement No. 8 
A/1285 p.3 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/673432/files/A_1285-EN.pdf accessed 10 October 2016  
1027 James Bohman, Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (MIT Press 1996) 17 
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During external self-determination processes in particular, a public consultation has 
two stages: the direct participation of the people in expressing their political opinions 
and the role of the people’s representatives in carrying out the outcome of the 
collective consultation. 1028  Public consultation is a mechanism which therefore 
facilitates communication between constituents and their representatives. The concept 
of ‘dialogue’- i.e. the exchange of political opinions, both amongst citizens and 
between them and their representatives is the central element of public consultation. 
Dialogue not only promotes the reconciliation of conflicting interests, but also 
develops political equality between populations, providing ‘ongoing’ channels 
through which citizens’ voice are heard. 1029  Neither referendums nor elections 
facilitate the ongoing use of dialogue, whereas public consultations allow the people 
to engage in public participation in far more depth, providing a communicative 
mechanism with which the people can express the reasoning behind their opinions. It 
is a way of including people, both those in agreement and disagreement with an 
agenda item in the decision-making process. The purpose of a public consultation is 
not to reach a unanimous decision but to facilitate the productive expression of 
diverse opinions, particularly from indigenous and minority groups of people. It is 
considered a legitimate action if citizens agree sufficiently to cooperate in the 
consultation.1030 If a public consultation is used during an external self-determination 
process, the government will be fully informed about the people’s position. Such a 
consultation allows diverse opinions to be heard during the process of policy creation 
and implementation after a decision has been reached on the alteration of a territory.  
 
                                                      
1028 General Assembly Official Record (n 1026) p.17  
1029 James Bohman (n 1027) 27-28 
1030 Ibid 26  
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Due to a previous lack of international standards, the fairest, most equal conditions of 
carrying out a public consultation have been a controversial issue. A contemporary 
understanding of a ‘public consultation’ is a mechanism which aims to create free, 
fair, and legitimate popular involvement in political affairs. A leading example of 
international law instrument is the International Labour Organization (ILO) 
Convention Number 169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention in 1989.1031 By 
means of the ILO Convention, one participatory right of people in decision-making 
processes is ‘the right to be consulted’.1032 These guidelines suggest a ‘coordinated 
and systematic approach’ for guaranteeing the equal consideration of all ethnic people 
in a collective consultation.1033 The guidelines also suggest how domestic institutions 
can guarantee the rights of ethnic minority people to be involved in a consultation, as 
well as the legal mechanisms which should be put in place to ensure that state law 
gives appropriate status to all people, including minority groups.1034  
 
In 2009, the ILO provided some guidelines for standardized conditions of a public 
consultation which reflect republican liberal theory. According to republican 
liberalism, ‘the people’ as a political community should have the right to be 
continuously, publically involved in the practical application of territorial alteration 
processes. Republican liberal theory states that if a practical application upholds three 
particular democratic values, then it can be considered legitimate. The three 
conditions are: minority involvement and peoples’ political equality without 
governmental authority domination; the presence of institutional frameworks to 
                                                      
1031 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 
http://www.eods.eu/library/ILO_Indigenous%20and%20Tribal%20Peoples%20Convention_1989_EN.pdf [Accessed 15 
February 2017] 
1032 International Labour Standards Department, ‘ILO Convention No. 169 (Pro169) Indigenous & tribal peoples’ rights in 
practice’ 2009 http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/publication/wcms_106474.pdf 
accessed 20 October 2016  
1033 Ibid p. 29 
1034 Ibid p.14 
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guarantee effective participation; and legal mechanisms to recognize all ethnic 
identities in a pluralistic society.1035 Under the ILO convention, these three following 
conditions are stated as components of legitimate, public consultation.  
 
Firstly, the people must grant ‘informed consent’ that a public consultation may take 
place, which means that they must know about the proposed issue.1036 During external 
self-determination it is particularly important that minority groups are informed and 
motivated to participate, increasing the fairness of the process. Public consultation 
promotes the inclusion of minorities, both individually and collectively, encouraging 
them to express their political opinions, and therefore achieve popular acceptance of 
the outcome.1037 Minority involvement in political affairs is also a factor in alleviating 
tensions or violent conflicts between majority and minority groups of people. 
Crucially, ensuring minorities are informed about the consultation topics as they are 
equally affected by the decisions made by the central government. 
 
In order to attain the ‘informed consent’ of the people, the ILO provides two 
conditions for the consent of the people to be fully ‘informed’; first that there is 
sufficient circulation of information, and secondly that an appropriate amount of time 
is allocated. The circulation of information is important to ensure that all the people 
fully understand the consequences of a public consultation.1038 Whether they agree or 
disagree with the proposed topic, the information should include all possible 
outcomes of the consultation. In addition, the government should not take sole 
                                                      
1035 Philip Pettit, (n 17) 190-200; Philip Pettit, (n 26) 160-179; John Mayor, (n 17) 129-133; Richard Bellamy, (n 17) 176-184 
1036  ILO Convention No. 169 (n 1032) p.61; Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 1457/2006 
CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 para7.6 http://www.worldcourts.com/hrc/eng/decisions/2009.03.27_Poma_Poma_v_Peru.htm accessed 
15 February 2017; African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communication 276/03 Centre for Minority Rights 
Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council)/Kenya para291  
1037 ILO Convention No. 169 (n 1032) p. 62  
1038 ILO Convention No. 169 (n 1032) p. 62; African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communication 276/03 (n 
1036) para289 
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responsibility for distributing one-sided information. The media and civil society 
should work together to raise public awareness.1039 In terms of time allocation, it is 
necessary to set appropriate time duration for the public, specifically enough time to 
ensure that the communicative system is sufficient to distribute all relevant 
information to the public. Without informed consent of people, any governmental 
action after the consultation is not considered legitimate. 1040  
 
Secondly, the presence of institutional framework has been considered to guarantee 
equal participation of all people in a public consultation. There are two ideas about 
how institutional frameworks can operate. The first of these is that there should be 
public involvement in formulating policy (i.e. the right to propose) from the outset, 
instead of simply waiting for the people’s reaction after the fact.1041 Consultation with 
the people, including ethnic minority groups, is a way to include their voices in the 
formulation process of policy-creation.1042 The ILO states that the wishes of all the 
people should be heard in formal institutions through representative bodies. The 
consequential interaction between the rulers and the ruled in such representative 
institutions can improve the quality of governmental policy, especially if it involves 
diverse groups of people. This will improve the fairness and equality of the decision-
making process as a whole. The second idea is that institutions should exist which 
allow all ethnic groups of people to express their public opinion. 1043  The 
establishment of institutions aimed to include all ethnically and culturally 
differentiated people, allowing them to share their opinions on a particular issue.1044 
Institutions should carry out two functions: increase public awareness of the people’s 
                                                      
1039 ILO Convention No. 169 (n 1032) p. 64 
1040 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communication 276/03 (n 1036) para268  
1041 ILO Convention No.169 (n 1032), art 7(1), p. 61 
1042 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communication 276/03 (n 1036) para282  
1043 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous people 2007, art 18  
1044 ILO Convention No. 169 (n 1032) p.75, 77; African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communication 276/03 (n 
1036) para132  
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rights and develop the capacity of indigenous people and minority people to govern 
themselves.1045 After the latter have sufficient knowledge to govern themselves, 
institutions should empower them to be able to represent themselves at a state level, 
decreasing discrimination and inequality among populations.1046 The creation of new 
institutions which confirm the rights of indigenous people or minority people to 
participate in territorial alteration decision-making processes increases the level of 
fairness and governmental legitimacy.  
 
Thirdly, it is crucial to recognize all people’s identities in any domestic law.1047 The 
main aim of creating legal mechanism is to protect the fundamental rights of people. 
It is a state obligation to respect, protect, and fulfil all people’s enjoyment of their 
fundamental rights to expression, movement, or association. If the right to free and 
equal political participation is endorsed within a legal instrument, public participation 
in decision-making processes is more robust.1048  If all opinions are taken into 
consideration, the outcome of a decision is legitimate. Thus, the constitution or 
specific statute is drafted on the basis that the fundamental rights of the people, 
particularly minority people, are guaranteed by law. During public consultations in 
territorial alteration processes it is important to have legal protection of the people’s 
right to freely express their genuine will about where they wish to live and to which 
country they wish to belong.  
 
                                                      
1045 ILO Convention No. 169 (n 1032) p. 49-50 
1046 Ibid p. 29 
1047 Ibid p. 31 
1048 African Commission on Human and People’s Rights Communication 155/96 The Social and Economic Rights Action centre 
and the centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria para46-48	 https://docs.escr-net.org/usr_doc/serac.pdf [Accessed 15 Feb 
2017]; Fons Coomans, ‘The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 749, 




If a public consultation complies with these three conditions set up by the ILO, and 
also aligned with republican liberalism, this can ensure that the public consultation is 
legitimate and the will of the people is reliable. If the governmental authorities carry 
out the will of the people according to the public consultation, the government itself 
will be considered more legitimate. The will of the people has been fairly and clearly 
ascertained.  
 
2. The application of republican liberalism to the public consultation processes 
One important aspect of republican liberal theory is political equality, i.e. the right of 
every citizen who resides in a particular territory to be allowed to take part decision-
making processes which affect their lives. A public consultation is a mechanism 
which aims to include all citizens in a decision-making process. It encourages people 
to be informed and motivates them to be involved in their country’s politics. Then, the 
continuous interaction between public opinion and state institutions is a leading factor 
in constructing legitimacy in a decision-making process. According to Habermas, 
democratic  institutional  reformation  includes a ‘two-track’ stage of decision-making  
(i.e. informal public communication and formal institutions).1049 The first is that a 
state should create a communicative mechanism between itself and the political 
community.1050 This process can guarantee the collection of public opinions from all 
stakeholders or interested groups in a pluralistic society. All groups of people are 
included in the territorial alteration process and have opportunities to express their 
opinions. In the second track, these diverse opinions are discussed and shared in 
                                                      
1049 Jurgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT 1996) 300-
301, 307; Patrick O’Mahony, The Contemporary Theory of the Public Sphere (Peter Lang 2013) 365-366 
1050 Ibid 301-302 
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formal state institutions through representative bodies. 1051  This can ensure the 
outcome of decision-making is derived from all the people’s concerns.  
 
In the 1960s, West Papua and Bahrain used public consultations to ascertain the will 
of the local people as part of a territorial alteration process. These two examples 
illustrate how the public consultation process functions as a part of state creation, 
however, they also reveal practical difficulties about ensuring political equality 
amongst a population, in particular minority involvement in the consultation 
process.1052 Firstly, not all of the people directly expressed their needs to their 
representative; the number of people who were consulted was limited. This 
demonstrates how a government control the practical application of an external self-
determination process in order to achieve the outcome it wants.1053 Secondly, the 
composition of representative bodies was largely in the hands of the state.1054 The 
local populations did not directly elect their own representatives. Therefore, it is 
difficult to say whether all the representatives promoted the people’s interests. Thirdly, 
in boundary alteration, even though the public consultations took place under the 
supervision of international institutions (i.e. the UN.), the latter had no legal 
enforcement over any state jurisdiction. When there was a human rights violation, the 
UN representatives merely informed the state parties that they should guarantee the 
fundamental rights of people.1055 These three difficulties directly affected the degree 
of legitimacy of the public consultations.  
 
                                                      
1051 Ibid 304 
1052 John Saltford, United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea) 
1968 to 1969: The anatomy of betrayal (Routledge 2003) 160-165; Brad Simpson, ‘Power, Politics, and Primitivism: West 
Papua’s Struggle for Self-Determination’ (2003) 35(3) Critical Asian Studies 469, 471-472; Chapter 8 Maintenance of 
international peace and security, ‘Question of Bahrain initial proceedings’ para2; UNSC Res 278 (1970), ‘The Question of 
Bahrain’ (11 May 1970) section 2  
1053 For example, in West Papua 1969 public consultation, see John Saltford (n 1052) 161-163 
1054 Ibid 166 
1055 Ibid 176-177 
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The following section will examine three relevant factors affecting the legitimacy of 
public consultations: international institutions’ involvement in setting up public 
consultation processes; effective public engagement in decision-making processes; 
and human rights protection.  
 
2.1 International involvement in the establishment of a public consultation  
A public consultation is used to ensure all citizens’ political opinions are heard, and to 
allow local populations to determine the future of their own territory. It is assumed 
that the differing views of all citizens are conveyed to the state before any final 
decision is made. International institutions are involved in organizing public 
consultations in order to guarantee that the local populations can make decisions 
without any intervention from state authorities. The work of international institutions 
should be free from state intervention in order that the government can claim the 
gathering of public opinions to be legitimate. From pre-to post-consultation, there are 
many ways in which international institutions are involved. In the pre-consultative 
process, a field trip or a survey is necessary to categorize different groups of people in 
a particular territory. This stage can help in creating a plan for educational training or  
raising public awareness on a boundary-making issue.1056 Then, during the public   
consultation process, the people will be informed and motivated to express their 
political opinions freely- in particular indigenous people or minority people who 
might otherwise be excluded.1057 In the post-consultative process, the findings of the 
international institutions’ representative are submitted to their governing body in 
order to assess the degree of legitimacy of the public consultation process.1058 The 
                                                      
1056 This continuous action of public consultation is in accordance with the republican liberal theory, in particular raising public 
awareness. See John W. Maynor (n 17) 155-171, 175-191; Michla Pomerance, ‘Methods of Self-Determination and the 
Argument of “Primitiveness”’ (1974) 12 The Canadian Yearbook of International Law 38, 40-41 
1057 John W. Maynor (n 17) 175-178; Michla Pomerance (n 1056) 48-49 
1058 John W. Maynor (n 17) 155-158; Michla Pomerance (n 1056) 49 
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objective of the international institutions is to ensure a smooth and peaceful transition 
to an independent state. If the three stages of collective consultation are carried out, 
this can help to legitimize the actions of the governmental authorities, because 
political equality has been achieved. 
 
The following two practical applications illustrate different levels of direct public 
participation in a collective consultation. In the context of Western New Guinea, 
Indonesia not only dominated the consultative process but also restricted UN 
monitoring, reducing the legitimacy of the overall process. In contrast, Bahrain 
provided an opportunity for the people to express their will in determining their future 
status. The UN acted as mediators conveying the local populations’ demands to 
Iranian state institutions.    
 
2.1.1 West Papua 
The issue of West Papua was taken into consideration when the UN Commission on 
Indonesia was established in 1949. West Papua was a part of ‘the Dutch East Indies’ 
or so called ‘Dutch New Guinea’. The territory  was composed  of two provinces: 
Papua and West Papua. A point of discussion between Indonesia and the Netherlands 
was whether West Papua was a part of ‘the Dutch East Indies’ or not.1059 The 
Netherlands and Indonesia had different views on the connection between people and 
territory. In the view of Indonesia, West Papua was an integral part of Indonesia; the 
people’s right over their territory should be considered based solely on their ‘political 
identity’ (i.e. the fact that both Indonesians and West Papuans were former colonial 
territories of the Netherlands) despite a clear ‘cultural or racial distinction’. By 
contrast, the Netherlands believed that the decolonization of Indonesia was not 
                                                      
1059	John Saltford (n 1052) 5-6	
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relevant to West Papua. They argued that the identification of the people was different 
based on West Papua’s cultural or racial ties to Indonesia -rather than simply a change 
of political administration.1060  
 
1949-1961: the beginning of the West Papua controversy 
In 1949, the Netherlands and Indonesia signed an agreement called the ‘Charter of the 
Transfer of Sovereignty over Indonesia’ at the Hague. The status of West Papua1061 
was an agenda item at the round-table conference discussion but no agreement was 
found. According to Article 2, the ‘status quo’ (i.e. New Guinea as a colony of the 
Netherlands should be maintained. It was stipulated that:  
“The status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the 
stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the 
Republic of the United States of Indonesia the question of the political status 
of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of 
the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands”.1062  
There was a disagreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia over the 
interpretation of ‘one year of status quo’.1063 From the standpoint of the Netherlands, 
the one-year timeframe was set up to postpone the re-discussion of their sovereign 
power over West Papua. They believed that territorial sovereignty belonged to the 
Netherlands until both parties reached a new agreement.1064 However, Indonesia 
                                                      
1060 A. Rigo Sureda, (n 45) 149 
1061 The territory has various names: New Guinea (Netherlands), West Irian and later Irian Jaya (Indonesia). Then, the territory is 
called West Papua in the late 1990s in order to satisfy nationalist sentiment. See Brad Simpson (n 1052) 469,475 
1062 Charter of the transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia 1949, art 2 https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-
core/content/view/S002081830002899X [Accessed 10 January 2017]  
1063 Paul W. Van Der Veur, ‘The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique’ (1964) 18(1) International Organization 53; Daniel 
Gruss, ‘UNTEA and West New Guinea’ (2005) 9 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 97, 99 
1064 Paul W. Van Der Veur (n 1063) 53  
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contended that according to the Article, West Papua would be incorporated into its 
sovereignty after that year.1065 
After the round-table conference in 1949 at the Hague, the Dutch made several 
attempts to resolve the West Papua problem. Firstly, in 1955, Dutch officials planned 
to submit a proposal to place West Papua into a trusteeship system under the UN. 
This attempt did not receive much attention at the Hague.1066 Secondly, in 1956, a 
negotiation between Indonesia and the Netherlands in Geneva was launched to 
determine the status of West Papua. The Netherlands did not accept the unilateral 
action of Indonesian government to dissolve the Netherlands and Indonesian Union 
which was signed in Linggadjati Agremeent 1949. Indonesia insisted that the 
negotiations could start when the Netherlands accepted West Papua as a part of 
Indonesia territory.1067 Thirdly, in 1961, the Netherlands Foreign Minister Luns made 
a draft resolution to the General Assembly for calling a transfer of Dutch Sovereignty 
to the West Papuans and holding a referendum under the supervision of the UN. 1068 
This draft resolution did not attain the simple majority requirement.  
 
Meanwhile, the Indonesian authorities’ reaction was to pressurize the Dutch to 
relinquish the West Papua territory altogether. In 1950, for example, the President of 
Indonesia Sukarno, announced the formation of a unitary system, which included 
West Papua- consolidating its position as an integral part of Indonesia. The 1955 and 
1956 negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands failed due to the threat of 
military forces against the Dutch in Indonesia. In 1958, the tension between Indonesia 
and the Netherlands rose to the extent that armed conflicts took place. Indonesia 
                                                      
1065 Paul W. Van Der Veur (n 1063) 53  
1066 John Saltford (n 1052) 6 
1067 Paul W. Van Der Veur (n 1063) 53; John Saltford, (n 1052) 6 
1068 Daniel Gruss (n 1063) 97, 102 
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claimed that it had a dominant power over West Papua territory because the 
Netherlands controlled West Papua without any geographical connection.  
 
In 1961, the Netherlands submitted its “Memorandum on the future and the 
development of Netherlands New Guinea” to the UN General Assembly. They 
included their belief that raising awareness among local populations and indigenous 
people about exercising their rights was an important step for attaining self-
governance. Even beforehand, from 1959 the Netherlands had launched a plan of 
action to train local populations to exercise their right to self-governance. They 
believed that if West Papuans were to govern themselves in the future, it was 
important to teach citizens about how legislative, executive and judicial powers 
should function according to international standards. The Dutch Memorandum of 
1961 also stated that the Netherlands intended to cede their power when the West 
Papuans’ right to self-determination was safeguarded.1069 They expected that West 
Papua would declare as an independent state by 1970.  
 
The Netherlands hoped to achieve their aim of educating the local population about 
self-governance through the establishment of a ‘Papuan National Congress’ and eight 
Regional Councils.1070 Prior to the Congress having been established, no West Papuan 
citizen had been involved in any way in the negotiation process, which was 
dominated by the colonial power (the Netherlands) and Indonesia. The ‘Papuan 
National Congress’ or ‘New Guinea Council’ was established to advise the Governor 
of the West Papua.1071 The Congress was composed of 16 officials elected by local 
populations and 12 selected by the Dutch for those areas deemed not yet sufficiently 
                                                      
1069 ‘Memorandum on the future and the development of Netherlands New Guinea (9 October 1961) UN Doc A/ 4915 para4 (b)    
1070 Ibid para3 
1071 Daniel Gruss, (n 1063) 97, 101  
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literate to vote. These 28 members of Congress were responsible for adopting or 
rejecting the bill (i.e. the New York Agreement 1962) to transfer administrative 
power from the Netherlands to the UN. Only 14 of them voted to adopt the bill. 1072 
Thus, even though half the West Papuan representatives did not agree with the 
proposal, the bill came into effect in 1962.  
 
1962: The New York Agreement  
Owning to the long-lasting conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia, the issue 
of West Papua was added to the UN agenda by the United Nations Secretary General 
(UNSG) in 1962. There was two subsequent actions: the New York Agreement - a 
peaceful settlement mechanism - and the establishment of a United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) along with a United Nations Security 
Force (UNSF) to administer over West Papua territory. 
 
The New York Agreement stressed the administrative power of the Netherlands over 
West Papua. The process laid out in the Agreement consisted of two stages. Firstly, 
the Netherlands would transfer administrative power over West Papua to the UNTEA, 
which was established under the jurisdiction of the UN Secretary-General. Secondly, 
after 7 months of power,1073 UNTEA would then transfer the administration to 
Indonesia.1074 Crucially, the New York Agreement was a legal mandate to allow 
public participation in exercising the right to self-determination. According to Article 
18 of the Agreement, the will of the people should be freely expressed through a 
consultative process. The agreement was set out thus:  
                                                      
1072 John Saltford, (n 1052) 20 
1073 John Saltford, ‘United Nations involvement with the act of self-determination in West Irian (Indonesian West New Guinea) 
1968 to 1969’ p.72-73Available at:		
http://resources.huygens.knaw.nl/indonesischebetrekkingen1945-
1969/DekolonisatieVanIndonesieEnHetZelfbeschikkingsrechtVanDePapoea/papers_pdf/saltford accessed 30 November 2016 
1074 New York Agreement 1962, art2  https://www.freewestpapua.org/documents/the-new-york-agreement/ accessed 1 December 
2016 
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“Indonesia will make arrangements, with the assistance and participation of 
the United Nation Representative and his staff, to give the people of the 
territory the opportunity to exercise freedom of choice. Such arrangements 
will include: 
(a) Consultations (Musyawarah) with the representative councils and 
appropriate methods to be followed for ascertaining the freely expressed will 
of the population”.1075  
 
After receiving the transference of West Papua from the Netherlands in 1962, the 
establishment of the UN administrative mission over West Papua territory was 
authorized by the General Assembly Resolution 1752. The UNSG was able to carry 
out his duty in bringing about peaceful settlement over West Papua. 1076 The UN acted 
as ‘a neutral buffer’ between the Netherlands and Indonesia.1077 The mandate of the 
UN concerning West Papua was divided into three phases:  
“1. Providing military observers to supervise the cease-fire that went into 
effect on 18 August 1962;  
2. Administering the territory of West Papua through the United Nations 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) with the help of a United Nations 
Security Force (UNSF), which was to maintain law and order; 
3. Dispatching a representative of the Secretary-General to participate in the 
arrangements for the act of free choice and to observe this act”.1078 
 
                                                      
1075 Ibid, art. 18  
1076 UNGA Res 1752 (XVII) ‘Agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands concerning 
West New Guinea (West Irian)’ (21 September 1962)  
https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/192/60/IMG/NR019260.pdf?OpenElement  
[Accessed 2 Jan 2017]  
1077 Ralph Wilde, International territorial administration: how trusteeship and the civilizing mission never went away (Oxford 
2008) 13  
1078 Daniel Gruss, (n 1063) 97, 104-105 
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From the above mandate, the establishment of UNTEA in collaboration with UNSF 
covered the first and the second phases of action. UNTEA’s activities involved many 
activities, for example, carrying out a field survey of the West Papuans’ political 
opinions.  
 
After implementing the New York Agreement in 1962, there were conflicts between 
UNTEA and the Indonesian government. On the one hand, UNTEA’s job was set out 
with a 5-year timeframe in assisting Indonesia to guarantee the right of West Papuans 
to self-determination. But in reality UNTEA carried out its duty for only 7 months 
and then decided to transfer sovereignty to Indonesia in May 1963.1079 The work of 
UNTEA over West Papua had two main weaknesses. Firstly, UNTEA was not ready 
to play its administrative role. Between the signing of the Agreement and the UN 
taking responsibility, there was only six weeks for recruiting new staff, planning how 
to train local populations, understanding the complexity of the problem and ensuring 
there were sufficient skilled staff.1080 Secondly, the West Papuans’ representatives did 
not have the opportunity to express their opinions about determining their territorial 
status in the negotiation process when the New York Agreement was signed in 
1962.1081 Thus, the equal consideration of indigenous people’s voices and demands 
was in doubt, in particular the ‘one man one vote’ rule, which the UN had proposed to 
Indonesia as being the best way to allow each citizen to fairly express their opinion.  
 
In addition, UNTEA encountered difficulties in setting up measures for sharing 
information with the local populations, in particular populations living in remote areas. 
UNTEA had a limited amount of time for planning after the Dutch unilaterally 
                                                      
1079 New York Agreement, art 12 (n 1074)   
1080	John Saltford, (n 1052) 15; Paul W. Van Der Veur, (n 1063) 53,58	
1081 New York Agreement 1962 (n1074)  
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decided to cede its administrative power. Another problem was that UNTEA could 
not get involved in maintaining law and order because Indonesia interfered by 
running its own campaign. Its strategy was to criticize the work of UNTEA, which 
replaced the Dutch administrative duty, on the basis that Indonesia could do better 
than UNTEA in meeting the West Papuans’ demands.1082 
 
1969: the ‘Act of Choice’ implementation and the public consultation process  
Between 1963 and 1969, the West Papua territory was under the control of Indonesia. 
During these six years popular uprisings were banned and people intimidated with 
severe punishment if they disagreed with the pro-Indonesian campaign. The 
Indonesian government ignored the right of West Papuans to participate in political 
affairs. In 1964, the UN urged Indonesia to provide a mechanism for local populations 
to express their political opinions based on the ‘one man one vote’ principle. However, 
Indonesia gathered the people’s will by dividing the West Papuans into ‘advanced 
people’ and ‘less advanced people’.1083 The former group had opportunities to express 
their views independently and vote for their representatives based on the ‘one man 
one vote’ basis. The latter groups consisted of those who resided in remote areas.  
 
In 1967, the third phrase of action under the New York Agreement 1962 was 
conducted when the Indonesian government signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
to hold a public consultation in West Papua. According to Indonesia standpoint, only 
a collective consultation was held, without the opportunity for individual citizens to 
express their views. The Memorandum included the phrase: 
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“The government will hold consultations with the Regional Councils in West 
Irian as to the most appropriate form of free choice and agrees to have United 
Nations’ participation in the consultation”.1084 
 
The ‘Act of Free Choice’ was subsequently released in 1969 as a document for 
creating viable conditions for a public consultation. This was a legal framework 
providing a procedural requirement to illustrate how the West Papuans right to self-
determination would be applied. A UN representative, Mr. Ortiz-Sanz, held a 
supervisory role to ‘assist, advise, and participate’ in ensuring that the political rights 
of the West Papuans were adhered to.1085  
 
Before proceeding to a public consultation, the Secretary-General’s representative’s 
suggested that the ‘consultative assemblies’ would truly represent all populations in 
the territory if there were three prerequisites for the collective consultation processes: 
first, they should have a sufficiently large membership; second, they should represent 
all sectors of the population; third, the new members should be clearly elected by the 
people.1086 Evidence for this can be seen in the letter dated 1 May 1969. The letter 
stated that: 
“The consultative assembly consists of representatives of the people who have 
been democratically elected by the people according to the aspirations and 
customs of the people of West Irian, and that a consultative assembly should 
                                                      
1084  UNGA A/7723 (6 November 1969) Annex 2 ‘Report of the Indonesian government to the Secretary-General of the United 
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be composed of people’s representatives involving all layers and groups of the 
local community”.1087 
 
Between 22nd March 1969 and 12th April 1969, a public consultation was held to 
measure the wishes of local populations in determining their territorial status.  The 
public consultation contained two important stages; 1) a consultation with the elected 
representative councils in the eight regencies. 1088 2) The formulation of the questions 
to permit the inhabitants to decide whether (a) they wish to remain with Indonesia or 
(b) they wish to sever their ties with Indonesia.1089 All adult residents (both male and 
female) at the time of signing the New York Agreement in 1962- or residents who 
returned to the territory after the termination of the Dutch administration- were 
eligible to be involved in the public consultation.  
 
The implementation of the Act of Free Choice was fully in the hands of Indonesia. On 
the one hand, Indonesia argued that certain populations had insufficient knowledge of 
self-governance, and on the other hand, the Act itself was deliberately ambiguous in 
explaining why the West Papuans were not entitled to vote using the ‘one man one 
vote’ principle. According to Article 18 of the New York Agreement, a procedural 
requirement for self-determination was collective consultations with the Regional 
Councils.1090 All 1026 representatives from eight Regional Councils were elected and 
each member represented approximately 750 inhabitants.1091 However, Indonesia did 
not use the process of public consultation in the way that the international community 
expected, but instead created their own way of ‘consulting’ the people. This model 
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did not allow individual people to be involved in expressing their political opinion, 
but instead depended upon how the official representatives (mostly chosen by 
Indonesia) engaged with the Regional Councils.1092 It should be noted Indonesia 
hand-picked the people who would represent West Papua in the consultation, 
decreasing the legitimacy of the public consultation process. The Regional Councils 
did not truly represent the West Papuan people, but rather were influenced by 
Indonesia’s interests. The Council did not present opposing views of the people when 
gathering public opinions. The collective consultation was solely under a state 
control.1093 This action did not provide any fairness of public consultation 
 
The collective consultation process that Indonesia established requires interrogation, 
as there is doubt about whether the wishes of local populations were freely expressed.  
Firstly, the UN involvement in the election of the eight Regional Councils was not 
conducted effectively. Only 195 out of 1026 were witnessed by UN observers. The 
other 831 simply informed the UN special representative (UNSR) of the result.1094 
The UN could not guarantee that the local population had been able to independently 
discuss their opinion without being influenced by Indonesia. Secondly, the UNSR had 
no legal power to enforce or prevent Indonesia’s actions, in particular their human 
rights violations.1095 The mandate of the UNSR was merely a supervisory one in 
arranging the implementation of the Act of Free Choice 1969. The UNSR could 
suggest or recommend any practices to meet international standards but it could not 
interfere during the collective consultation.1096  
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From this example, there are two observations to be made about how the wishes of 
the local population were distorted. Firstly, the government of Indonesia controlled 
every stage of the public consultation. ‘One man one vote’ was not fully implemented 
because populations in ‘less advanced areas’ were not sufficiently informed. Some 
dissenting opinions were ignored and citizens intimidated by Indonesia’s 
governmental officers. The elected representatives did not promote the real desires of 
these local populations. The credible will of the local populations was in question.   
Secondly, the UN representative failed to perform its duty to ensure the political 
rights of the people were upheld. Anti-Indonesian politicians or independence 
campaigns were prevented from expressing their demands in public areas. Through 
the lens of republican liberalism, the political equality of West Papuans was not 
upheld. Consequently, diverse groups of people had little opportunity to express their 
opinions. This can reduce the degree of legitimacy to the UN involvement in the 
public consultation.  
 
2.1.2 Bahrain 
Geographically, Bahrain is an archipelagic state that consists of 33 islands. Only 5 of 
these islands have resident populations. Bahrain was a former protectorate territory of 
the British Empire and an integral part of the Persian Gulf. 1097 There was a 
controversy over Bahrain as a territory between Britain and Iran. Until 1783, Bahrain 
had been claimed as a part of Iran- albeit separated. 1098  In 1969 the British 
government contended that Bahrain has been an independent sheikhdom since that 
year, when the Al-Khalifah rulers had occupied  the  territory  and    claimed  political  
                                                      
1097 John Duke Anthony and John A. Hearty, ‘Eastern Arabian States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and 
Oman in David Long and Bernard Reich (eds), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa (Westview 
2001) 140  
1098 Ibid 141 
304 	
separation from Iran.1099 Thus, Britain claimed Iran had no legitimate right over the 
territory. In 1928, Britain signed a special agreement with Bahrain as a member of the 
Gulf State, which maintained Bahrain’s status as a self-governing territory, although 
under British protection.1100 In practice, the British sent political agents to administer 
indirect control under a ‘protectorate system’ which gave the Bahrainis status as 
British subjects.1101 In contrast, Iran’s contention was based on both historical and 
legal connections. Historically, in 1820, Iran (Persia) claimed sovereignty over 
Bahrain, not recognizing the claim to independence put forward since 1783.1102 Thus, 
according to the Persians, Bahrain was an integral part of Persia. When the British 
Empire took control over Bahrain in 1928, this directly affected Iran’s dominating 
power over Bahrain. In response, in 1957, the Iranian Parliament passed a legal 
declaration to incorporate Bahrain as its fourteenth province. Consequently, two 
Bahraini representatives were entitled to two positions in the Iranian parliament.1103 
 
With regard to the sovereignty of Bahrain, there were differing opinions about the 
method of operation for consulting local populations in Bahrain. Iran proposed   
holding a referendum.1104 The Bahrain government contended that this was not 
appropriate to solve its territorial dispute because Iran and Britain did not have direct 
administrative control over Bahrain.1105 Bahrain was not under the colonial regime of 
the British Empire. They argued that the use of a plebiscite under the UN supervision 
was not the best way to ascertain the wishes of populations. Similarly, in the view of a 
                                                      
1099 UNSC ‘Note by the Secretary-General’ (30 April 1970) S/9772 para12 
http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/74870/S_9772-EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y accessed 10 February 2017 
1100 Hussain M. Al-Bahrana, ‘The fact-finding mission of the United Nations Secretary-General and the settlement of the 
Bahrain-Iran dispute May 1970’ (1973) 22 ICLQ 541, 542 
1101 James Summers, (n 80) 443 
1102 Hussain M. Al-Bahrana, (n 1100) 541 
1103 Al-Pumaihi Mohammed Ghanim, ‘Social and Political Change in Bahrain Since the First World War’ (Doctoral thesis, 
Durham University 1973) http://e-theses.dur.ac.uk/7942/1/7942_4940.pdf [Accessed 10 January 2017]; Roham Alvandi, 
‘Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question 1968-1970’ (2010) 37(2) British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 159,162  
1104 Roham Alvandi, (n 1103) 159,164 
1105 Hussain M. Al-Bahrana, (n 1100) 541,545, 552  
305 	
British Ambassador in Tehran, a plebiscite could increase a danger of instability in 
Bahrain and the Gulf state due to the sectarian tensions between Sunni and Shia 
communities. The British Ambassador also believed that the use of a referendum 
would increase tension between Iran and Bahrain because holding a referendum was 
considered by the latter to be an elite control mechanism.1106 This long-term dispute 
exemplifies the necessity of a mediator such as the ‘UN good offices’ and a public 
consultation to avoid any elite control of the outcome. 
 
1969: the first stage of Bahrain’s public consultation  
In 1968, the British government declared its intention to withdraw military troops 
from the Gulf area by the end of 1971, because of the 1965 financial crisis. This led to 
a significant change in Iran’s attitude towards Bahrain’s territorial administration.1107 
They believed they may now have a chance to officially claim Bahrain as part of their 
country. Thus a negotiation of a peaceful settlement between Britain and Iran began 
in 1968. The Bahraini officials suggested a mediation process in order to resolve the 
territorial conflicts. In January 1969, the question of Bahrain and the possibility of 
allowing the Bahraini population to decide its future territorial status was posed at a 
press conference which was held by the Shah of Iran.1108 He implicitly expressed his 
willingness to offer the Bahrainis people the chance to exercise their right to self-
determination in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter. Finally, in March 
1969, a bilateral agreement between Iran and Britain was drawn up called ‘the terms 
of reference’. It specified the use of a peaceful settlement in the case of Bahrain’s 
sovereignty, stressing that:  
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 “Having regard to the problem created by the differing views of the parties 
concerned about the status of Bahrain and the need to find a solution to this 
problem in order to create an atmosphere of tranquility, stability and 
friendliness throughout the area, the Secretary General of the United Nations 
is requested by the parties concerned to send a Personal Representative to 
ascertain the wishes of the people of Bahrain”.1109 
 
The method of operation was left entirely to the UN Secretary-General (SG) and its 
special representative, Mr. Vittorio Winspeare Guicciardi, who, alongside five 
secretariat members, organized  ‘a UN fact-finding mission’ in 1970.  
 
1970-1971: from the UN fact-finding mission to Bahrain independence 
After Iran and Britain requested that the UNSG discover the local population’s wishes 
by peaceful means, Mr. Winspeare (with approval from the SG) decided to set up a 
collective consultation process in order to ascertain the facts.1110 During this process, 
Mr. Winspeare suggested that both parties (i.e. Iran and Great Britain) could send 
personal representatives to determine the wishes of the Bahrain population.1111 Iran 
did not send any representatives to observe the consultation process. According to the 
Shah (the Iranian leader), the UN would perform its duty independently, and Iran did 
not want to interfere. If the wishes of the Bahraini people were clearly expressed, Iran 
would accept the UN’s findings.1112 Britain also did not send any representatives, 
believing that the UN should be able to perform their duty freely without interference. 
It is interesting to note here that both Britain and Iran deliberately avoided interfering 
                                                      
1109 Hussain M. Al-Bahrana, (n 1100) p.544-545 
1110 UNSG S/9726 ‘Good offices of the UN Secretary-General with regard to Bahrain’ 28 March 1970 
http://repository.un.org/bitstream/handle/11176/74779/S_9726-EN.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y accessed 15 February 2017 
1111 Chapter 8 Maintenance of international peace and security, (n 1039) 151	 
1112 Roham Alvandi, (n 1103) 159,172 
307 	
with the public consultation process, or influencing the local population about their 
future.1113 Indeed, prior to the UN establishment of a public consultation in 1970, 
Bahrain and Iran officials only had an indirect contact through British diplomatic 
channels in order to reduce the chance that Iran might exert control over the Bahraini 
people.1114 The actions of both parities reflect the characteristic of non-domination 
which republican liberal theory emphasizes as necessary for a government to be 
considered a legitimate authority.  
 
The main purpose of the UN good offices was to be a mediator, alleviating tensions 
particularly between Iran and Bahrain.1115 In March 1969, there had been a final 
meeting between Iran and Britain, where Bahraini officials provided a list of 
designated groups which the UN special representative should consult during the 20-
day process.1116 The public consultation therefore involved Mr. Winspeare and his 
staff meeting with these groups (and others) which were cross-sector partnerships: 
organizations, societies, institutions, groups, and ordinary citizens.1117  
 
By carrying out this mission, the Permanent Representative of Iran and the United 
Kingdom sent letters to the Secretary-General to endorse the UN good offices as a 
mechanism to seek out the true wishes of the Bahraini population.1118 The letters 
stated that:  
“The government of Iran formally requests Your Excellency to exercise your 
good offices with a view to ascertaining the true wishes of the people of 
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Bahrain with respect to the future status of the Islands of Bahrain by 
appointing a Personal Representative to carry out this mission”.1119 
“I am authorized, on behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom (for 
Bahrain), to inform Your Excellency that the proposal of the Imperial 
Government of Iran that Your Excellency should exercise your good offices 
by sending a personal representative to ascertain the wishes of the people of 
Bahrain is acceptable”.1120 
 
Between 30th March and 18th April 1970, a public consultation was conducted 
throughout the Bahraini territory. Mr. Winspeare took responsibility for ensuring that 
the people of Bahrain were ready and able to express their wishes to himself and his 
staff freely and privately, without fear of personal consequences.1121 Understanding 
the genuine will of the people was of central importance to the mission. Consequently, 
Mr. Winspeare submitted his report to the SG, who conveyed it to the Security 
Council for consideration and endorsement. In his report, he stated that “the majority 
of the people of Bahrain wished to gain recognition of their identity in a fully 
independent and sovereign state”. 1122  In addition, he stressed that the public 
consultation mechanism was sufficient to ascertain the wishes of the population.1123 
The UN adopted his findings in creating the UN Security Council Resolution 278 in 
1970. This resolution endorsed the fact-finding mission of the UN Secretary-General, 
specifying: 
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“the overwhelming majority of the people of Bahrain wish to gain recognition 
of their identity in a fully independent and sovereign state free to decide for 
itself its relation with other states”.1124 
 
The public consultation in Bahrain in 1970 was a mechanism to gather the collective 
will of the local populations. The consultation consisted of three continuous stages. 
Firstly, when the genuine will of the people was clearly ascertained, it was conveyed 
to the UN Security Council. Secondly, after this initial presentation, the UN Security 
Council had a final say in endorsing the collective consultation of the UN special 
representative. Evidence for this can be seen in the 1536th meeting of the Security 
Council on 11 May 1970.1125 For instance, the American and Spanish delegates’ 
statements supported the public consultation process as a peaceful mechanism to 
resolve conflicts. They stated that:  
 
“We are also happy to note in Mr. Winspeare’s report that all those he 
consulted in Bahrain wished for tranquillity, stability and friendliness in the 
area, as well as being virtually unanimous in wishing for recognition of their 
identity in a fully independent and sovereign state”.1126 
 
“The fact that the Secretary-General has found a formula acceptable to the 
Governments of Iran and the United Kingdom is a source of satisfaction, for 
this has doubtless prevented a conflict between the two Governments and a 
continuation of the tense situation caused by their differences of opinion. 
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Action by the Secretary-General to solve problems arising between States is 
acceptable in our view, for this means using the good offices of a highly 
qualified person, the Secretary-General of the Organization”.1127 
 
However, the Pakistan representative created controversies over the public 
consultation. The Pakistan representative pointed out that the use of a public 
consultation was a strategy for avoiding challenges from two competing parties (i.e. 
Britain or Iran). In his view, the use of public consultation provided similar outcome 
to a plebiscite.1128 He stated that: 
 
“We note that neither of the two parties who requested the Secretary-General’s 
good offices, Iran and the United Kingdom, exercised any direct 
administrative control over Bahrain. If either had been doing so, the avoidance 
of the method of plebiscite for consulting the popular will could have been 
open to challenge by the other”.1129 
 
Thirdly, Bahrain’s status as independent was recognized domestically and 
internationally. The Security Council passed a Resolution to endorse the public 
consultation in measuring the will of the people.1130 Then, the Iranian National 
Assembly confirmed the Security Council resolution 278 by a vote of 186 in favour 
and 4 against.1131 In other words, the public consultation was deemed to be a 
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potentially successful method of ascertaining the will of the people. A year later, 
Bahrain became an independent state and was admitted to the UN membership.1132  
 
In conclusion, the Bahraini collective consultation provides an example of how a 
public consultation should take place, reflecting the non-domination characteristic of 
republican liberalism. On the one hand, it provided an opportunity for ordinary 
citizens to be involved freely and independently in the decision-making process. On 
the other hand, the UN personal representative took action without any interference 
from Iran or Britain, as previously noted. In this example, the free will of the people 
was not influenced by any governmental authority and thus their clear will was 
reliable, increasing the legitimacy of any state authority’s actions as a consequence of 
the consultation.  
 
 
2.2 Effective participation of the people in a public consultation  
 
A public consultation aims to increase the effective participation of minority groups 
in political activities. The establishment of a public consultation requires 
‘communicative action’ between various groups: the people, including ethnic 
minorities and remote populations; representatives from international institutions; 
independent organizations from civil society; political parties; the media and 
governmental bodies. If political equality is present, during this period, then the 
outcome of the decision-making process is more likely to be accepted by the people, 
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even if they disagree with it, as their voice has been heard. The efficacy of the 
participation can be measured by two characteristics of the consultation process. 
Firstly, it is necessary to allow all groups of people to express their political opinions. 
‘The will of the people’ does not only mean the majority of the population, but also 
includes indigenous people or other minority groups who are directly affected by the 
final decision.1133 Secondly, the demands of the local population are taken into 
consideration by representative bodies. Before implementing a policy or law, the 
people’s representatives should make decisions based on the diverse opinions 
deriving from all the people.1134 If all the people have effectively taken part in the 
collective consultation, then the government can claim that any consequent actions 
regarding the territorial alteration are based on political equality, and are therefore 
legitimate. 
 
In West Papua, the majority of the people were largely Melanesians who had no 
ethnic or historical connections to Indonesia.1135 The word ‘Melanesians’ was used in 
relation to ethnic and linguistic differences of West Papuans. They have ethnic and 
social similarities to Papua New Guineans rather than Indonesians.1136 According to 
the census in 1960, only 2.5 % of the population identified as Indonesian, while 
indigenous people represented approximately 97%. Meanwhile, in 1971, there was a 
slight increase of Indonesians immigrants, rising to 4% and indigenous people were 
94% of the total population.1137 Thus, the collective consultation needed to include all 
groups of people to find an acceptable solution.  
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In order to analyze the effective public participation in a public consultation, it is 
necessary to look at two interrelated issues: West Papua Regional Councils 
composition and the reaction of people’s representatives in the Regional Councils to 
carry out their duty in responding to the public opinions. 
 
West Papua consultative assemblies composition was a combination of the people’s 
election and Indonesia’s selection. The status of local populations was classified by 
their place of residence instead of their racial or cultural background.1138 The division 
of the territory consisted of eight areas covering the regions of Merauke, Djajawidjaja, 
Paniai, Fak-Fak, Sorong, Manokwari, Tjenderawasih and Djajapura.1139 Each region 
was allocated different days for the collective consultation process, each had to 
conclude the outcome within one or two meetings.1140 Each assembly was comprised 
of three different groups. Firstly, representatives from social, cultural and political 
organizations were selected by Indonesia. Secondly, the tribal chiefs were chosen by 
the local councils. There was no specific criterion by which to identify who was 
entitled to take part because the local councils could make a choice based on their 
arbitrary will. Thirdly, the existing Regional Councils, who were directly elected by 
the West Papuans, were included in the consultative assembly.1141   
 
The outcome of public consultation was announced to the public by each region. All 
eight regions mentioned that West Papuans agreed to integrate with Indonesia. Even 
though the consultative process provided unity of people throughout the West Papua 
territory, the genuine will of the local populations was in doubt. Firstly, when 
considering the composition of the consultative assembly, Indonesia took part in 
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selecting certain members of the assembly, leading to the partiality of the 
assembly.1142 Secondly, Indonesia was not able to provide any evidence that local 
populations understood the legal effect of the consultation. West Papuans did not 
adequately receive accurate information to understand the proposed question of a 
public consultation.  In addition, West Papuans had no opportunity to express their 
opinions individually to the Regional Councils. Only the leaders of the Papuan 
community could speak on the future of the territory because ordinary citizens were 
not categorized as ‘motivated or informed’ people to determine their future.1143 On 
this point, Indonesia contended that it was impossible to comply with Western 
democratic standards in collective consultation. All ethnic inclusion was not suitable 
for the West Papua because there was a large number of undeveloped people (i.e. 
indigenous people who have insufficient knowledge of self-government).1144 Through 
the lens of republican liberalism, the West Papuans was not equally considered as 
constituents in territorial alteration. The effective participation of both Indonesians 
and Melanesians in collective consultation did not create political equality between 
populations.    
  
With regard to Bahrain, the official census was conducted every nine years: 1941, 
1950, 1959, 1965 and 1971. The community was equally 50% Shiite and 50% 
Sunni.1145 The last two censuses in 1965 and in 1971 revealed that the majority of the 
local population was Bahraini (i.e. 79% and 82% respectively).1146 The remainder 
were 7% Omanis and Muscatis, 4% Iranians, 3% Indians, 2.2% Pakistanis, and 5% of 
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other nationalities.1147 Approximately 70% of the Bahraini population were young 
people (i.e. under 30 years old). Prior to the public consultation in 1970, Bahrain 
officials had provided a list of designated people, organizations and institutions with 
whom they recommended the special representative, Mr. Winspeare consult. Instead, 
the UN special representative made a decision not to follow a list of designated 
people. He included a number of additional clubs and professional groups which 
covered all 85 registered Bahraini clubs 1148, for example, the Hidd Nahha club, the 
Samaheej club, lawyers, and pharmacists. In the view of Mr. Winspeare, the 
collective consultation could receive all diverse opinions from all representatives of 
all organizations.1149 
 
One observation was that there was no consultation with non-Bahrainis organizations. 
Indian, Omanis, or Pakistanis representatives were excluded from the list. These 
groups of people were also affected from the collective consultation outcome. Since 
non-Bahraini populations did not have opportunity to express their views in the 
collective consultation, this would decrease the degree of fairness and accuracy of the 
will of the people.  
 
During the process in 1970, consultations were held in the six municipal councils in 
Bahrain: Manama, Muharraq, Hidd, Rafaa, Jidhafs, and Sitra. The participants 
comprised different groups and organizations: religious leaders, municipal councils 
and other administrative committees, welfare societies, clubs and other community 
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centres as well as professional groups, sports and recreational associations.1150 These 
groups of people enfranchised citizens both in the principal towns (i.e. Manama and 
Muharraq) and rural villages (i.e. Daraz, Hidd, Isa town, Karzakkan).1151 Each 
organization sent its representatives (at least three people) to convey the local 
population’s wishes to Mr Winspeare and his colleagues. The representatives came 
from both the principal town of Manama or Muharraq and the outlying villages.1152 If 
the collective will of the people were collected from every part of the territory, this 
would increase the credibility of public involvement in public consultation.  
 
In addition, the religious leaders (i.e. Shia and Sunni communities) were involved in 
expressing their opinions. Mr. Winspeare visited some village heads and talked to the 
assembled members of the community.1153 It is notable that approximately 200,000 
inhabitants were unanimous in their aspirations in demanding a fully independent 
sovereign state.1154 By doing this, the UNSR put effort into gathering all public 
opinions. Shia and Sunni communities were equally encouraged to participate in the 
consultation, creating political equality. 
 
2.3 Human rights protection  
The legitimacy of a public consultation depends on the level of the promotion and 
protection of human rights. People’s freedom of expression, movement, and 
association should be protected throughout the consultation period. The upholding of 
these human rights correlates with the functioning of three inter-related entities: 
political parties, the media, and civil society. Ideally, if these three inter-related 
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entities function well, then the genuine will of the people can be assessed, and the 
distortion of the will of the people can be avoided. These three actors (i.e. political 
parties, the media and civil society) can ensure the protection of human rights, and 
therefore the people can enjoy the right to political participation, which in turn 
increases the legitimacy of the public consultation process. 
 
In the pre-consultative process in particular, sharing accurate information is an 
important factor that affects people’s decisions. Political parties represent specific 
local populations’ wishes during the consultation process-in formal meetings for 
example. When political parties carry out these activities, freedom of expression and 
movement flourish.  
 
The role of the media and civil society are also crucial, as they function as a channel 
of communication to present the facts on territorial alteration matters to the people, 
and to reflect the people’s reactions to these issues. The media and civil society are 
two important actors in public consultations which uphold the human rights to 
freedom of expression, thus contributing to the people being able to share their 
political views without interference from state authorities. When they run campaigns 
or political activities by peaceful means, the people’s fundamental freedoms (of 
assembly and association in particular) are upheld.  
 
The advantage of the media is the creation of an atmosphere of informed and 
motivated citizens. Media coverage also plays an important role in monitoring formal 
and informal institutions, which are carrying out their duties in accordance with 
public opinion. The media provides the people with updated information on the 
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process and practices within the government. In addition, through sharing information 
about political activities, the media broadcasts the movements and campaigns in civil 
society, often attracting public attention and influencing political parties. The media 
and civil society work together to raise public awareness around particular issues, 
such as, in this instance, territorial alteration.  
 
Civil society enables groups of people to work together using campaigns and 
movements, demonstrating the collective will of the people to the state. There are two 
features of civil society which demonstrate the collective will of the people in action. 
Firstly, public consultation expresses the bottom-up characteristic of people’s 
influence over their representatives’ decision-making. Secondly, an independent 
agency should exist free from state intervention, which protects individual autonomy 
and empowers people to be involved in deliberative decision-making.1155 Moreover, if 
such independent civil organizations exist in society then opportunities develop which 
allow diverse groups of people (often minorities) to express their opinions.1156  
 
In West Papua, the New York Agreement 1962 ensured the right to freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement and freedom of assembly of the West Papuans 
populations. Article 22 specified that: 
“The UNTEA and Indonesia will guarantee fully the rights, including the 
rights of free speech, freedom of movement and of assembly, of the 
inhabitants of the area. These rights will include the existing rights of the 
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inhabitants of the territory at the nine of the transfer of administration to the 
UNTEA”.1157 
 
According to the SG report in November 1969, it was necessary to distribute adequate 
information both to literate and illiterate people. On the one hand, the dissemination 
of information was an efficient way to communicate amongst literate people.1158 The 
simple terms and consequence of ‘the Act of Free Choice’ could be clearly explained 
to local populations. On the other hand, direct communication with illiterate people is 
also a crucial factor in raising public awareness. Local officials, school teachers, tribal 
chiefs and missionaries can convey information to illiterate people.  
 
However, the Indonesian government interfered with the circulation of information. 
This governmental action could lead to one-sided information and had a direct 
influence on ethnic minorities in expressing their will. West Papuans were intimidated 
if they did not agree with the pro-Indonesia campaign.1159 The people’s freedom of 
expression was restricted because they were not categorized as ‘free and informed’ 
people. In addition, Indonesia had the supreme power to authorize the existence of 
political parties to influence public opinions.1160  
 
In terms of freedom of movement, before the implementation of the Act of Free 
Choice 1969, Indonesian government released a communiqué to allow West Papuans 
to return home. It appeared that only one family returned to the territory following the 
issuance of the communiqué.1161 West Papua’s freedom of movement was controlled 
                                                      
1157 New York Agreement 1962, art 22 (n 1074)  
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1160 Ibid 18 
1161 UNGA Res 1752 (XVII) (n 1076) Annex 1 p.26  
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by Indonesia on the basis that West Papuans were forced from their original homeland 
to a new place, a particular area that Indonesia set up for the purpose. Hence, they 
became minorities in this new land because they were assimilated into Indonesian-
possessed territory, which already contained a high number of Indonesian 
immigrants.1162 In addition, according to the UNSR findings, the UN sent a request to 
Indonesia to release approximately 300 political detainees, who supported West 
Papua independence. 1163 Indonesia did not comply. This is an example of how 
Indonesia suppressed its political opposition. In practice in West Papua, although the 
fundamental freedoms of the people were ignored and the public consultation was 
therefore not reliable, this did not undermine the Indonesian government’s position as 
an authoritative body because the UN was relatively powerless to intervene.   
 
Regarding the civil society movement, ‘the Free Papua movement’ (OPM) was 
established in 1965 to demand independence from Indonesia.1164 It was the central 
vehicle of the West Papuans’ nationalism.1165 The strategy of the OPM was guerrilla 
attacks on the Indonesian military troops and multinational companies who had taken 
Papuan land and resources.1166 Even though the OPM claimed to represent the 
majority of the West Papuans, it was a weak organization for bargaining for power 
with the Indonesian government. Independence aspirations were conducted mostly in 
the form of civilian protests.1167 The leaders and civilian demonstrators were arrested 
or severely punished by Indonesian authorities. In April 1969, there was a popular 
uprising against Indonesian government. An organized group was consisted of 90 
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well-armed, Papuan policemen, 30,000 local Kapakua (Ekari) and the OPM fought 
against Indonesia troops.1168 There was large-scale killings and abused of tribal 
people rights by Indonesia troops.1169 
 
During the public consultation process in 1969, the OPM ran a campaign for the ‘one 
man one vote’ system among the West Papuan populations. The OPM emphasized the 
West Papuans’ entitlement to take part in collective consultations rather than solely 
relying on representative bodies of the leaders of the Papuan community to speak out 
on their behalf.1170 The OPM’s campaign had a purpose to promote individual and 
collective rights of local populations in determining their territorial status. In terms of 
individual autonomy, every West Papuan had a right to express his political opinion 
based on ‘one man one vote’ basis. Meanwhile, the collective will of the West 
Papuans was simply to promote their own welfare.1171 The OPM worked as the civil 
society alongside the UN in West Papua, gathering public opinions and conveying 
information to local populations.  
 
In the context of Bahrain, non-governmental organizations in Bahrain were 
categorized based on different tribal groups of people.1172 This categorization aimed 
to share power between different ethnic groups of people through proportional 
representation. During the public consultation in 1970, individual and collective 
groups freely expressed their political opinions. Individuals were free from state 
intervention to express their views.1173 They were able to express their political 
opinions with a written communication directly to the UN special representative. 
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Meanwhile, collective groups of people in the form of clubs or professional groups 
also expressed their opinions. These became the centre of communities and their 
representatives conveyed local populations’ concerns to formal state institutions.1174  
 
In the absence of political parties, these ‘clubs’ were recognized as a substitute.1175 
The establishment of the clubs was under the control of the 1959 Bahrain Licensing 
of Societies and Club Ordinance.1176 In order to form a club, written permission must 
be obtained from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.1177 The majority the 
members were elite men who gathered together to develop and articulate political 
opinions.1178 In practice, each club was separated from the others and did not have 
influence over the other clubs’ decisions in any political affairs. They had their own 
forum for members to exchange political opinions.1179  However there was no specific 
rule to prohibit people from holding memberships to more than one club. Several 
members of Al-Uruba also held memberships to the Alumni club, particularly college 
graduates and professionals. This raised a controversy over how diverse opinions of 
people were expressed because the collective will of the people was clearly 
ascertained from the same groups of people.  
 
During the consultation in 1970, Bahraini clubs played an important role in political 
mobilization and in convincing the UN special representative and his assistant to 
recognize Bahrain as an independent state. 1180  However, there were some 
controversial issues regarding the diversity of public opinion. In order to tackle this 
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problem, it was necessary to consider the gender-based, ethnic-based, religious-based 
composition of club membership.  
 
Firstly, there was a clear distinction between men and women in the political domain. 
It was obvious that men had political importance in decision-making whereas women 
had supreme power in the domestic, household arena.1181 Most clubs were limited to 
male memberships, such as Al-Arabi club and the Uruba club. Only 6 women welfare 
clubs were established. There were only two women clubs which aimed to contribute 
political development. The first women’s club in Bahrain (and also in the entire Gulf 
state) was founded in 1955 and was called ‘ the Bahrain Young Ladies Society’.1182 
There were approximately 75 members, consisting mostly of merchant families and 
educated women. The objective of the clubs was to provide a channel for wealthier 
and better-educated women to assist poor families. Politically, the group ran its 
campaign to support women to take part in the election for the constitutional and 
national assemblies position in the early 1970s.1183 Another political involvement club 
was the Awal Women’s Society. It was established in 1969 at Muharraq. The main 
task was to support women’s rights, especially the right to vote and other efforts 
toward building democratic institutions.1184  
 
Secondly, it was inevitable that the social sectors of Bahrain were divided into Sunni 
and Shia communities. The administrative power was in the hands of the Sunni ruling 
family since 1783 but the local populations were mostly Shia. 1185  The Shia 
community was regarded as second-class citizens. Both communities lived separately 
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in their own village, except in the capital Manama and to a small extent in Muharraq. 
In terms of club membership, the local populations knew which clubs belonged to the 
Sunni or Shia communities, for example the Ahli club was reserved for rich, Sunni 
merchants, and the Al-Uruba for Shia merchants and high civil employees.1186 When 
the Sunni community had administrative power in their hand, public opinion was 
under control of such an ‘elite’ who designated which groups of people should be 
involved in the public consultation.  
 
Thirdly, in terms of the ethnic and cultural dimension, different ethnic groups of 
people lived separately in their own villages. They did not intermingle, except those 
residing in Manama and Muharraq. Ethnic classification was divided based on their 
original nationalities. The existence of clubs was dependent upon the similarity 
between public opinions and the ethnic backgrounds of people, for example, the Goa 
Youth Club (only reserved for people who originally came from Goa), Western based 
clubs (only reserved for the British and Americans).1187 In addition, the governmental 
authority denied a license to any club that extended its membership beyond a specific 
locality. For instance, the Muslim Youth Society was prohibited from recruiting new 
Shia members in other villages except to Diraz village.1188  
 
The media’s function was controlled by the press law in 1965. There were two local 
Arabic-language presses which were privately owned: Al-Adwa and Sada al-Usbu. 
These two presses contributed to the formation of a national political opinion.1189 The 
media’s freedom of expression included the right to impart and receive information or 
ideas to people. The Bahraini population was advised of their rights through a variety 
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of media broadcasts.1190 One of the most motivated media was the written press (i.e. 
newspapers) which was an integral part of the communication process between the 
Bahrainis and the Bahraini governmental authority. However, after implementing the 
Press Law in 1965, the press did not fully function because of the restrictions imposed 
by the government. Based on the law, the government was able to suspend publication 
or interfere violating the fundamental right to freedom of the press.1191 However, 
according to the UN special representative’s report, local media performed their task 
appropriately in order to influence people in a collective consultation.1192 The media 
acted as an intermediate organization to share information between the people and the 
UN special representative.  
 
3. Conclusion  
Republican liberal theory holds that the involvement of ‘informed and motivated 
people’ is an important criterion for an effective public consultation. All people 
should have the opportunity to express their political opinions whether assenting or 
dissenting. In order to claim legitimacy of a governmental authority, public 
consultation can be assessed by the reflection of public opinion in communicative 
actions and the level of ethnic inclusion within the process. In addition, public 
participation and political communication is also reliant on the function of media and 
civil society in order to develop an ‘informed and motivated people’.  
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After gathering the differing views of local populations in a collective consultation, 
the interdependence between local populations and governmental authorities 
illustrates a continuous action of external self-determination practical application. In 
terms of the governmental authority, if they carry out public demands, this will lead to 
an acceptable outcome for all citizens. At least, their differing opinions are heard and 
conveyed via sharing and discussion processes. For citizens, the establishment of a 
public consultation increases political equality in decision-making process. The 
informal communicative action is a way to predetermine the demands of local 
populations.  
 
The public consultations in West Papua and Bahrain provide different images of how 
states control over public opinions in expressing their views to determine their 
territorial status. Within a pluralistic society, it is assumed that democratic equality 
and the participatory rights of people are two important factors in influencing policy 
formation. Public opinions from the various racial, religious, organized groups and 
political groups contribute to an increased level of legitimacy. In order to attain 
political equality among population, the importance of ethnic inclusion in the 
collective consultation is a way to ensure that all affected people participate in sharing 
and  expressing  their  political  opinion  in  boundary-making process. If all  differing  
public opinions are taken into consideration in formal state institutions, this will 
substantially increase the degree of popular acceptance of the existing govering 
regime.  
 
However, the effective pariticipation of the poeple in public consultations was limited 
by the state authority. The local populations had no chance to elect their 
representatives to convey their opinion into state institution, for example in West 
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Papua in 1969. There was no clear framework to guarantee that all the people are 
involved in exchanging their views within state institutions. In Bahrain’s public 
consultation in 1970, the freedom of the people to express their will or to assemble 
was restricted to certain groups of people. The establishment of a club was reserved to 
men and those who could pay for membership. Thus, it is difficult to say that all 






















This thesis intended to propose republican liberal theory as an alternative to liberalism 
and communitarianism in measuring public, political participation in external self-
determination practices. Firstly, applying republican liberal theory to external self-
determination can contribute to the improvement of public participation in decision-
making processes. Unlike liberalism and communitarianism, republican liberalism 
supports that the whole population residing within a territory is entitled to exercise 
their territorial status independently and freely. Republican liberalism attempts to fill 
the gap of individual rights of people in liberalism and group rights of people in 
communitarianism. The people should actively engage in deciding their territorial 
status independently and freely. Secondly, unlike any other theory, republican 
liberalism states that institutional frameworks are key to increasing the legitimacy of 
territorial alteration processes. The existence of such domestic and international 
institutions can protect the participation of the people and can balance the power of 
the state. In addition, republican liberalism mandates the importance of non-state 
institutions alongside governmental organisations during decision-making processes. 
The presence and activity of these non-state bodies increase the legitimacy of the 
outcome. Thirdly, unlike the other theories, republican liberalism mandates the 
recognition of the people’s rights within the constitution of a state. This is another 
strengthening tool to increase the people’s authority in territorial alteration processes. 
Thus republican liberalism can make such processes more systematic by emphasizing 
the continuous action of the people’s will, and how this can most effectively be the 




Using the core principles of modern republican liberal theory to establish a process of 
measuring the will of the people (instead of liberalism or communitarianism) 
foregrounds the participation of the people in the decision-making process. Therefore 
as a theory, republican liberalism reflects the values of democratic governance and the 
moral reasoning of public participation. This theory stresses the people’s value in 
public, political participation. The application of republican liberal theory to external 
self-determination processes can create political equality among populations. Public 
deliberation and political equality among citizens are supposed to provide liberty and 
freedom. Republican liberalism holds that formal (i.e. state institutions and 
international institutions) and informal institutions (i.e. civil society) have a role in 
motivating people to express their will. It advocates continuous interaction between 
public opinion, state, international, and non-state institutions to ensure the legitimacy 
of the decision-making process through public participation. Public, political 
participation would be meaningless if there was no existing institution to take public 
opinion into account. Meanwhile, the expressed will of the people is recognized as 
legitimate if the people have the right to communicate with governmental authorities 
through various channels, for example representative processes or sharing their 
opinions in public consultations processes. Public, political participation is a way of 
reducing the supremacy of the territorial integrity of a state. This participation does 
not involve only the people as constituent powers but also encompasses other actors 
or entities that influence public opinion, for example political parties, the media, and 
civil societies. These non-state institutions are crucial to increasing the legitimacy of 
elections and public consultations.  
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Legislation must exist to guarantee the people’s right to participate and a way to 
implement public opinions in state institutions. In particular, republican liberalism 
emphasizes the role that legal frameworks play in acknowledging and guaranteeing 
public participation in decision-making processes about territorial alteration. Legal 
frameworks must ensure that non-governmental institutions can work independently 
from state control. Through its advocacy of legal mechanisms to create a robust 
system for safeguarding the will of the people, republican liberalism recognizes that 
bottom-up law-creation is one of the principle components of ensuring public, 
political participation.  
 
If these three conditions of republican liberalism are aligned properly, public opinion 
will be meaningful and fairly ascertained. Then, the negotiation between government 
and the secessionists, which is based on the will of the people, is considered to be 
legitimate. In other words, if the free and fair will of the people is ascertained and 
implemented, any resulting secession will be considered duly legitimate, by both 
states and the international community, and a peaceful resolution can therefore be 
found.  
 
When applying republican liberal theory to different process-based mechanisms, this 
research does not look at the outcome of a new state-creation. Instead, it focuses on 
the varying degrees to which procedural designs produce legitimate or illegitimate 
actions in external self-determination practices. International lawyers propose that 
bringing people into any decision-making process can increase the legitimacy of the 
outcome. The degree of public participation is supported by the concepts of moral 
reasoning and democratic governance. Republican liberal theory upholds these two 
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concepts, as it advocates a number of practical actions to ensure public, political 
participation. These include the interdependence between ordinary citizens, processes, 
the function of existing institutions and legal regulations. These principles encourage 
the people’s authority as a supreme power which balances state authority.  
 
In the context of external self-determination practices, there are three mechanisms 
that states or international institutions choose to assess the will of the people: 
referendums, elections, and public consultations. Referendums may produce, at least 
superficially, a straightforward assessment of what can be considered the will of the 
people. It allows direct participation by the people, and it is a simple mechanism 
which allows them to say yes or no to the proposed question. However, the nature of a 
referendum is not a dynamic and ongoing process. The people cannot act as active 
participants because the governmental authority is in control of the institutional and 
legal frameworks, as well as setting the question, and can use its power to limit the 
involvement of certain groups of people. Therefore the people have no freedom to 
express their will freely and independently during an external self-determination 
process. 
 
When looking at some practical examples, during an independence referendum, there 
is no state or international framework to implement public opinion. In addition, if 
there is no clear constitutional framework to uphold the supremacy of the people’s 
will, the referendum can be ignored. For example, in Catalonia 2012, holding a 
referendum was considered to be unconstitutional as it was held without the validity 
of domestic law. Thus, the Spanish governmental authorities overruled public opinion. 
Sometimes, pubic opinions will not clearly be ascertained if the people are misled by 
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a biased question. In the Southern Cameroons (1961) and Croatian (1991) 
independence referendums, setting the referendum questions was in the hands of 
elites or executives bodies. The questions did not reflect the people’s wishes. In 
addition, enfranchising or disenfranchising certain groups of people are controversial 
matters as this can change the final outcome of the referendum. For example, in 
Western Sahara in 1975, the UN took action to resolve the dispute between Morocco 
and the Frente Polisario. Each side wanted to include a specific group of the 
population to alter the final outcome of the referendum. Eventually, the UN could not 
find a compromise between conflicting parties and the referendum did not take place. 
From these difficulties, it is clear that holding a referendum does not work in 
accordance with republican liberalism because there is no recourse for the people to 
ensure that their will is taken into consideration.  
 
The nature of elections and the peoples’ representatives reflects how the latter carries 
out the will of the people. There are a number of distinct advantages to elections and 
representative processes. Through the lens of republican liberalism, the people are 
able to check, revise, or contest their representatives’ actions. Because the people’s 
representatives want to be re-elected, they are likely to act in response to public 
opinion rather than their own. In addition, because elections rely on a pre-identified 
system, all people have the chance to claim their voting right before the election is 
held. Finally elections provide a channel for every ethnic group’s representative to 
work toward the people’s interests within a state institution. These advantages make 
elections dynamic and flexible.  
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However, in external self-determination practices, it could be argued that even 
representative processes do not reflect the people’s will. Firstly the people might 
select their representatives not based on the campaign but on that particular 
personality. For example, the East Pakistan (Bangladeshi) leader in the 1970 general 
election who was elected due to his popularity despite not having a mandate for 
independence. Secondly public demands and the people’s representatives’ actions are 
not necessarily compatible with each other. For example the Czechoslovakian 
National Assembly had proportional equality between the people’s representatives for 
the Czech and Slovak ethnic groups. However despite this, the people’s demand for 
dissolution in the 1992 election was unclear. The vote for dissolution in 1993 did not 
necessarily therefore reflect their will. Rather, it was a consensual negotiation 
between the Czech and Slovak representatives. Another example of this is in Kosovo, 
where the involvement of minority groups of people (i.e. Kosovo-Serbs) were not 
respected when the Kosovo Assembly (dominated by the Kosovo-Albanians) released 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 2008. Finally, in the aftermath of an 
election, the process of constitution-making can be difficult due to violent conflicts, 
for example after the Namibian election in 1978. The limitations outlined above affect 
the legitimacy of the demands made by the people.   
 
Public consultations encourage the people to be active participants in external self-
determination processes through communicative action. The establishment of a public 
consultation reduces tension among different ethnic groups of people in a pluralistic 
society by increasing minority involvement and creating political equality. All people 
are able to express their political views whether they agree or disagree on a particular 
issue. If the population is not under the control of the state authorities, the minority 
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voices at least will be heard. Another advantage is that public consultations prepare 
the readiness of the people to express their will by increasing civic education about 
the issues. However, the effective pariticipation of the people in public consultations 
can be limited by the state authorities. For example, in West Papua in 1969 there was 
no clear framework to guarantee that all the people were involved in exchanging their 
views within state institutions. In addition, the freedom of the people to express their 
will or to assemble has been restricted to certain groups of people for example men or 
those who could pay for participating in a political arena, as exemplified in Bahrain in 
1970. However, in the Bahrain consultative process in 1970, the UN made a lot of 
effort to include all diverse backgrounds of people (e.g. religious, profession, area of 
living) to be involved in deciding their future.  
 
Historically, using either referendums, elections or public consultations separately for 
assessing the will of the people in external self-determination practices has been 
restricted by governmental domination and the tyranny of the majority within a state. 
This research found that referendums should not be held on their own without either 
an election or a public consultation to increase the legitimacy of the will of the people. 
The people should play an active role in the state-framing process. Public, political 
participation is a way of reducing the supremacy of the territorial integrity of a state. 
This participation does not involve only the people as constituent powers but also 
encompasses other actors or entities that influence public opinion, for example 
political parties, the media, and civil societies. These non-state institutions are crucial 
factors in increasing the legitimacy of elections and public consultations, therefore 
using either of these processes in conjunction with referendums provides a two-stage 
process of measuring the will of the people.  
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Applying republican liberal theory to external self-determination processes can help 
international law development in the following areas: acknowledging the people as 
right-holders, broadening the content of the rights themselves, and recognizing the 
value of domestic, constitutional law in the international law arena. The three core 
ideas of republican liberalism (the people’s rights, the presence of institutions and 
constitutional frameworks) provide guidelines for the international legal community 
on how to carry out self-determination which is legitimately based on the expressed 
will of the people. In terms of ordinary citizens, ‘peoples’ are recognized as subjects 
of international law and accepted as right-holders in deciding their future destiny. The 
whole population within a particular territory is equally entitled to express their will. 
The classification of people based on ‘ethnic sense’ is eradicated in the republican 
liberalism model. Meanwhile the content of external rights to self-determination can 
be assessed by their interactive and communicative actions in states, international, and 
non-state institutions. These participative processes can ensure that the will of the 
people is taken into consideration in the existing institutions. At least the voice of the 
people is heard - whether they agree or disagree with the proposed topic. Republican 
liberalism provides public recourse for when the people are dissatisfied with 
governmental actions. Last but not least, the recognition of public opinion within a 
legal framework is another significant factor in ensuring that the determination of the 
will of the people is under the protection of law. If domestic law can guarantee 
individual rights protection during any decision-making process, the people’s 




Taking all of the above into consideration, using republican liberalism can increase 
the level of legitimacy in external self-determination processes, in particular, external 
recognition from other states. In theory, the application of the right to self-
determination is generally limited but not prohibited. Thus, public involvement in an 
external self-determination process is a way to ensure that the people’s will is 
respected as they are stakeholders of territorial change. The practical application of 
external self-determination is legitimized if all people have equal political status. In 
addition, republican liberalism can help to solve a ‘one-off exercise’ (or discontinuous 
action) of external self-determination. The establishment of public discourse through 
institutional and legal frameworks strengthens the people’s authority in any decision-
making process. This can provide a systematic and a continuous action of public 
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